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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research study was to identify leadership strategies and practices 
for overcoming adversity in military organizations. This entailed determining what 
challenges military leaders face in implementing practices aimed at fostering resilience 
in their organizations. Also examined was how military leaders measure success at 
fostering resilience in their organizations. Finally, this study considered what 
recommendations military leaders would make to aspiring leaders wanting to foster 
resilience in their own organizations in the future. The researcher used a 
phenomenological approach that incorporated interviews and content analysis. The 
population for this study was United States Marine Corps infantry officers who 
commanded battalions in a war zone in Iraq or Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. 
The results of this study suggest that the personal attributes that enable military leaders 
to overcome adversity during combat operations are: (1) educated and trained, (2) 
physically fit, and (3) believing in God. This study suggests that the foundational 
practices for overcoming adversity in military organizations are: (1) build cohesion in the 
organization by conducting small unit training, (2) create a positive command climate in 
the organization, and (3) instill a sense of purpose in the organization. This study 
suggests that the pre-deployment practices for fostering resilience in military 
organizations are: (1) demonstrate character to subordinates, (2) win the affection of 
subordinates, (3) design training for the organization that builds competence and 
confidence, (4) design realistic training for the organization that creates adversity, and 
(5) manage expectations about war. This study suggests that the deployment practices 
for overcoming adversity in military organizations are: (1) share in the danger with 
xii 
subordinates, (2) be calm and confident on the battlefield, (3) focus on the mission, (4) 
do not second-guess decisions, (5) talk about the casualties and killing, (6) keep the 
unit moving after casualties and killing, (7) keep subordinates informed, and (8) 
empower small unit leadership.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Overcoming adversity is a fundamental component of conducting combat 
operations. Writing in the early 19th century, Prussian Major-General Carl von 
Clausewitz identified danger and physical exertion as the constant sources of friction in 
war (Watts, 2004). Regarding the commander’s responsibility to be resilient in the face 
of both danger and physical exertion, Clausewitz (1976) offered the following thoughts: 
It is the impact of the ebbing of moral and physical strength, of the heart-rending 
spectacle of the dead and wounded, that the commander has to withstand - first 
in himself, and then in all those who, directly or indirectly, have entrusted him 
with their thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears. (p. 104) 
Clausewitz goes on to say, “As each man’s strength gives out, as it no longer responds 
to his will, the inertia of the whole gradually comes to rest on the commander’s will 
alone” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 104). Clausewitz concluded that military leaders and their 
subordinates could counter the negative effects of friction through both experience in 
combat and realistic training (Watts, 2004). Resilience is about coping with adversity. 
Britt, Sinclair, and McFadden (2013) defined resilience as “the demonstration of positive 
adaptation after exposure to significant adversity” (p. 4). Resilience can reduce 
incapacitating reactions to stress and provide the impetus to act in the face of threat 
(Hannah, 2012). 
Background 
During combat operations, military personnel “face a wide range of traumatic or 
potentially traumatic events, including being shot at, knowing someone who has been 
injured or killed, seeing dead bodies or human remains, witnessing atrocities, and 
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seeing ill or injured civilians (including children)” (Britt, Sinclair et al., 2013, p. 4). The 
inability of service members to cope effectively with adversity during combat can 
negatively affect health, well-being, and both individual and organizational performance 
(Britt, Sinclair et al., 2013). The United States military has developed great interest in 
understanding the factors associated with resilience. A survey of 172 military leaders 
from 16 NATO and Partnership-for-Peace nations showed that most of those leaders 
considered themselves responsible for the psychological readiness of their personnel 
(Adler et al., 2008). 
Overcoming battlefield adversity. Paul T. Bartone (2006), with the Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces at National Defense University, identified six causes of 
psychological stress in military operations. Like Clausewitz, Bartone (2006) pointed out 
that danger, the threat and real risk of death or serious bodily harm, is always present 
on the battlefield. Like the physical exertion that Clausewitz described as a source of 
friction, Bartone (2006) identified workload, or the long hours and days of combat 
deployments, as contributing to the adversity that soldiers must overcome. Soldiers and 
their leaders should also expect to experience isolation, ambiguity, powerlessness, and 
even boredom (Bartone, 2006). 
The United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, conducted research to identify the intangible psychological constructs that are 
critical for soldier mission readiness (Aude, Bryson, Keller-Glaze, Nicely, & Vowels, 
2014). Researchers at the institute first conducted a review of academic and military 
literature to identify the psychological constructs relevant to preparing soldiers for 
deployment. Next, the researchers interviewed soldiers that were conducting pre-
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deployment tactical training at Fort Hood, Texas. Each interviewee rated the 
psychological constructs identified in the literature for criticality to readiness, 
effectiveness of current training, the need for new or improved training, and frequency 
of training needed (Aude et al., 2014). 
One of the meta-constructs identified by this research was survivability. The 
study identified resilience (sometimes referred to as hardiness) as a sub-construct of 
survivability. According to Aude et al. (2014), resilience manifests behaviorally as 
“recovering quickly from setbacks, shock, injuries, adversity, and stress while 
maintaining a mission and organizational focus” (p. 47). The soldiers interviewed for this 
study stated that resilient behaviors require the highest frequency of training. 
Interestingly, those surveyed also believed that resilience is the least effectively trained 
behavior (Aude et al., 2014). Despite the opinions of the soldiers interviewed for this 
study, most military personnel do not develop severe mental health problems after 
exposure to traumatic events to include war (Sinclair, Waitsman, Oliver, & Deese, 
2013). 
Resilience process. Britt, Sinclair et al. (2013) developed an organizing 
framework for the study of military resiliency. Per their framework, after military 
personnel face a demanding event such as combat, they go through an appraisal and 
coping process. The factors that influence the appraisal and coping process can be 
personal, organizational, or both. This process results in the outcomes that military 
personnel experience from the demanding event. 
Researchers with the Center for Military Health Policy Research at Rand 
Corporation (Meredith et al., 2011), conducted a critical review of psychology, sociology, 
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and medical literature to identify factors that promote military resilience. To identify the 
non-static, or changeable, factors associated with psychological resilience, the 
researchers coded 187 relevant documents published between 2000 and 2009. These 
researchers described resilience as “bouncing back, adapting, or returning to a baseline 
after experiencing adversity or trauma” (Meredith et al., 2011, p. 20). Their review of the 
literature also showed that resilience could involve growth after experiencing adversity 
or trauma. 
Meredith et al. (2011) identified the individual factors that encourage resilience in 
the military as “positive coping, positive affect, positive thinking, realism, behavioral 
control, physical fitness, and altruism” (p. 16). They identified the unit or 
organizational factors that support resilience as “positive command climate, teamwork, 
and unit cohesion” (Meredith et al., 2011, p. 16). Britt and Oliver (2013) likewise argued 
that morale and unit cohesion enhance the resilience of military personnel. Morale helps 
service members cope with stressful and potentially traumatic military operations. Unit 
cohesion is a social construct that enables a military unit to work together towards 
accomplishing assigned missions (Britt & Oliver, 2013). 
Bartone (2006) has argued that military leaders can influence how members of 
their units make sense of, interpret, and understand operational stress. According to 
Bartone (2006), the hierarchical structure of authority in the military gives leaders 
considerable control over their personnel. As a result, military leaders can have 
substantial sway over the meaning-making process in their organizations. For example, 
military leaders may “alter the manner in which their subordinates interpret and make 
sense of their experiences” through the “policies and priorities they establish, the 
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directives they give, the advice and counsel they offer, the stories they tell, and perhaps 
most important the examples they provide” (Bartone, 2006, p. S138). Bartone (2006) 
hypothesized that hardy (resilient) leaders could, by example, encourage their followers 
to have hardy (resilient) interpretations of stressful experiences. Sinclair and Britt (2013) 
also agreed that leader behaviors could influence the ability of military personnel to 
exhibit positive adaptation to significant adversity. 
Statement of the Problem 
The problem with the current state of research into this phenomenon is two-fold. 
The first part of the problem concerns the study of the risk and protective factors that 
influence a service-members’ ability to be resilient. Lee et al. (2013) explored the 
psychological variables of resilience in data gathered from 33 studies conducted 
between 2001 and 2010. Their findings showed that resilience variables were 
comprised of both risk factors and protective factors. Risk factors included anxiety, 
depression, and perceived stress. Protective factors included optimism, social support, 
and self-efficacy (Lee et al., 2013). Protective factors showed the largest correlation 
with resilience. These results indicated that resilience improves more effectively by 
enhancing protective factors than reducing risk factors (Lee et al., 2013). However, 
according to Eisen et al. (2014), prior research conducted on the impact of stress and 
trauma on military personnel has concentrated mostly on identifying risk factors. Fewer 
studies have investigated the protective factors (Eisen et al., 2014). 
The second part of the problem concerns the study of the personal and 
organizational factors that influence a service-member’s ability to be resilient. As 
discussed previously, both personal factors and organizational factors can influence the 
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coping and appraisal process that enables military personnel to overcome adversity 
(Britt, Sinclair et al., 2013). The main emphasis of prior research has been identifying 
individual traits that predict resilience (Jex, Kain, & Park, 2013). However, as Adler 
(2013) noted, resilience is mostly a group-level phenomenon in the military because 
team members rely on each other to work effectively in high-demand and high-threat 
environments. However, the U.S. Military has focused mostly on developing individual 
resilience in it personnel (Adler, 2013). This study seeks to address this problem by 
identifying factors, both protective and organizational, that influence a service-member’s 
ability to be resilient. 
Purpose of the Study 
Military leadership can impact the protective and organizational factors that 
influence a service-member’s ability to be resilient. Examples of these factors include 
training, social support, and organizational culture (Jex et al., 2013). In preparation for 
combat, military leaders can and should seek to improve the resilience of the personnel 
under their command (Bartone, 2006; Sinclair & Britt, 2013). The purpose of this study 
was to identify leadership strategies and practices for fostering resilience in military 
organizations. This entailed determining what challenges military leaders face in 
implementing practices aimed at fostering resilience in their organizations. Also 
examined was how military leaders measure success at fostering resilience in their 
organizations. Finally, this study considered what recommendations military leaders 
would make to aspiring military leaders wanting to foster resilience in their organizations 
in the future. 
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Research Questions 
To discover how leader best practices and strategies foster resilience in a military 
organization, the questions posed were: 
1. What current practices do military leaders employ to overcome adversity in 
their organizations? 
2. What challenges do military leaders face in implementing those practices 
employed in overcoming adversity in their organizations? 
3. How do military leaders measure their success at overcoming adversity in 
their organizations? 
4. What recommendations would military leaders make to aspiring leaders 
wanting to overcome adversity in their organizations in the future? 
Significance of the Study 
During the four years following the invasion of Afghanistan in September 2001, 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) evaluated 103,788 recently separated service 
members with tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan (Seal, Bertenthal, Miner, Sen, & 
Marmar, 2007). Of these veterans, 25% (25,658) received at least one mental health 
diagnosis such as anxiety disorder, depression, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, or post-
traumatic stress (Seal et al., 2007). Conversely, the remaining 75% (78,130) of the 
veterans did not present with mental health issues. 
Similar findings are available in a study conducted by Bonanno et al. (2012). As 
part of the Millennium Cohort Study, these researchers investigated the trajectories of 
post-traumatic stress symptoms of service-members before and after deployments to 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The Millennium Cohort Study started collecting health data in 
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2001 from U.S. military personnel in all branches of service to include active duty, 
reserve, and National Guard. The researchers looked at 3,393 service members who 
deployed once and 4,394 service members who deployed multiple times. Researchers 
surveyed self-reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress before and after deployment. 
They administered follow-up surveys three years later and again six years later. 
Bonanno et al. (2012) examined the data to determine longitudinal trajectories and 
found the following stable trajectories: 
1. Low post-traumatic stress before and after deployment was 83.1% of 
personnel studied with a single deployment and 84.9% with multiple 
deployments. 
2. Moderate to improving post-traumatic stress was 8.0% of personnel with a 
single deployment and 8.5% with multiple deployments. 
3. Worsening to chronic post-traumatic stress was 6.7% for personnel with a 
single deployment and 4.5% with multiple deployments. As the researchers 
predicted, this group also experienced the most combat during their 
deployment(s). 
4. High and stable post-traumatic stress was 2.2% for personnel with a single 
deployment. 
5. High to improving posttraumatic stress was also 2.2% for personnel with 
multiple deployments. 
These statistics suggest that only about 10% of service members that have deployed to 
Iraq and Afghanistan are suffering from high or chronic post-traumatic stress. According 
to Hystad, Olsen, Espevik, and Säfvenbom (2015), most military personnel and their 
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leaders have successfully developed the ability to maintain effective functioning, despite 
the stress and pressure created by friction on the battlefield. Sinclair et al. (2013) have 
called for more research on why most service members do not develop mental health 
problems when exposed to stressors. This study answers that call. This study also 
answers calls for the study of leadership in the military context (Halpin, 2011) and the 
study of leadership in in-extremis or dangerous environments (Hannah, Campbell, & 
Matthews, 2010). 
Assumptions of the Study 
Some would say that it is impossible to prove a negative. That is, it is impossible 
to prove how or why some military personnel do not suffer from combat related stress, 
or at least suffer less than others do, after enduring the same or similar experience of 
war. Thus, one may argue on those grounds that this research effort cannot prove that 
any leader strategy or practice was particularly effective at fostering resilience and 
enabling military personnel to overcome the adversity of combat. 
However, this study assumes that after so many years of historical refinement, 
the military as an institution is adept at fostering resilience in its organizations. This 
study assumes that the behaviors of military leaders can influence the ability of military 
personnel to exhibit positive adaptation to significant adversity (Bartone, 2006; Jex et 
al., 2013; Sinclair & Britt, 2013). Indeed, this study assumes that one of the primary 
goals of military leadership is to build individual and collective resilience so that military 
units can fight and win on the battlefield. 
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Limitations of the Study 
All the data analyzed in this study is from participant interviews. This research 
study only examines the experiences of military officers that commanded battalions in a 
war zone between 2003 and 2014. It is possible that the participants’ recollections of 
their experience will have lessened over time. 
Definition of Key Terms 
● Resilience is the “positive psychological capacity to rebound, to ‘bounce back’ 
from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure or even positive change, progress 
and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002b, p. 702). 
● Military resilience is “the ability to maintain optimal performance during acute 
situations, positively recover afterward, and sustain combat motivation while 
meeting operational demands” (Boermans, Delahaij, Korteling, & Euwema, 
2012, p. 315). 
● Hardiness is a pathway to resilience (Bartone, 2006). Hardiness is 
characterized by (1) believing that one can control or influence events, (2) 
feeling committed or involved to the events of one’s life, and (3) viewing 
anticipated change as positive (Kobasa, 1979). 
● Positive psychology is an “umbrella term used to stimulate and organize 
research, application, and scholarship on strengths, virtues, excellence, 
thriving, flourishing, resilience, flow, and optimal functioning in general” 
(Donaldson & Ko, 2010, p. 177). 
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● Positive Organizational Scholarship is “positive organizational characteristics 
that can enhance organizational survival and effectiveness in times of crises 
and adverse conditions” (Luthans & Youssef, 2004, p. 152). 
● Positive Organizational Behavior is the “study and application of positively 
oriented human resource strengths and psychological capacities that can be 
measured, developed, and effectively managed for performance improvement 
in today’s workplace” (Luthans, 2002a, p. 59). 
● Leadership in the Profession of Arms is “the process of developing individual 
and collective human and organizational capacity and providing the purpose, 
direction, and motivation required to employ that capacity to create effective 
and ethical combat power under intense, dynamic, and dangerous conditions 
on behalf of the nation state being served" (Hannah, 2012, p. 14). 
● In-extremis leadership is “giving purpose, motivation, and direction to people 
when there is imminent physical danger, and where followers believe that 
leader behavior will influence their physical well-being or survival” (Kolditz, 
2006, p. 6). 
Organization of the Study 
This research study examined how leader strategies and practices can foster 
resilience in a military organization. Using the metaphor of the blueprint, Grant and 
Osanloo (2014) explained that the application of theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
in a dissertation study is like building a home. Architects develop blueprints to guide 
construction of a house. In the same way that the architect designs the house, the 
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researcher uses critical thinking and planning to develop a blueprint for the dissertation 
(Grant & Osanloo, 2014). 
Theoretical framework. Grant and Osanloo (2014) compared the theoretical 
framework of a dissertation with the elevation blueprint for a house. The theoretical 
framework “serves as the guide on which to build and support your study, and also 
provides the structure to define how you will philosophically, epistemologically, 
methodologically, and analytically approach the dissertation as a whole” (Grant & 
Osanloo, 2014, p. 13). The theoretical framework used in this dissertation is social 
constructivism. 
Rather than a social or educational theory, constructivism is a meta-theory of 
knowledge and learning (Ültanir, 2012). According to Creswell (2015), social 
constructivism seeks to understand the world that people live in through an examination 
of their experiences and what they mean. Research conducted using a social 
constructivist framework relies primarily on the views of study participants. From these 
views, the researcher inductively and deductively develops a pattern of meaning 
(Creswell, 2015). 
Conceptual framework. Grant and Osanloo (2014) equated the conceptual 
framework of the dissertation to the floorplan blueprint for a house. The conceptual 
framework provides a structure to view related concepts and ideas (Grant & Osanloo, 
2014). This research takes a positive psychology approach to uncovering successful 
leadership strategies for fostering resilience in a military organization. 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) advocated for a psychology of positive 
human functioning. They predicted that psychologists, in order help individuals, families, 
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and communities thrive, would embrace positive human functioning to enable scientific 
understanding and the development of effective interventions. Positive psychology 
focuses on positive experiences, positive individual traits, and positive institutions 
(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Luthans (2002b) later explained that positive 
psychology aims to “shift the emphasis away from what is wrong with people to what is 
right with people” (p. 697). Therefore, the intent of positive psychology is to “focus on 
strengths as opposed to weaknesses, to be interested in resilience as opposed to 
vulnerability, and to be concerned with enhancing and developing wellness, prosperity 
and the good life as opposed to the remediation of pathology” (Luthans, 2002b, p. 697). 
Chapter 1 Summary 
This chapter introduced the concept of military resilience and presented the 
purpose for this research study. The primary purpose of this study is to identify 
leadership strategies and practices for overcoming adversity in military organizations. 
The four research questions developed for this study were listed in this chapter. The 
assumptions and limitations of this study were also discussed. Several key terms that 
are referenced in the study were defined. Chapter one also explained both the 
theoretical and conceptual approaches that are used in this study. The theoretical 
framework used in this dissertation is social constructivism. Conceptually, a positive 
psychology approach was taken to determine the leader strategies and practices that 
foster resilience in a military organization. A review of the relevant literature follows in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
This chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to the purpose, research 
approach, and topic of this study. The review will address resilience theory, military 
resilience, military leadership, and positive psychology. The intent of this research effort 
is to add to the existing body of knowledge on military leadership and military resilience. 
Resilience Theory 
The term resilience worked its way into the American lexicon soon after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Newman, 2005). Focus groups conducted by 
the American Psychological Association (APA) found that many people throughout the 
country were experiencing both uncertainty and stress because of the attacks. In 
response, the APA launched an education campaign in August 2002 called the “The 
Road to Resilience.” According to Newman (2005), a key aspect of the program 
included psychologists providing information about resilience directly to their 
communities. The APA collaborated with Discovery Health Channel to coproduce and 
air a documentary entitled Aftermath: The Road to Resilience. This documentary 
showed that people could use resilience to cope with adversity and hardship (Newman, 
2005). 
Hardiness. Kobasa (1979) first described hardiness when she studied how 
personality moderated the onset of illness in two groups of public utility executives with 
comparably elevated levels of stress. Her research looked at how 86 executives with 
high stress remained healthy, as compared to 75 executives with high stress that 
exhibited illness. She hypothesized that high stress people stay healthier if they believe 
that they can control or influence their experiences, they feel involved or committed to 
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their lives, and they regard change as a positive challenge to their personal 
development (Kobasa, 1979, p. 3). Kobasa (1979) measured the control, commitment, 
and challenge dimensions of personality hardiness using separate scales. The results of 
her research showed that executives with elevated stress levels and low illness are 
hardier compared to executives with high levels of stress and illness (Kobasa, 1979). 
Maddi (2002) argued that the combination of control, commitment, and challenge 
constitutes hardiness, and that any two of the three, without the third, does not. He 
explained that commitment was a predisposition to be involved rather than alienated. 
Control is about the struggle to have an influence on outcomes rather than being 
powerless. Challenge is learning constantly from experience instead of avoiding threats 
and uncertainties (Maddi, 2002). 
Maddi (2004) also characterized hardiness as existential courage. According to 
Maddi, existential courage is about searching for meaning in one’s life. Existential 
courage is choosing the future rather than the past. Each decision that a person makes 
involves choosing a future path that is unfamiliar and provokes developments versus 
repeating a previous familiar path. However, choosing the future instead of the past 
creates ontological anxiety through fear of uncertainty and the potential for failure. 
Consequently, choosing the future requires existential courage or hardiness (Maddi, 
2004). According to Bartone (2006), hardiness is a pathway to resilience. 
Individual resilience. Richardson (2002) concluded that “both resilience and 
resiliency are metatheories providing an umbrella for most psychological and 
educational theories” (p. 309). His foundational theory of resilience applies to individuals 
and groups such as families and communities. The resilience process begins at 
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biopsychospiritual homeostasis, which Richardson (2002) defined as “a point in time 
when one has adapted physically, mentally, and spiritually to a set of circumstances 
whether good or bad” (p. 310). Reintegration after disruption can take one of four paths. 
Ideally, a person will reintegrate resiliently. However, a person might simply return to 
their original state of biopsychospiritual homeostasis. Following adversity, people can 
reintegrate with some form of loss or even worse, they can reintegrate dysfunctionally 
(Richardson, 2002). 
Richardson (2002) based his resiliency model on the three separate lines of 
inquiry that his research uncovered. Some of the resiliency literature described the 
internal and external protective factors or qualities that enable people to cope with 
adversity. The literature also explained resiliency as a coping process that leads to the 
growth of these protective factors or qualities following adversity. Lastly, the literature 
identified resiliency as a force that drives a person from survival to self-actualization. 
According to Richardson (2002), this force comes from “within the human spirit or 
collective unconscious of the individual” (p. 319). 
Connor and Davidson (2003) defined resilience as “the personal qualities that 
enable one to thrive in the face of adversity” (p. 76). They created and validated the 
Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC) as a short 25-item self-rated measure to 
quantify resilience. Connor and Davidson (2003) based the content of their CD-RISC 
scale on the hardiness and resilience constructs developed by Kobasa (1979), Rutter 
(1985), and Lyons (1991). In addition, they included a spiritual component. They tested 
CD-RISC in both clinical and general population samples, finding the scale internally 
consistent and reliable (Connor & Davidson, 2003). 
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A study by Bonanno (2004) found that adults most often demonstrate a steady 
pattern of either recovery or resilience after exposure to loss, or potential trauma. He 
stated that recovery and resilience have separate outcome trajectories. Bonanno (2004) 
described recovery as initially experiencing moderate to severe disruptive psychological 
symptoms that decline gradually and then return to pre-trauma levels over several 
months. He characterized resilience as experiencing only mild disruption followed by a 
stable return to healthy functioning (Bonanno, 2004). 
Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) concluded that the two related processes of 
deliberative rumination and meaning-making may lead to post-traumatic growth. 
Rumination about the event that involves thinking about how and why the event 
occurred is accompanied by elevated levels of distress, at least initially, and 
characterized by intrusive thoughts, memories, and counter-factual thinking about how 
the incident could have been avoided. However, when an individual starts to derive 
meaning from the trauma by contemplating why it happened and what they can learn 
from the experience, they may experience positive life changes. The authors also argue 
that social support and self-disclosure to trusted and empathetic others may help the 
individual derive meaning from the event (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Tedeschi and 
Kilmer (2005) stated that the transformative positive changes of posttraumatic growth: 
1. Occur most distinctively in the aftermath of trauma rather than during lower 
level stress. 
2. Appear to go beyond illusion. 
3. Are experienced as an outcome rather than a coping mechanism. 
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4. Require a shattering of basic assumptions about one’s life that traumas 
provide but lower level stress does not. 
According to Rutter (2006), resilience might be the result of psychological coping 
processes or a “turning point” (p. 1) experience in a person’s life. Rutter later described 
resilience as “essentially…an interactive concept that is concerned with the combination 
of serious risk experiences and a relatively positive psychological outcome despite 
those experiences” (p. 2). He explained that exposing a person to controlled risk, 
instead of avoiding risk, may improve resilience. He also posited that resilience might be 
the result of specific traits or circumstances (Rutter, 2006). 
Mancini and Bonanno (2009) offered a model of resilience that highlighted the 
influence of individual differences on the appraisal processes and social support that 
lead to coping and resilience. Examples of these individual differences include 
personality, demographics, worldview, trauma exposure, social resources, economic 
resources, and positive emotions capacity. Mancini and Bonanno (2009) expressed 
doubts as to whether resilience-building interventions are effective, because the 
predictors of resilience are stable and therefore not easily changed. They argued that 
the idea of teaching resilience skills might “lead some people to overestimate their own 
coping ability or to underestimate the level of distress they might experience in 
response to a potential psychological hazard such as combat” (Bonanno, Westphal, & 
Mancini, 2011, p. 527). 
Seery, Holman, and Silver (2010) hypothesized that exposure to some adversity 
would be more likely to promote resilience than exposure to either high adversity or no 
adversity. They developed the Lifetime Adversity Measure that reports the number of 
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times a person has ever experienced 37 different negative life events such as serious 
illness or injury, physical and sexual assault, death in the family, and exposure to 
natural disaster. During a two-year longitudinal assessment, 2,000 respondents 
completed the Lifetime Adversity Measure along with several other measures of well-
being and mental health. Seery et al. (2010) reported that exposure to at least some 
prior adversity correlated to better well-being and mental health than did high lifetime 
adversity or no adversity. The results confirmed their hypothesis and suggested that 
exposure to some adversity can have benefits (Seery et al., 2010). 
Seery (2011) later elaborated on the “steeling” effects of adversity described by 
Rutter (2006). According to Seery (2011), this steeling effect “parallels the development 
of physical fitness from aerobic exercise” (p. 390). Seery explained, “Just as the body 
requires exertion to improve fitness, there is no opportunity for toughness to develop if 
someone has never coped with stress; likewise, physical overexertion can be harmful, 
and too much stress disrupts toughening” (p. 390). 
Seery, Leo, Lupien, Kondrak, and Almonte (2013) conducted a standardized 
laboratory pain experiment with healthy undergraduates. After completing the Lifetime 
Adversity Measure (Seery et al., 2010), study participants immersed one of their hands 
in ice-cold water and then reported the intensity of their pain. Following the painful 
experience, Seery et al. (2013) measured the participant’s negative cognitive 
processes. This experiment revealed that a history of at least some adversity related to 
lower negative emotions as compared to high lifetime adversity or no adversity (Seery 
et al., 2013). 
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According to Lee et al. (2013), there are two points of view regarding resilience. 
The first considers resilience as an individual trait that is fixed and stable. The second 
considers resilience as dynamic and changeable over time. In the latter case, 
adaptation derives from the interaction between individuals and their environment. 
According to Lee et al. (2013), a higher level of resilience accounts for both adaptive 
behaviors and physiologically and psychologically balanced growth. 
Lee et al. (2013) explored the psychological variables of resilience in data 
gathered from 33 studies conducted between 2001 and 2010. Their findings showed 
that resilience variables were comprised of both risk factors and protective factors. Risk 
factors included anxiety, depression, and perceived stress. Protective factors included 
optimism, social support, and self-efficacy (Lee et al., 2013). Protective factors showed 
the largest correlation with resilience. Risk factors provided a medium effect. Self-
efficacy was the most robust protective factor. Depression was the strongest risk factor. 
These results indicated that resilience improves more effectively by enhancing 
protective factors than reducing risk factors (Lee et al., 2013). 
Cacioppo, Reis, and Zautra (2011) pointed out that most investigators regard 
resilience as an individual property. They say however, that social resilience is the 
capability for both individuals and groups to “foster, engage in, and sustain positive 
social relationships and to endure and recover from stressors and social isolation” 
(Cacioppo et al., 2011, p. 43). According to Cacioppo et al. (2011), social resilience 
transforms adversity into growth by making existing social engagements stronger and 
by creating new relationships. Social resilience is about the individual’s capacity to 
overcome adversity by working with other people. They identified the following nine 
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features of individuals and groups that promote social resilience (Cacioppo et al., 2011, 
p. 47): 
1. Perceiving others accurately and empathically. 
2. Feeling connected to other individuals and collectives. 
3. Communicating caring and respect to others. 
4. Perceiving others’ regard for the self. 
5. Having values that promote the welfare of self and others. 
6. Responding in an appropriate way to social problems. 
7. Expressing social emotions in an appropriate way. 
8. Having trust. 
9. Having tolerance. 
Organizational resilience. Organizational resilience is new to management 
thinking (McAslan, 2010) and the concept of organizational resilience has remained 
mostly ambiguous and undefined (Burnard & Bhamra, 2011). Translating the concept of 
resilience into a working construct for organizations is complicated (McManus, Seville, 
Vargo, & Brunsdon, 2008). Lengnick-Hall (2005) found that the literature offers two 
differing perspectives on the meaning of organizational resilience. Some consider 
organizational resilience as only the ability to bounce back from an adverse situation. 
Others see organizational resilience as capitalizing on unexpected change and 
challenge by developing new capabilities to exploit future opportunities (Lengnick-Hall, 
2005). 
Friery (2012) noted that the concept of overcoming adversity through resilience is 
applicable to both individuals and organizations. According to Friery (2012), personal 
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resilience is a learned behavioral process that is amenable to training intervention. He 
posited that since gradual exposure to adversity enables individuals to develop coping 
skills, regular exposure to adversity for organizations via training interventions may 
enable the development of coping skills at the organizational level as well. 
Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011) pointed out that organizations could develop 
competencies in core employees that support an organization’s capacity for resilience. 
The aggregation of these competencies at the organizational level enables resilient 
responses to adversity. They defined organizational resilience as the “firm’s ability to 
effectively absorb, develop situation-specific responses to, and ultimately engage in 
transformative activities to capitalize on disruptive surprises that potentially threaten 
organization survival” (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011, p. 248). According to them, the human 
resource management function is critical to the development of these strategic 
resources. They identified the employee contributions that support collective cognitive 
capacity in an organization as decisiveness, opportunism, expertise, and creativity 
(Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011, p. 244). 
Luthans, Vogelgesang, and Lester (2006) presented human resource strategies 
for developing resilience. They proposed hiring employees that exhibit resilience, and 
implementing programs that will increase the resiliency of existing employees. They 
argued that developing resilience in employees could make organizations more 
adaptive and successful over time (Luthans et al., 2006). Hystad et al. (2015) also 
claimed that if hardiness is a stable individual disposition, organizations could use 
recruitment and selection mechanisms to increase organizational resilience. Likewise, if 
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hardiness is flexible, then training and educational interventions could be important 
additional tools to enhancing hardiness in organizations (Hystad et al., 2015). 
Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) defined organizational resilience as “the maintenance 
of positive adjustment under challenging conditions such that the organization emerges 
from those conditions strengthened and more resourceful” (p. 3481). Challenging 
conditions can include ongoing risks, stresses, strains, errors, scandals, crises, shocks, 
and disruptions. According to Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007), resilient organizations operate 
“under the belief that they are imperfect but can become more perfect over time through 
learning from events and near events” (p. 3491). They stressed the importance of 
organizational learning as a means to developing resilience capabilities. In addition, 
they posited that resilient organizations might have structured processes that enable 
learning from a wider range of both successful and unsuccessful experiences (Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Gibson and Tarrant (2010) proposed a ‘principles model of resilience’ as the 
basis for the study of organizational resilience. Achieving organizational resilience 
requires an understanding of non-routine and disruption related risk. Their review of 
other conceptual models showed that resilience is an outcome that relies on a variety of 
organizational capabilities. The key principles of the Gibson and Tarrant (2010) 
resilience model include: 
1. Resilience is not a process, management system, strategy, or predictive 
measurement. Resilience is an outcome. 
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2. Resilience is not a static trait. There is no metric or score that will describe 
resilience as a fixed feature. Resilience is dynamic and will increase or 
decrease as the context changes. 
3. Resilience is not a single trait. Resilience arises from a complex interplay of 
many factors. 
4. Resilience is multidimensional and there is currently no single model that 
describes resilience. 
5. Resilience can exist over a range of conditions from low resilience 
(vulnerable) to high resilience (resilient). 
6. Good risk management is the foundation of resilience (p. 7). 
To develop organizational risk capacity, Gibson and Tarrant (2010) concluded 
that organizations must consider a variety of interdependent risk factors. They identified 
four strategic approaches for building organizational resilience: resistance, reliability, 
redundancy, and flexibility. Resistance strategies strengthen the organization to endure 
the immediate effects of adversity. Reliability strategies ensure that key functions, 
information, and resources remain available. Redundancy strategies provide alternate 
options for operational routines. Flexibility strategies seek to enhance decision-making, 
emergent leadership, trust, loyalty, and purpose through resiliency training and 
exercises (Gibson & Tarrant, 2010). 
Burnard and Bhamra (2011) found that the mechanisms of organizational 
resilience can “improve an organization’s situational awareness, reduce organizational 
vulnerabilities to systemic risk environments, and restore efficacy following the events of 
a disruption” (p. 5587). They concluded that the detection and activation phases of a 
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resilient response are fundamental to an organization’s positive adjustment following 
disruption. Situational awareness and an understanding of system vulnerabilities are 
key capabilities in the detection phase. The initiation of a response to the disruption is 
the key component of the activation phase. In addition to enabling an effective response 
to adversity, proactive detection and activation may create opportunities to grow 
because of a disruptive event (Burnard & Bhamra, 2011). 
Mamouni Limnios, Mazzarol, Ghadouani, and Schilizzi (2014) pointed out that 
past research has usually characterized organizational resilience as a positive and 
desirable system characteristic. According to Mamouni Limnios et al. (2014), 
organizational resilience can manifest as either capacity for adaptive learning or 
resistance to change. Therefore, they argue that resilience can be an undesirable 
system characteristic, depending on the system state. In order to evolve, organizations 
must be willing to change. At the same time, organizations cannot make changes in 
response to every fluctuation in the operating environment. Accordingly, the strategic 
use of organizational resilience depends on whether, at the time of examination, 
resilience is a more or less desirable system characteristic (Mamouni Limnios et al., 
2014). 
McAslan (2010) stated that organizational resilience requires emphasis on 
adaptability, leadership, ethos, and values to stay committed to the organization’s vision 
and purpose during times of crisis. General resilience is an organizational goal that 
does not replace the traditional risk management or continuity planning that provides 
specified resilience to ordinary and predicable threats. McAslan (2010) noted that since 
most organizations will never experience a major disruption, training exercises are the 
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best way to gain experience. McAslan (2010) commented on the “remarkable similarity 
between the enduring principles of resilience which the military require[s] of individuals 
and units, with the more general needs of organizational resilience” (p. 13). He 
explained that the military integrates intellectual, moral, and physical resources to build 
fighting power. The intellectual factor is the knowledge to fight and includes an 
understanding of the operational context. The moral factor is the will to fight and 
involves motivation, inspiration, and effective leadership. The physical factor is the 
means to fight and includes people, equipment, and collective capability (McAslan, 
2010). 
Ho, Teo, Bentley, Verreyne, and Galvin (2014) studied the organizational 
resilience literature utilizing content analysis software to determine implications for 
human resource management. Their results showed that the relevant literature 
characterizes organizational resilience as the organizational processes required to 
adapt and change environmental and competitive dynamics in support of strategic 
readiness. They concluded that organizational resilience is path-dependent and 
developed over time in expectation of the need. They found that employee training, 
development, recruitment, and selection influences organizational resilience by enabling 
the organization’s capability to prepare for and cope with significant change (Ho et al., 
2014). 
Hassall, Sanderson, and Cameron (2014) surveyed 310 industry practitioners 
from companies operating in a variety of industries both in Australia and abroad to 
obtain their perceptions of organizational resilience. They characterized organizational 
resilience as the ability of a system to adjust to change to manage disturbances and 
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exploit opportunities. They intended their results to guide the development of tools and 
models that will affect industry’s ability to enhance its own resilience. They argued that 
organizational resilience is a useful concept only if industry understands it and 
considers it important. Furthermore, practitioners must be able to implement resilience 
within their organizations (Hassall et al., 2014). 
Hassall et al. (2014) showed that most survey respondents considered building 
organizational resilience as important for their organization. Over 90% of the 
respondents indicated that building resilience was important for their company’s 
survival. Only 2% of respondents considered organizational resilience to be of little or 
no importance. Just 26% of respondents considered themselves knowledge or very 
knowledgeable about organizational resilience. Most respondents believed that their 
organizations should do more to improve practitioner’s knowledge of organizational 
resilience (Hassall et al., 2014). 
Kay and Goldspink (2012) interviewed more than 50 Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO) from some of the largest critical and non-critical infrastructure organizations 
across Australia to develop a body of knowledge and research agenda on 
organizational resilience. According to Kay and Goldspink (2012), the CEO responses 
suggest that an organization’s resilience capability matures over time. Initially, resilience 
enables the organization to conduct effective business as usual even during times of 
disruption. Later, the capability for resilience enables the organization to change and 
adapt in response to adversity. The resilient organization can shape its environment to 
either avoid or better respond to adversity. The CEOs viewed organizational resilience 
as mostly a cultural challenge. They also identified the critical role of trust in 
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organizational resilience. According to the CEOs, their company’s human resource 
function is central to the development organizational resilience. They identified the use 
of scenarios, simulations, and training exercises as activities that support the 
development of resilience capability (Kay & Goldspink, 2012). 
Military Resilience 
Boermans et al. (2012) defined military resilience as “the ability to maintain 
optimal performance during acute situations, positively recover afterward, and sustain 
combat motivation while meeting operational demands” (p. 315). According to 
Boermans et al. (2012), personal adaptation to adversity requires capacities that are 
internal, and resources that are external, to the individual. Positive psychological 
functioning, boosted by strengths of character, is an example of an internal capacity. An 
external resource could be the social facets of the military environment that encourage 
soldiers to overcome adversity. Boermans et al. (2012) claimed the military could 
develop resilience in their organizations by conducting interventions that strengthen 
both internal capacities and environmental resources. 
Researchers with the Center for Military Health Policy Research at Rand 
Corporation (Meredith et al., 2011), conducted a critical review of psychology, sociology, 
and medical literature to identify factors that promote military resilience. To identify the 
non-static, or changeable, factors associated with psychological resilience, the 
researchers coded 187 relevant documents published between 2000 and 2009. These 
researchers described resilience as “bouncing back, adapting, or returning to a baseline 
after experiencing adversity or trauma” (Meredith et al., 2011, p. 20). Their review of the 
literature also showed that resilience could involve growth after experiencing adversity 
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or trauma (Meredith et al., 2011). A review of studies by Tedeschi and McNally (2011) 
also shows that combat veterans who report post-traumatic growth over time may be 
becoming more resilient. 
Meredith et al. (2011) identified the individual factors that encourage resilience in 
the military as “positive coping, positive affect, positive thinking, realism, behavioral 
control, physical fitness, and altruism” (p. 16). They identified the unit or organizational 
factors that support resilience as “positive command climate, teamwork, and unit 
cohesion” (Meredith et al., 2011, p. 16). Britt and Oliver (2013) likewise argued that 
morale and unit cohesion enhance the resilience of military personnel. Morale helps 
service members cope with stressful and potentially traumatic military operations. Unit 
cohesion is a social construct that enables a military unit to work together towards 
accomplishing assigned missions (Britt & Oliver, 2013). 
The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 
conducted research to identify the intangible psychological constructs that are critical for 
soldier mission readiness (Aude et al., 2014). Researchers at the institute first 
conducted a review of academic and military literature to identify the psychological 
constructs relevant to preparing soldiers for deployment. Next, the researchers 
interviewed 56 soldiers that were conducting pre-deployment tactical training at Fort 
Hood, Texas. Each interviewee rated the psychological constructs identified in the 
literature for criticality to readiness, effectiveness of current training, the need for new or 
improved training, and frequency of training needed (Aude et al., 2014). 
One of the meta-constructs identified by this research was survivability. The 
study identified resilience (sometimes referred to as hardiness) as a sub-construct of 
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survivability. According to Aude et al. (2014), resilience manifests behaviorally as 
“recovering quickly from setbacks, shock, injuries, adversity, and stress while 
maintaining a mission and organizational focus” (p. 47). The soldiers interviewed for this 
study stated that resilient behaviors require the highest frequency of training. 
Interestingly, those surveyed also believed that resilience is the least effectively trained 
behavior (Aude et al., 2014). 
Britt, Sinclair et al. (2013) developed an organizing framework for the study of 
military resiliency. Per their framework, after military personnel face a demanding event 
such as combat, they go through an appraisal and coping process (Britt, Sinclair et al., 
2013). The factors that influence the appraisal and coping process can be personal, 
organizational, or both. This process results in the outcomes that military personnel 
experience from the demanding event (Britt, Sinclair et al., 2013). 
Cohesion and morale. According to Siebold (2007), military group cohesion is 
about social integration within four relationship structures: peer (horizontal), leader 
(vertical), organizational, and institutional bonding. Peer bonding is among members of 
a military unit at the same hierarchical level such as a squad, platoon, or company. 
Leader bonding is between seniors and subordinates at the unit level. Together, peer 
and leader bonding compose primary group cohesion. Primary group cohesion is about 
trust among group members and the capacity for teamwork. Primary group cohesion is 
the result of direct personal interactions and is a predictor of performance. Primary 
group cohesion creates the willingness to follow leaders into combat and fight alongside 
peers (Siebold, 2007). 
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Siebold (2007) also explained that military cohesion includes the integration of 
service members into larger secondary organizations. Organizational bonding is 
between the service member and the larger organizations to which they belong. For 
example, members of a squad should also feel a sense of belonging to the platoon and 
company that they are a part of. Institutional bonding is between service members and 
their branch of service (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines). Organizational and 
institutional bonding compose secondary group cohesion. Secondary group cohesion is 
also about the perceived trustworthiness of the organization or institution that the 
service member belongs to. Secondary group cohesion creates professional service 
members. Secondary group cohesion is a predictor of discipline and attitudes towards 
military service (Siebold, 2007). 
King (2006) has argued that the process of combat training is what decisively 
binds military groups together. He stated that collective training drills are both critical to 
building soldier relationships and “decisive in creating social cohesion in combat” (King, 
2006, p. 509). King (2006) goes on to say, “No matter how familiar soldiers are with 
each other on a personal and informal basis, if they do not recognize what collective 
military practices these symbols imply, the soldiers will lack social cohesion; they will be 
militarily ineffective” (p. 510). 
Britt, Dickinson, Moore, Castro, and Adler (2007) defined morale as motivation 
and enthusiasm to perform well. Their longitudinal study of 1,685 U.S. soldiers on a 
peacekeeping mission to Kosovo showed that engagement in meaningful work and 
confidence in unit leadership and functioning are predictors of morale. They also 
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concluded that morale also enables better adjustment under stressful circumstances 
(Britt et al., 2007). 
Britt, Adler, Bliese, and Moore (2013) assessed whether higher levels of morale 
would associate with lower levels of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) for soldiers 
who recently returned from a combat deployment. Study participants that reported 
higher levels of morale were less likely to report PTSD symptoms. The results of their 
study also indicated that morale could mediate the negative psychological 
consequences of combat (Britt, Adler et al., 2013). 
Resilience as a predictor of success. Escolas, Pitts, Safer, and Bartone (2013) 
examined the effects of military time-in-service on self-reported PTSD in U.S. military 
personnel and the potential for hardiness to moderate this relationship. The researchers 
collected data using anonymous questionnaires of 561 post-deployment military 
personnel stationed at Fort Sam Houston and Lackland Air Force Base from the 
summer of 2010 to the summer of 2011. They measured hardiness using the 
Dispositional Resiliency Scale. They assessed PTSD symptoms using a separate self-
report. The results of their study showed that hardiness related negatively to PTSD 
symptoms. Military time-in-service related positively to PTSD. However, military time-in-
service had no effect on service members that scored high for hardiness. According to 
Escolas et al. (2013), hardiness could be a protective factor for those that serve longer 
in the military. 
Hystad, Eid, Laberg, and Bartone (2011) examined the role of hardiness as a 
predictor of admission into military officer schools in Norway. A total of 1,111 officer 
applicants completed the Norwegian version of the Dispositional Resilience Scale at the 
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beginning of a three-week selection process in the summer of 2009. Using independent 
sample t-tests, the researchers compared the hardiness scores of the 569 admitted 
applicants to the scores of the 542 applicants not admitted. Their results showed that 
the successful applicants scored significantly higher in hardiness (Hystad et al., 2011). 
Bartone, Kelly, and Matthews (2013) evaluated hardiness as a predictor of 
leadership and adaptability for 145 first year cadets at West Point during 2001 and 
2002. The researchers surveyed the cadets when they first entered the school and then 
again three years after graduation from the four-year program. They measured the 
cadet’s resilience using the Dispositional Resilience Scale. The researchers retrieved 
the cadet’s leadership potential scores from their admissions records. The researchers 
constructed a separate scale to measure adaptability. Hierarchical regression analyses 
showed that hardiness predicted both leader performance while in school at West Point 
and leader adaptability in the Army after graduation (Bartone et al., 2013). 
Skomorovsky and Stevens (2013) assessed data collected from 200 Canadian 
Forces candidates during basic training to test the resilience characteristics of hardiness 
and coping. The results of their study suggest that neuroticism, military hardiness, and 
problem-focused coping are important concepts that explain the variance in resilience 
among military personnel. According to the researchers, recruiting potential military 
personnel with lower neuroticism would be beneficial. In addition, resilience training for 
new recruits that incorporates hardiness and coping components may also be beneficial 
(Skomorovsky & Stevens, 2013). 
Johnsen et al. (2013) investigated whether hardiness predicted successful 
completion of a 250-km, nine-day, Artic ski march by 178 Norwegian soldiers. The ski 
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march was the final event in the selection process for soldiers that protect the border 
between Norway and Russia. The researchers hypothesized that the hardiness facets 
of commitment, control, and challenge would predict successful completion of the ski 
march. To measure hardiness, this study used a revised 15-item Dispositional 
Resilience Scale. Hierarchical regression analysis showed that total hardiness scores 
predicted successful completion of the ski march, even after controlling for nutrition, 
physical fitness, and sensation seeking factors. A second hierarchical regression found 
that the commitment facet of hardiness was the most significant predictor of success in 
the ski march (Johnsen et al., 2013). 
Bartone, Roland, Picano, and Williams (2008) found that psychological hardiness 
contributes significantly to the successful completion of U.S. Army Special Forces 
candidate school. Using the short form of the Dispositional Resilience Scale, the 
researchers assessed 1,138 candidates at the start of the course. Bartone et al. (2008) 
calculated the resilience scores and evaluated them as a predictor of success or failure 
at the school. Confirming their hypothesis, independent sample t-tests and regression 
analyses indicated that the 637 course graduates were significantly higher in hardiness 
than the 501 nongraduates (Bartone et al., 2008). 
Resilience and mental health. Taylor, Pietrobon, Taverniers, Leon, and Fern 
(2013) examined the association of hardiness to both mental health and physical health 
in two samples (N = 65, N = 55) of male Navy and Marine Corps personnel. The 
researchers predicted that mental health would mediate the association of hardiness 
with physical health. They measured hardiness using the Dispositional Resilience 
Scale-15. They examined the associations between hardiness, mental health, and 
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physical health using regression-based mediation analyses followed by a test of indirect 
effects. An initial model showed that hardiness predicted physical health in the total 
sample. However, when the researchers added mental health to the model, the 
influence of physical health was no longer significant. A test of significance suggested a 
mediated effect. They observed similar patterns in each individual sample (Taylor et al., 
2013). 
Bartone (1999) explored the potential for hardiness to mediate stress in a group 
of six Army National Guard and Army Reserve medical units that mobilized for 
deployment to the Gulf War. Three of the units deployed to the Persian Gulf. One unit 
went to Germany, and two units remained in the United States. During May through 
June 1992, Bartone (1999) collected self-report, voluntary questionnaires measuring 
stress, hardiness, and negative health symptoms. His study suggests that closeness to 
the war zone associates with higher stress levels and negative health outcomes. As 
expected, the medical unit that deployed to the Persian Gulf reported the highest levels 
of stress. The unit that remained in the United States reported the lowest levels. The 
unit that deployed to Germany reported the next highest levels of stress. Regression 
modelling showed that the low-hardiness group reported more negative health 
outcomes than the high-hardiness group (Bartone, 1999). 
Dolan and Adler (2006) investigated the relationships between deployment 
stressors, health outcomes, and depressive symptoms as reported by 629 soldiers 
during a six-month peacekeeping deployment to Kosovo. The researchers collected 
deployment stressors data three to four months into the deployment. Data collection of 
health outcomes occurred one to two months after the soldiers returned to their home 
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base in Germany. Dolan and Adler (2006) hypothesized that hardiness would correlate 
with psychological and physical health both during and after the deployment. They also 
expected hardiness to moderate the effects of deployment stressors on psychological 
and physical health after the deployment. The researchers developed the 18-item 
Military Hardiness Scale to measure the hardiness components of commitment, control, 
and challenge in this study. Commitment was associated with strong military identity 
and commitment to accomplishing the mission. Control was associated with personal 
influence on mission outcomes and job control. Challenge was associated with the 
exertion of personal resources in support of deployment demands (Dolan & Adler, 
2006). The results of their study showed that hardiness correlated with psychological 
health during and after deployment (Dolan & Adler, 2006). Soldiers with higher 
hardiness scores reported lower depression levels. Contrary to the researchers’ 
hypothesis however, hardiness did not correlate with physical health either during or 
after deployment (Dolan & Adler, 2006). 
Orme and Kehoe (2014) tested whether cognitive hardiness moderated the 
adverse effects of deployment-related stressors on the health of 448 Australian Army 
Reservists deployed on peacekeeping operations in Timor-Leste or the Solomon 
Islands. The researchers surveyed the peacekeepers at the start, end, and up to 24 
months after returning from a four to seven-month deployment. The results of their 
study showed that hardiness, as measured by the Cognitive Hardiness Scale, 
moderated the relationship between non-traumatic stress, trauma exposure, and a 
composite measure of psychological distress. Hardiness did not moderate the 
relationship to poor physical health (Orme & Kehoe, 2014). 
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Pietrzak, Johnson, Goldstein, Malley, and Southwick (2009) examined whether 
psychological resilience and social support protected against traumatic stress and 
depressive symptoms in Iraq and Afghanistan veterans returning to Connecticut. The 
purpose of their research was to develop recommendations for Connecticut’s public 
policy makers for improving the readjustment of veterans back into civilian life. Pietrzak 
et al. (2009) surveyed 272 veterans that served in Iraq or Afghanistan between January 
2003 and March 2007 for resilience, social support, stress, and depressive symptoms. 
They measured resilience using the CD-RISC. Their hierarchical regression analysis 
suggested that resilience and social support after deployment associated negatively 
with traumatic stress and depressive symptoms (Pietrzak et al., 2009). Veterans 
reporting stress and depressive symptoms reported more than one full standard 
deviation lower levels of resilience and post-deployment social support than did 
veterans not reporting stress and depressive symptoms. According to Pietrzak et al. 
(2009), these results suggest that interventions aimed at improving resilience and social 
support may reduce the impact of adversity and trauma. 
Schok, Kleber, and Lensvelt-Mulders (2010) examined whether resilience was 
associated with the processing of war-zone experiences or if resilience protected 
against post-traumatic stress reactions. They collected survey data from a sample of 
1,561 Dutch veterans who deployed for an average of 18 months during combat and 
peacekeeping operations since 1945. Using structural equation modelling, their results 
showed that the resilience variables of self-esteem, optimism, and control predicted 
lower perceptions of war-zone stressors as threatening. Higher self-esteem, control, 
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and optimism correlated with more growth gained from a military deployment (Schok et 
al., 2010). 
Eisen et al. (2014) examined the intrinsic resilience variables of hardiness and 
self-efficacy, and the extrinsic resilience variable of social support, as factors that could 
prevent mental health problems and the abuse of alcohol and drugs in U.S. military 
personnel returning from deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. The researchers 
surveyed a random sample of 2,000 recently returned military personnel from the 
Defense Manpower Data Center. The sample included 50% active duty, 25% National 
Guard, and 25% reserve personnel from across the military services. The sample 
included an equal number of men and women. Of those service members contacted, 
512 of them completed surveys between 3 and 12 months after returning deployment 
during 2008-2009 and again another 6 to 12 months later. The researchers used 
regression analyses to establish whether resilience measured shortly after deployment 
predicted later mental health and substance problems. They used the Deployment Risk 
and Resilience Inventory, the 15-item Dispositional Resilience Scale, and separate 
instruments to measure mental health and alcohol or drug use. The results of their study 
showed that greater hardiness predicted better mental health and lower levels of 
substance abuse 6-12 months later. However, hardiness did not predict subsequent 
post-traumatic stress symptom severity. Some aspects of resilience seem to protect 
service members from the negative effects of traumatic exposure. These findings 
suggested that interventions aimed at promoting and sustaining resilience after 
deployment might have the potential to improve the mental health of veterans (Eisen et 
al., 2014). 
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Bonanno et al. (2012), using data from the Millennium Cohort Study of service 
members, investigated the trajectories of post-traumatic stress symptoms before and 
after deployment. The Millennium Cohort Study started collecting health data in 2001 
from U.S. military personnel in all branches of service to include active duty, reserve, 
and National Guard. The researchers looked at 3,393 service members who deployed 
once and 4,394 service members who deployed multiple times. Researchers surveyed 
self-reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress before and after deployments to Iraq or 
Afghanistan. They administered follow-up surveys three years later and again six years 
later. Bonanno et al. (2012) examined the data to determine longitudinal trajectories. 
Their results showed comparable trajectories for personnel deploying once or multiple 
times. The researchers found the following stable trajectories. 
 Low post-traumatic stress before and after deployment was 83.1% of 
personnel studied with a single deployment and 84.9% with multiple 
deployments. 
 Moderate to improving post-traumatic stress was 8.0% of personnel with a 
single deployment and 8.5% with multiple deployments. 
 Worsening to chronic post-traumatic stress was 6.7% for personnel with a 
single deployment and 4.5% with multiple deployments. As the researchers 
predicted, this group also experienced the most combat during their 
deployment(s). 
 High and stable post-traumatic stress was 2.2% for personnel with a single 
deployment. 
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 High to improving posttraumatic stress was also 2.2% for personnel with 
multiple deployments. 
Consolidated Soldier Fitness (CSF) program. The Army approached Martin 
E.P. Seligman, from the University of Pennsylvania, in August 2008 to discuss the 
problems of soldiers returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Seligman and 
Fowler, 2011). According to Casey (2011), the rates of suicide and posttraumatic stress 
in the Army were high due to the strain of nearly a decade of protracted war. Seligman 
met with U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, and his advisers in the 
Pentagon later that year (Seligman & Fowler, 2011). 
Seligman explained that the human response to high adversity is normally 
distributed (Seligman & Fowler, 2011). On the left of the distribution are the minority 
who exhibit maladaptive responses to include PTSD, depression, or anxiety. The center 
of the distribution includes most people who are resilient and after a brief disruption, 
return to a normal level of functioning. On the right side of the distribution are the people 
who grow after adversity by attaining a higher level of functioning. Seligman suggested 
that the aim of any prevention program developed by the Army should be to move the 
distribution to the right by lowering maladaptive responses and increasing resilience and 
posttraumatic growth (Seligman & Fowler, 2011). 
With help from Seligman, the Army subsequently developed the CSF program to 
enhance the psychological resilience of soldiers, their family members, and Department 
of the Army civilians (Seligman & Fowler, 2011). CSF develops psychological resilience 
in the physical, social, emotional, spiritual, and family dimensions (Casey, 2011). The 
CSF program is a “strengths-based” resiliency program that moves beyond a treatment-
41 
centric approach and focuses on prevention by enhancing the already present 
psychological strengths of soldiers (Casey, 2011). According to Casey (2011), he 
envisioned a “culture in which psychological fitness is recognized as every bit as 
important as physical fitness” (p. 2). 
Cornum, Matthews, and Seligman (2011) described the CSF program as 
historically unique in a large organization with over one million people. They pointed out 
that the CSF program proactively improves resilience rather than waiting to see who 
might have a negative outcome following stress. They argued that the program might 
provide a model for implementing similar interventions in other very large organizations. 
The four elements of the CSF program are: 
1. Online self-assessment of emotional, social, family, and spiritual fitness using 
the Global Assessment Tool (GAT). 
2. Online learning modules individualized from GAT results to improve fitness in 
these domains. 
3. Formal resilience training at every Army leader development school. 
4. Training of Army master resilience trainers (MRTs) to design training plans 
and conduct training at the unit level (Cornum et al., 2011, p. 6). 
According to Peterson, Park, and Castro (2011), the CSF program, 
…aims to measure the psychosocial strengths and assets of soldiers as well as 
their problems, to identify those in need of basic training in a given domain as 
well as those who would benefit from advanced training, and then to provide that 
training. (p. 10) 
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Peterson et al. (2011) described program assessment using the online GAT as 
the “linchpin” of the CSF program (p. 10). The GAT is a self-report 105-item survey that 
measures psychosocial fitness in the emotional, social, family, and spiritual domains. 
The lead developer of the GAT was Chris Peterson at the University of Michigan 
(Lester, Harms, Herian, & Sowden, 2015). Nansook Park, also from the University of 
Michigan, and Army Colonel Carl A. Castro of the U.S. Army Medical Research and 
Materiel Command contributed to the development of the GAT as well (Lester et al., 
2015). Peterson et al. (2011) described the four original domains of psychosocial fitness 
as follows: 
1. Emotional fitness reflects freedom from depression, positive mood, life 
satisfaction, optimism, character strengths, active coping styles, and personal 
resilience. 
2. Social fitness indicates feelings about the Army, the soldier’s unit, and 
colleagues. It is a measure of trust in colleagues and leaders and overall 
moral. 
3. Family fitness refers to how the soldier is faring in personal and familial 
relationships. 
4. Spiritual fitness reflects whether the soldier has a sense of meaning, purpose, 
and accomplishment in life that extends beyond the self. (p. 13) 
Regarding spiritual fitness, Peterson et al. (2011) noted that it was important to measure 
a soldier’s meaning and purpose without reference to any basis in specific religious 
beliefs and practices. The Army did not base the spiritual fitness component of the CSF 
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program on any specific idea of philosophical, nonreligious, or religious belief or practice 
(Pargament & Sweeney, 2011). 
The Army released GAT 2.0 in 2014. The latest version of GAT reflects that the 
CSF program has expanded beyond psychosocial functioning to include physical health. 
The GAT now includes questions about sleep patterns, nutrition, risk-taking behaviors, 
and substance use (Lester et al., 2015). Peterson et al. (2011) explained that the Army 
uses the GAT to assess soldiers, provide immediate feedback about his or her profile of 
strengths, and then direct them into an individualized online training program. The Army 
also uses GAT to evaluate the success of the CSF program and to gauge the 
psychosocial fitness of the entire Army. All soldiers currently not deployed to combat 
operation complete the GAT annually. Requiring every soldier to take the GAT reduces 
the stigma typically associated with mental health surveys (Peterson et al., 2011). 
According to Lester, McBride, and Cornum (2013), only the U.S. Army Chief of Staff 
may direct the release of soldier’s GAT score to anyone other than the soldier who 
completed the GAT. This policy has prevented officials from obtaining GAT scores for 
criminal and suicide investigations (Lester et al., 2013). 
Lester et al. (2015) found that soldiers who attained Ranger status have high 
GAT scores and soldiers with behavioral problems generally evidence low GAT scores. 
On this basis, they suggested that the Army could use GAT scores as a means for 
selecting personnel for challenging military assignments (Lester et al., 2015). Peterson 
et al. (2011) posited that once validated, the GAT might have value in gauging overall 
unit-level effectiveness and assignments. However, according to Lester, McBride, and 
Cornum (2013), the Army has never used GAT as a surveillance tool despite repeated 
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requests from commanders. Army policy does not allow for command access to 
individual or unit-level GAT scores because data analyses suggests a wide distribution 
of scores within units and few if any reliable differences between large organizations 
(Lester et al., 2013). 
Reivich, Seligman, and McBride (2011) described the development of the 10-day 
Master Resilience Trainer (MRT) course. The University of Pennsylvania’s Positive 
Psychology Center developed the preparation component of MRT. Researchers at the 
center, led by Seligman, previously developed the Penn Resilience Program (PRP). 
That program was successful in preventing depression and anxiety in young people. 
According to Reivich et al. (2011), the skills taught at PRP are applicable to an adult 
military population. Because of the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army 
leadership accepted empirical evidence supporting the efficacy of the PRP instead of 
waiting to conduct pilot testing on the MRT course (Lester et al., 2013). Researchers at 
the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research developed the sustainment component that 
focuses on deployment cycle training (Reivich et al., 2011). Sports psychologists at the 
United States Military Academy at West Point developed the enhancement component 
that teaches personal and professional skills. The MRT course is a “train-the-trainer” for 
enlisted leaders that enables dissemination of MRT concepts throughout the Army 
(Reivich et al., 2011). 
A report prepared for the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command 
measured both resilience and growth in terms of actual trajectories of psychological 
functioning over time (Park & Peterson, 2014). Soldiers in the 4th Infantry Division 
completed surveys before (February 2008), during (July 2008), immediately after (May 
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2009), and long after (2011–2013) their deployment to Iraq. The study assessed a 
comprehensive set of healthy and unhealthy psychosocial characteristics. The study 
also assessed the impact of potentially traumatic events such as threats to one’s own 
life, injuries, loss of comrades in combat, degree of combat exposure, and marital 
problems (Park, 2014). The findings from this data showed: 
1. Soldiers frequently experienced adverse events during deployment. 
2. Soldiers’ mental health decreased on average during deployment. 
3. Soldiers on average had similar levels of psychological wellbeing after 
deployment as before deployment. 
4. The most important contributor to soldier well-being after deployment was 
well-being before deployment. 
5. The factors that predicted well-being following deployment included those 
emphasized in the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) Program (Park, 
2014, p. 5). 
Lester et al. (2013) reported results collected by an Army program evaluation 
team that also seemed to confirm the effectiveness of the CSF program. According to 
Lester et al. (2013), impartial evaluators not associated with the development of the 
CSF program, assessed soldiers from multiple Brigade Combat Teams, 75% of which 
deployed to combat during the evaluation period. The evaluation team assessed 
soldiers at three times over a period of 15 months using the GAT. According to their 
findings, even after controlling for unit cohesion and leadership, MRT training in 
operational army units does lead to an increase in the positive psychological states and 
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a decrease in negative psychological states as measured by the GAT across time 
(Lester et al., 2013). 
Carr et al. (2013) conducted the first-ever assessment of MRT training 
implementation in a deployment setting. Each researcher, except for Eonta, were 
military service members conducting this work as part of their official duties. According 
to Carr et al. (2013), an Army unit that deployed to a detention facility in Afghanistan 
received structured weekly resiliency training over a 12-week period in 2010. An MRT 
certified instructor provided the training. Both the Army unit and the researchers 
expected the implementation of MRT to be more effective since it was proximal in both 
time and space to exposure to deployment related stressors. According to Carr et al. 
(2013), the objective of their assessment was to explore opportunities to improve the 
MRT component of the CSF program. They collected self-report data before and after 
the 12 weeks of training using the CD-RISC. The researchers also collected separate 
measures of stress, morale, and performance. Their results showed that the MRT 
resilience training resulted in no measurable change in cognition as measured by CD-
RISC (Carr et al., 2013). 
Military Leadership 
Military contexts impose unique contingencies, constraints, and causations on 
leadership processes (Hannah, 2012). Stanley M. Halpin (2011), with the U.S. Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, noted that many reviews of 
leadership research are now calling for the study of leadership within its organizational 
context. Admonitions to study leadership in context is particularly relevant to the 
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challenges and complexities of the military environment (Halpin, 2011). Hannah (2012) 
described leadership in the profession of arms as, 
…the process of developing individual and collective human and organizational 
capacity and providing the purpose, direction, and motivation required to employ 
that capacity to create effective and ethical combat power under intense, 
dynamic, and dangerous conditions on behalf of the nation state being served. 
(p. 14) 
The profession of arms. In Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 
(2013), it states that military personnel, especially officers, must understand military 
theory and philosophy, know military history, and appreciate the great responsibility of 
their office (p. B1). Military professionals are students in the art and science of war, and 
they proudly refer to their calling as the Profession of Arms. Don Snider (2012), of the 
U.S. Army War College, pointed out that professions produce expert work that is unique 
to their field of endeavor, after years of practice and study. According to Snider (2012), 
“A deep moral obligation rests on the profession, and its professionals, to continuously 
develop expertise and use that expertise only in the best interests of society—
professionals are actually servants” (p. 6).  
Intrinsic factors such as lifelong pursuit of expert knowledge and the privilege and 
honor of service motivate professionals (Snider, 2012). General Martin Dempsey 
(2012), a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently reminded military 
personnel that they “qualify as professionals through intensive training, education, and 
practical experience” (p. 4). To “maintain the best led and best trained force in the 
world,” Dempsey called on military professionals to renew their commitment to the 
48 
Profession of Arms (2012, p. 3). He stated that the values of “duty, honor, courage, 
integrity, and selfless service” are the “moral and ethical fabric” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3) 
of the military profession. According to Dempsey (2012), military leaders are the 
“foundation and driving force” that provide “incalculable competitive advantage against 
our adversaries” (p. 4). 
The distinguishing characteristics of the military profession are its capability to 
use lethal force, and the readiness of those in uniform to die in the service of their 
country (Dempsey, 2012, p. 4). Military service demands the acceptance of this 
unlimited liability (The Armed Forces Officer, 2006, p. 94). In 1962, General Sir John 
Hackett of the British Army was the first to use the term unlimited liability in a military 
context (Mileham, 2010). In his seminal book, The Profession of Arms, Hackett (1983) 
declared, “The essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force under 
an unlimited liability” (p. 202). 
Combat leadership. Hannah, Campbell, and Matthews (2010) have called for 
more research on leadership when confronting dangerous contexts. Thomas A. Kolditz 
(2005), from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, noted that in dangerous contexts, 
followers demand that their leaders are competent. Military rank and authority alone are 
not likely to garner respect, or obedience to orders, in the combat environment (Kolditz, 
2005). 
Kolditz (2005) described in-extremis leadership as “giving purpose, motivation, 
and direction to people when there is imminent physical danger, and where followers 
believe that leader behavior will influence their physical well-being or survival” (p. 6). 
According to Kolditz (2005), in-extremis leaders are inherently motivated and oriented 
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towards learning. They are willing to share risks with their subordinates and strive to 
develop trust in their organizations. In-extremis leaders are situationally aware and learn 
quickly. They are authentic, lack materialism, and focus on values (Kolditz, 2005). 
Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio, and Cavarretta (2009) categorized three specific types 
of in-extremis organizations: high-reliability organizations, trauma organizations, and 
critical action organizations. All three are applicable to the military. High-reliability 
organizations employ systems to execute repetitive tasks with few errors and they focus 
on risk prevention. Most military units would be in the category. Trauma organizations 
often operate in extreme situations and they adhere to strict procedures and protocols. 
Military field hospitals are an example of trauma organizations (Hannah et al., 2009). 
Critical action organizations directly confront danger with the understanding that there 
will be significant risk to members of the organization. Critical action organizations are 
willing to accept casualties to accomplish their missions (Hannah et al., 2009). Army 
and Marine Corps infantry units that train for, and participate in, direct combat are 
examples of critical action organizations. 
Hannah, Campbell, and Matthews (2010) argued that ethos is fundamentally 
important to organizations that operate in a dangerous or in-extremis context. They 
pointed out that military organizations typically codify their ethos in writing. The U.S. 
Marine Corps’ “Rifleman’s Creed” and the U.S. Army’s “Warrior’s Ethos” are examples. 
They also noted that ethos in practice is more encompassing than these explicit 
statements of commitment. According to Hannah, Campbell et al. (2010), ethos 
comprises “the essence of what it is to be an exemplar member” of the military 
profession (p. s180). 
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Hannah (2012) concluded that moral identity sustains ethical behavior in military 
personnel. Snider, Oh, and Toner (2009) submitted that the Army’s professional military 
ethic is a shared system of beliefs and norms, both legal and moral, which define the 
Army’s commitment to serve the nation. Jennings and Hannah (2011) noted that a 
“fundamental tension in military ethics” is about going well past just averting unethical 
behavior to inspiring “supererogatory conduct above and beyond the call of duty” (p. 
550). They identified obligation and aspiration as two contrasting, but complementary, 
moralities in the military. According to them, military service motivates personnel to both 
follow rules and develop identity. 
Jennings and Hannah (2011) suggested that the baseline for a military ethic 
should be a motivation to follow rules based on an accepted moral obligation. However, 
they proposed that an effective military ethic must also “inform and motivate identity-
conferring conduct based on a morality of aspiration” (Jennings & Hannah, 2011, p. 
561). Intrinsic motivation, self-challenge, and self-efficacy are representative of identity 
conferring behavior. The morality of aspiration is about achieving the full realization of 
martial virtue. Martial virtue includes such ideals as honor, courage, commitment, and 
sacrifice (Jennings & Hannah, 2011). 
Through inductive investigation, Fisher, Hutchings, and Sarros (2010) studied the 
in-extremis leadership exhibited by military advisors from Australia during their service 
in the Vietnam War. They determined that the most significant component of effective 
in-extremis leadership is trust. The researchers also found that trust is conditional and 
that it is possible to develop trust quickly in the in-extremis environment (Fisher et al., 
2010). Sweeney, Thompson, and Blanton (2009) studied trust and influence in combat. 
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They surveyed 320 U.S. Army soldiers in Iraq during combat operations. Their findings 
showed that followers who trust their leaders are more willing to accept the influence of 
those leaders. Followers consider leaders dependable if the leader has good character 
traits, establishes interdependent relationships, and displays the required knowledge 
and skills associated with their leadership position (Sweeney et al., 2009). 
Strategic, operational, and tactical leadership. Wong, Bliese, and McGurk 
(2003) reviewed military leadership literature to identify research needs and 
opportunities for military leadership scholars. Using the Hunt (1991) model of 
leadership, they organized the critical leader tasks and individual capabilities required 
into a hierarchy at the systems, organizational, and direct levels of leadership. The Hunt 
model recognizes that systems leadership relates to the 10- to 20-year timespan and 
longer. Organizational leadership relates to the two- to 10-year timespan. Direct 
leadership relates to the present to two-year timespan (Wong et al., 2003). 
Wong et al. (2003) found that Hunt’s three-level model of leadership correlated to 
the military’s stratification of war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In 
Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States (2013), the writers explain that 
conceptualizing warfare at three levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—serves to 
link tactical actions to the achievement of national objectives. According to Wong et al. 
(2003), Hunt’s systems level leadership is applicable to the strategic level of warfare 
and concerns national policy and theater strategy. The organizational level is parallel to 
the operational level of and concerns military campaigns and major operations. Direct 
level leadership equates to the tactical level of warfare. The tactical level of war is 
where the close combat of battles and engagements take place (Wong et al., 2003). 
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Halpin (2011) noted that the devolution of greater authority to tactical-level leaders has 
not received adequate attention in the military leadership literature. This study seeks to 
partially fill that gap. 
Hannah, Jennings, and Nobel (2010) assessed tactical-level leadership in the 
U.S. Army to provide a referent structure for future research. They conducted semi-
structured interviews with three separate samples of junior officer leaders with recent 
combat experience. According to their research, some of the cognitive and affective 
attributes required of tactical-level leaders are hardiness, resilience, positive affectivity, 
and leadership efficacy. Hannah, Jennings et al. (2010) also identified confidence, 
courage, hope, optimism, and resilience as required attributes. Using inductive coding, 
they identified the following five major roles for tactical-level leaders: 
1. Intelligence Manager—The leader collects intelligence; reports and shares 
intelligence; and disseminates and uses intelligence. 
2. Tactical Warfighter—The leader displays tactical and technical proficiency; 
and tactical balance and restraint. 
3. Diplomat—The leader counters insurgents by building collaborative 
relationships and resolving conflict through negotiation. 
4. Nation Builder—The leader supports civil affairs assessments; coordinates 
and manages civil support processes; and facilitates local governance. 
5. Troop and Unit Leader—The leader develops, trains, and motivates 
personnel; ensures unit cohesion and effectiveness; and ensures troop 
welfare and discipline (Hannah, Jennings et al., 2010, p. 428). 
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Positive Organizational Psychology 
Donaldson and Ko (2010) stated that positive psychology is now an “umbrella 
term used to stimulate and organize research, application, and scholarship on 
strengths, virtues, excellence, thriving, flourishing, resilience, flow, and optimal 
functioning in general” (p. 177). According to them, the positive psychology movement 
has inspired new applied research studies and practical applications well beyond 
traditional psychology. For example, Positive Organizational Psychology aims to 
improve organizational effectiveness by studying positive subjective traits and 
experiences in the workplace. Positive Organizational Psychology is an overarching 
term that includes both Positive Organizational Scholarship and Positive Organizational 
Behavior (Donaldson & Ko, 2010). 
Positive organizational scholarship. Luthans and Youssef (2004) explained 
that Positive Organizational Scholarship emphasizes “positive organizational 
characteristics that can enhance organizational survival and effectiveness in times of 
crises and adverse conditions” (p. 152). For example, Peterson and Park (2006) 
proposed that strengths of character are a resource mostly untapped by typical 
organizations. They argued that people with good character find significance beyond 
themselves, and “are happier, healthier, more resilient, and more productive” (Peterson 
& Park, 2006, p. 1,153). They also stated that organizations could foster strengths of 
character by recognizing, celebrating, and encouraging those strengths (Peterson & 
Park, 2006). 
Peterson and Seligman (2004) created an organizing schema of character 
strengths and virtues. They based their classifications on the core virtues that world 
54 
cultures have historically recognized (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005). 
Peterson and Seligman (2004) described the virtues of wisdom, courage, humanity, 
justice, temperance, and transcendence as the “core characteristics valued by moral 
philosophers and religious thinkers” (p. 13). According to Peterson and Seligman 
(2004), each virtue is comprised of multiple character strengths and a single person is 
unlikely to display all 24 of the character strengths. The virtue of wisdom and knowledge 
includes the character strengths of perspective, creativity, love of learning, judgment, 
and curiosity. The courage virtue includes zest, bravery, honesty, and perseverance. 
The virtue of humanity includes the character strengths of social intelligence, kindness, 
and love. The justice virtue includes leadership, teamwork, and fairness. The virtue of 
temperance includes the character strengths of self-regulation, forgiveness, prudence, 
and humility. The transcendence virtue includes appreciation of beauty and excellence, 
spirituality, hope, gratitude, and humor (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). 
Positive organizational behavior. Positive Organizational Behavior concerns 
individual qualities that influence the improvement of performance (Donaldson & Ko, 
2010). Starting with considerations of the individual, Positive Organizational Behavior 
developed inductively to the group and then the organizational levels of analysis 
(Donaldson & Ko, 2010). Luthans (2002a) first proposed the Positive Organizational 
Behavior approach to the workplace. He defined Positive Organizational Behavior as 
the “study and application of positively oriented human resource strengths and 
psychological capacities that can be measured, developed, and effectively managed for 
performance improvement in today’s workplace” (Luthans, 2002a, p. 59). Organizations 
can foster the learning, developing, changing, and managing (Luthans, 2002b) of 
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Positive Organizational Behavior through workplace interventions and proactive 
management (Luthans & Youssef, 2004). 
Psychological capital. Luthans and Youssef (2004) described the collective 
capacities of Positive Organizational Behavior as Psychological Capital. In addition to 
the traditional considerations of human and social capital, Luthans, Luthans, and 
Luthans (2004) proposed that leaders also look at Psychological Capital as a means for 
improving organizational effectiveness. Resilience, optimism, hope, and confidence are 
the four components of Psychological Capital (Luthans & Youssef, 2004). According to 
Luthans et al. (2004), by “eschewing a preoccupation with personal shortcomings and 
dysfunctions and focusing instead on personal strengths and good qualities” (p. 45), 
leaders can develop Psychological Capital in their organizations. 
In a study of 74 production workers at a small Midwestern manufacturing 
company, Larson and Luthans (2006) discovered Psychological Capital related 
significantly to job satisfaction and employee commitment. Their study suggests that 
Psychological Capital contributed more than human or social capital to job satisfaction 
and employee commitment. They characterized confidence, hope, and optimism as 
proactive states in the face of adversity. In contrast, they determined that resilience is 
more reactive (Larson & Luthans, 2006). Similarly, Luthans et al. (2006) proposed that 
confidence, hope, and optimism act as pathways to resilience. 
Schaubroeck, Riolli, Peng, and Spain (2011) examined the influence that 
Psychological Capital had on soldiers during combat deployment. They predicted that 
soldiers with higher levels of trait Psychological Capital would perceive less threat to 
their safety and less feelings of loss during the deployment. They expected that soldiers 
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with high Psychological Capital scores would instead find more challenge, learning 
potential, and personal growth during deployment (Schaubroeck et al., 2011). During 
their tours in Iraq, 633 U.S. Army soldiers from nine infantry units completed responses 
for their study (Schaubroeck et al., 2011). When the researchers collected data during 
the summer of 2004, the soldiers surveyed had been combating the Iraqi insurgency for 
at least two or more months. The researchers examined stressful stimuli to include 
engaging in direct combat, seeing their peers injured or killed in action, and 
experiencing the burden to perform effectively in dangerous situations. They used 
measures of hope, optimism, and ego resilience to measure Psychological Capital. 
Their factor analysis suggests that trait Psychological Capital predicts health and 
performance-related variables. They found that trait Psychological Capital negatively 
correlates with threat appraisal, loss appraisal, anxiety, somatic complaints, and 
depression. They also found that trait Psychological Capital correlates positively with 
challenge appraisal (Schaubroeck et al., 2011). 
Chapter 2 Summary 
This chapter provided a review of the literature relevant to the purpose, research 
approach, and topic of this study. Resilience theory, military resilience, military 
leadership, and positive organizational psychology were all covered. The intent of this 
research effort is to add to the existing body of knowledge on military leadership and 
military resilience. The next chapter discusses the research design and methodology. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
This study seeks to discover how leader practices and strategies can foster 
resilience in military personnel. Conceptually, this study takes a positive psychology 
approach to examining the phenomenon of fostering resilience in a military organization. 
Positive psychology focuses on strengths rather than weaknesses. By focusing on 
leadership strengths, this research uncovers successful strategies and practices that 
military leaders use to foster resilience in their organizations. 
Nature of the Study 
This research study is descriptive in nature. According to Butin (2010), 
descriptive research includes the “deliberate and systematic articulation and analysis of 
issues” (p. 1,215) that can support later action. This descriptive study answers the 
following research questions: 
1. What current practices do military leaders employ to overcome adversity in 
their organizations? 
2. What challenges do military leaders face in implementing those practices 
employed in overcoming adversity in their organizations? 
3. How do military leaders measure their success at overcoming adversity in 
their organizations? 
4. What recommendations would military leaders make to aspiring leaders 
wanting to overcome adversity in their organizations in the future? 
The theoretical framework for this research is social constructivism. Creswell 
(2013) described social constructivism as seeking to understand the world that people 
live in through an examination of their experiences and what they mean. Research 
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conducted using a social constructivist framework relies on the views of study 
participants. From these views, the research develops patterns of meaning inductively 
(Creswell, 2013). According to Creswell (2013), a research study that uses a 
constructivist framework “includes the voices of participants, the reflexivity of the 
researcher, a complex description and interpretation of the problem, and its contribution 
to the literature or a call for change” (p. 44). 
This study employed qualitative methods to address the research questions 
posed. Creswell (2013) defined qualitative research as beginning with “assumptions and 
the use of interpretive/theoretical frameworks that inform the study of research problems 
addressing the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (p. 
44). When conducting a qualitative study, Creswell (2013) pointed out that researchers 
make four philosophical assumptions. 
1. Regarding the nature of reality, qualitative researchers make the ontological 
assumption that any topic under investigation will have multiple realities. 
2. Regarding the epistemological assumption of how to justify knowledge claims, 
researchers conducting a qualitative study seek to minimize the objective 
distance between themselves and the participants of their study. 
3. Qualitative researchers address the axiological assumption by specifically 
stating their values to the readers of the study. 
4. The methodology of qualitative research is “inductive, emerging, and shaped 
by the researcher’s experience in collecting and analyzing the data” 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 22). 
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This research study identified leadership strategies and practices for overcoming 
adversity in military organizations. The participants in this study provided an account of 
their experiences as military commanders in a war zone. The experience of war 
provided these military leaders, and the men that they led into combat, with the chance 
to exhibit resilience in the face of extreme adversity. 
Research Methodology 
According to Creswell (2013), the five approaches to qualitative inquiry are 
narrative, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study. This 
research effort takes a phenomenological approach that incorporates interviews and 
content analysis. The results of a phenomenological study describe the shared meaning 
of common, lived experiences for a group of individuals that have all experienced the 
same phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). A phenomenological study describes both “what” 
the individuals in the group have experienced and “how” they experienced it (Creswell, 
2013). 
Moerer-Urdahl and Creswell (2004) identified the two major approaches to 
phenomenology as hermeneutic and transcendental. Hermeneutic phenomenology is 
based on the work of German philosopher Martin Heidegger and is about the reflective 
interpretation of a study or text to gain a full understanding of its meaning (Moerer-
Urdahl & Creswell, 2004; Moustakas, 1994). Another German philosopher, Edmund 
Husserl, embraced the philosophical issues that underlie transcendental 
phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology is about finding the essence of 
human experience by building a composite and general description of meaning (Moerer-
Urdahl & Creswell, 2004; Moustakas, 1994). This research effort employs 
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transcendental phenomenology to understand the essence of how military leaders 
foster resilience in their organizations. 
Research Design 
A researcher makes several considerations when designing a qualitative 
research study. This section describes how the researcher selected participants for this 
study and how the sources of data were located. Additional topics discussed are criteria 
for inclusion, exclusion, and maximum variation. The section also addresses human 
subject consideration and data collection methods. 
Participant selection. Participants chosen for a phenomenological study must 
have experienced the phenomenon under question. The population for this research 
study is United States Marine Corps infantry officers that commanded battalions in the 
Iraq or Afghanistan war zones between 2003 and 2014. The infantry battalion is the 
basic tactical unit of ground combat power for United States Marine Corps. Personnel 
assigned to infantry battalions are likely to experience extreme adversity while deployed 
to a combat zone. The Marine Corps battalion commander is the unit of analysis for this 
research effort. 
This study employed purposeful sampling of the identified population. Research 
that is qualitative and phenomenological uses purposeful sampling because it informs 
an understanding of the problem under study (Creswell, 2013). The sampling size of 
participants for this study was 15 Marine Corps infantry officers that commanded 
battalions in the Iraq or Afghanistan war zones between 2003 and 2014. 
Sources of data. Researchers must devise plans for locating and contacting 
participants for their study. As a retired Marine Corps Infantry Weapons Officer, the 
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author of this study knows former colleagues that met the criteria for participant 
selection. Using the LinkedIn social networking site, he developed a list of potential 
participants. The researcher obtained contact information for the potential participants 
from the LinkedIn social networking site. Many military professionals, like professionals 
from other fields, use social networking sites such as LinkedIn to maintain contact with 
current and former colleagues. 
Criteria for inclusion. The researcher used criterion sampling to narrow the 
starting list of potential participants by selecting cases that meet specific criteria for 
inclusion in the sample (Creswell, 2013). He included only Marine Corps battalion 
commanders from the identified population that have since retired from active duty. The 
researcher, as a retired military officer that has previously served in combat, believes 
that distance in time and space from military service enables a more thoughtful 
recollection of the wartime experience. 
Criteria for exclusion. The researcher excluded cases that did not meet 
specified criteria for inclusion in the sample (Creswell, 2013). He also excluded all 
battalion commanders from the population that were involuntarily relieved of their 
command responsibilities by the Marine Corps for any reason either during or 
immediately after their combat deployments. The researcher considers the relief of 
command as sufficient reason to believe that the excluded battalion commander’s lived 
experience of the phenomenon under investigation may not be generalizable to the 
entire population of Marine Corps infantry officers that command a battalion in combat 
in either Iraq or Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. 
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Criteria for maximum variation. After applying criteria for inclusion and 
exclusion, the identified list of former United States Marine Corps officers that 
commanded infantry battalions in Iraq or Afghanistan war zones between 2003 and 
2014 remained larger than 20 potential participants. The researcher used maximum 
variation to further reduce the size of the list. Maximum variation is a strategy used by 
qualitative researchers to make certain that the study includes diverse perspectives 
(Creswell, 2013). The researcher achieved criteria for maximum variation by selecting a 
mix of battalion commanders that reflected wartime experiences in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan across the range of available deployment dates between 2003 and 2014. 
Human subjects consideration. The experiences of the study participants 
provided the data necessary to understand how leader strategies and practices can 
influence military personnel to overcome adversity through resilience. The research 
methodology of this study required the approval of the Pepperdine University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). This research study meets the requirements for 
exemption under the federal guidelines. The researcher received an IRB Exemption 
Notice (Appendix A) from the Pepperdine University Graduate School of Education and 
Psychology Institutional Review Board. 
Data collection methods. The researcher contacted each potential participant 
via LinkedIn messaging and invited those individuals to take part in this study. The 
researcher used a recruitment script (Appendix B) during initial and follow-up 
discussions to invite the participants. As each participant agreed to participate in the 
study, the researcher requested full contact information and provided a copy of the 
Informed Consent form (Appendix C) developed for this study. Each participant 
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acknowledged receipt and understanding of the Informed Consent by electronic mail. 
The researcher reviewed the Informed Consent again with the participants immediately 
prior to conducting the telephone interviews. 
The participants of this study were physically located throughout the continental 
United States, making face-to-face access for interviews problematic. Thus, the 
researcher scheduled telephone interviews for 120 minutes each for June through 
August of 2016. He sent reminder emails to each of the study participants, one week 
prior to the scheduled interview dates. This confirmation email included the researcher’s 
contact information, the purpose and scope of the upcoming interview, and the date and 
time scheduled for the interview. 
Prior to each interview, the researcher advised each of the participants that he 
would record the telephone interviews and later transcribe them personally. He offered 
each participant the opportunity to decline the recording of his interview. All participants 
agreed to the recording of their interviews. The researcher advised the participants that 
they would be able to review, check, and consent to the accuracy of interview 
transcriptions and notes. During the telephone interviews, he used two iPhones as 
recording devices to mitigate the failure of a single device. 
The researcher transcribed the recorded interviews into Microsoft Word 
documents. He redacted all personally identifiable information and used pseudonyms to 
reference study participants and their military organizations. The researcher offered 
each participant an opportunity to review, check, and consent to the accuracy of the 
interview transcriptions and notes. Each participant consented accordingly. The 
researcher destroyed the audio recordings within one week after the candidate’s final 
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defense of this dissertation. He is storing the electronic (written) interview transcripts on 
the hard drive of his password-protected personal computer for three years. A back-up 
version of the electronic (written) interview transcripts is located on the researcher’s 
password-protected Carbonite cloud-based data storage service. 
The researcher provided no incentives for participation in the study. The potential 
risks to study participants included feeling uncomfortable with certain questions, fatigue, 
and boredom. Another risk to study participants was the potential disclosure of 
privileged internal policies and procedures belonging to the military organizations in 
which they served. 
Interview Protocol 
The researcher designed the following interview protocol specifically for this 
study. There was no requirement for the establishment of reliability for the data 
collection instrument. A preliminary committee of student peers reviewed and approved 
the interview protocol. The faculty dissertation committee finalized the protocol. 
Interview techniques. At the beginning of each telephone interview, the 
researcher reviewed the provisions of the Informed Consent with the study participant. 
The researcher also reviewed the purpose and scope of the study. He informed study 
participants of the intended 120-minute duration of the interview and of the researcher’s 
intent to audio record the sessions. He conducted the telephone interviews with each 
party alone in a closed room at their homes or place of work to ensure privacy. 
The semi-structured interview questions were general, open-ended, and 
designed to develop an understanding of the phenomenon under study. The interview 
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questions for this study were sub-questions of the original research questions (Appendix 
D). The list of interview questions follows. 
1. What practices did you employ to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
2. What personal attributes enabled you to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
3. What leadership skills enabled you to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
4. What personal challenges did you face implementing practices to overcome 
adversity during combat operations in your military organization? 
5. How did you overcome those personal challenges during combat operations? 
6. What challenges did your organization face overcoming adversity during 
combat operations? 
7. How did your organization overcome those challenges during combat 
operations? 
8. How did you prepare your organization to overcome adversity during combat 
operations? 
9. How did you assess your organizations readiness to overcome adversity 
during combat operations? 
10. How did you measure your organization’s success at overcoming adversity 
during combat operations? 
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11. Is there anything that you have learned from your experience in overcoming 
adversity that you wish you knew prior to your organization’s deployment for 
combat operations? 
12. How would you recommend that aspiring military leaders prepare their 
organizations to overcome adversity during combat operations? 
The researcher encouraged the study participants to answer the interview 
questions thoughtfully and he provided them with opportunities to elaborate on their 
answers. Kvale (2006) pointed out that qualitative research interviews are often a “one-
way dialogue” characterized by an asymmetrical distribution of power (p. 184). The 
researcher employed the Socratic approach to interviewing to develop maximum 
understanding of the phenomenon under study (Kvale, 2006). The Socratic approach to 
interviewing includes two-way dialogue with both the interviewer and study participant 
asking and answering questions to ensure a full exploration of each question. After each 
interview, the researcher thanked the participants for their contributions. He asked for 
and received verbal confirmation from each participant that follow-up contact was 
permissible to seek a better understanding of answers if required. 
Validity and reliability. The researcher developed the interview questions for 
this study based on the research questions listed previously and a review of the 
literature. The interview questions are specific to the population of former United States 
Marine Corps officers that commanded infantry battalions in the Iraq or Afghanistan war 
zones between 2003 and 2014. The researcher specifically designed the research 
questions to uncover leadership strategies and practices related to the phenomenon of 
overcoming adversity in military organizations. He designed the interview questions to 
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encourage the study participants to share their experiences, challenges, and 
recommendations. 
The researcher used a validation process to ensure the interview questions 
addressed the research questions effectively. First, he constructed a table showing the 
relationship between each of the four research questions and its corresponding 
interview questions to establish prima facie validity. In the second step of the validation 
process, a panel of three student peers in the Pepperdine Doctor of Education in 
Organizational Leadership program reviewed a summary statement of the purpose and 
scope of the study. The student peers also assessed the validity of the interview 
protocol. Each of the panel members had previously completed graduate-level courses 
in quantitative and qualitative research methods and data analysis. The panel members 
had also engaged in conducting qualitative research and the practice of instrument 
validity during their studies at Pepperdine University. 
The researcher asked the panel members to review each interview question 
carefully, and then assess whether that question could measure the data needed to 
answer the corresponding research question. The panel affirmed, without any 
modifications, that the interview questions were directly relevant to each of the four 
research questions. The researcher’s faculty dissertation committee, acting as a panel 
of experts, was standing ready to resolve any differences between the researcher and 
the peer-review panel regarding the interview questions. The peer-review panel made 
no recommendations for modification of the interview questions. 
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Statement of Limitations and Personal Bias 
According to Creswell (2012), researchers cannot set aside their own 
experiences entirely. The author of this study concedes that personal bias may have 
influenced the interpretation of the data collected. The author is a retired United States 
Marine Corps Infantry Weapons Officer with over 20 years of active duty experience. In 
addition, the author participated in two combat deployments to Iraq in 2003 and 2004. 
The author retired from active duty in 2007. The Marine Corps assigns one Infantry 
Weapons Officer to each of its 24 infantry battalions. More commonly known as Marine 
Gunners, these officers are prior enlisted infantry personnel with exceptional records of 
achievement and at least 16 years of service. The Marine Corps selects only a few 
Marine Gunners each year from a pool of highly qualified applicants. The Marine 
Gunner is the subject matter expert on weapons and tactics in the infantry battalion. The 
Gunner provides counsel on the training and employment of the infantry battalion’s men 
and weapons against the enemy. The Gunner does not command troops. Instead, the 
Gunner is a principal advisor to the infantry battalion commander. 
The author of this study is a military insider. Members of an organization that are 
studying their own organization are conducting insider research (Brannick & Coghlan, 
2007). Insider researchers are actors in the processes under study. Many academics 
consider insiders as being too close to maintain objectivity or conduct valid research 
within their organizations (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007). Because insider researchers 
have formed insights about their organizations and gained knowledge from their own 
lived experience, their tendency towards loyalty or empathy may negatively influence 
their research (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007). In addition, insider researchers may assume 
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that they already know the answers to their questions. Peer-reviewed journals often 
decline to publish insider research for these reasons. Despite these concerns, Brannick 
and Coghlan (2007) have affirmed the value of insider research. According to them, 
insider researchers, precisely because they are insiders, can understand, reframe, and 
express tacit knowledge as theoretical knowledge (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007). 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis in qualitative research consists of preparing and organizing the 
data. Qualitative researchers build their patterns, categories, and themes from the 
bottom up, by organizing the data inductively into increasingly more abstract units of 
information (Creswell, 2013). This inductive process involves researchers working back 
and forth between the themes and the database until they establish a comprehensive 
set of themes (Creswell, 2013). Drawing on methods previously discussed by 
Moustakas (1994), Creswell recommended six steps when conducting a 
phenomenological study (Creswell, 2013, pp. 193-194). The researcher used the 
following six steps, based on Creswell (2012), to conduct this study. 
1. The researcher described his firsthand experiences with the phenomenon 
under study. 
2. The researcher developed a list of significant statements found in the 
electronic [written] interview transcripts about how the participants 
experienced the phenomenon under study. The researcher then coded these 
statements by reducing and aggregating them into meaningful elements. 
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3. The researcher grouped the resulting coded elements and classified them 
into general themes. In qualitative research, themes are comprehensive units 
of information that form a common idea. 
4. The researcher developed textual descriptions of what happened when the 
study participants experienced the phenomenon. The researcher included 
verbatim examples in the development of these textual descriptions. 
5. The researcher developed structural descriptions of how the study 
participants experienced what happened. The structural descriptions reflect 
the context in which the study participants experienced the phenomenon. 
6. Using the textual and structural descriptions, the research developed a 
composite description, or essence, of the study participants’ experience with 
the phenomenon under investigation. 
Interrater Reliability 
The researcher used a three-step coding process. He coded the data in the first 
step. The researcher discussed the results of coding for the first five interviews with 
peer reviewers in the second step. In the third step, once the researcher completed the 
coding of all remaining interviews, he again submitted the coding results to the peer 
reviewers for feedback. The faculty dissertation committee, serving as a panel of 
experts, stood ready to resolve any differences. 
Coding by the researcher. The researcher reviewed the electronic (written) 
transcripts from five of study participants’ responses and identified key words or 
phrases from each interview. He treated each statement in the resulting list as having 
equal value. The researcher created a table of interview questions with the 
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corresponding key words or phrases. He extracted codes from the data and identified 
themes to organize into common categories and patterns. 
Peer review. The researcher discussed results with peer reviewers in the second 
step. He submitted the resulting coding and preliminary themes obtained from the first 
five interviews for review by two doctoral students peers enrolled in the same 
Organizational Leadership program at Pepperdine University. Both peer reviewers had 
training in qualitative research methods and data analysis. After receiving feedback 
from the peer reviewers, the researcher discussed the feedback with them to resolve 
any areas of non-consensus between the researcher’s coding results and the feedback 
from the peer reviewers. He used the coding results for the first five interviews as the 
basis for coding the remaining interviews. 
Expert review. In the third step, after the researcher completed the coding of all 
interviews, he submitted the results again to the peer reviewers for feedback. 
Discussions with the peer reviewers ensured that there was consensus between the 
researcher and the reviewers regarding the coding results. If consensus was not 
possible, the faculty dissertation committee panel, acting as a panel of experts, was 
standing ready to remedy the differences. However, the researcher and the reviewers 
reached consensus without issue. 
Chapter 3 Summary 
This chapter explained the nature of the study and the research methodology 
employed in the study. This research study followed a phenomenological approach that 
incorporated semi-structured interviews and then provided a detailed analysis of the 
resulting data. The 15 participants that agreed to take part in this study, now all retired, 
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were United States Marine Corps infantry officers that commanded battalions in the Iraq 
or Afghanistan war zones between 2003 and 2014. This chapter discussed the interview 
protocol, to include the 12 interview questions developed specifically for this study. This 
chapter also reviewed the data analysis techniques and procedures in detail. The next 
chapter discusses the findings of the study. 
  
73 
Chapter 4: Findings 
The purpose of this study was to identify leadership strategies and practices that 
foster resilience in military organizations. This entailed determining what challenges 
military leaders face in implementing practices aimed at fostering resilience in their 
organizations. Also examined was how military leaders measure success at fostering 
resilience in their organizations. Finally, this study considered what recommendations 
military leaders would make to aspiring military leaders wanting to foster resilience in 
their organizations in the future. 
Military leadership can impact the protective and organizational factors that 
influence a service-member’s ability to be resilient. Statistics suggest that about 10% of 
service members that have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan are suffering from high or 
chronic post-traumatic stress (Bonanno et al., 2012). Most military personnel and their 
leaders have successfully developed the ability to maintain effective functioning, despite 
the stress and pressure created by friction on the battlefield (Hystad et al., 2015). 
Sinclair et al. (2013) have called for more research on why most service members do 
not develop mental health problems when exposed to stressors. This study answers 
that call. 
Participants 
The population for this research study was United States Marine Corps infantry 
officers that commanded battalions in the Iraq or Afghanistan wars zone between 2003 
and 2014. This study used purposeful sampling of 15 participants from the identified 
population. The participants in this study are no longer on active duty in the United 
States Marine Corps. 
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All 15 of the participants in this study graduated from four-year college prior to 
entering military service. Following their commissioning, each participant attended the 
Marine Officer Candidate School at Quantico, Virginia. All the participants in this study 
are males. During the time that these participants served, the military restricted female 
officers from serving in infantry units. At the time that each participant led his battalion in 
combat in either Iraq or Afghanistan, their average age was 39 years. Their average 
amount of time served on active duty was 17 years. Nine of the participants had 
previous combat experience. 
The researcher numbered the participants in order of the date that they deployed 
to combat. Participants P1-P5 all participated in the initial invasion of Iraq in early 2003. 
Two of the first five participants deployed back to Iraq a second time, in command of the 
same battalion, within seven months of their first return home. Participants P6 and P7 
deployed to Iraq in late 2003 and early 2004 respectively. These deployments occurred 
at the time when the U.S. Armed Forces were restoring civil order and the rule of law in 
Iraq. One of these two commanders deployed back to Iraq with the same battalion soon 
after returning home. 
Participants P8 and P9 deployed to Iraq in 2005 and 2006. At the time of these 
two deployments, the insurgency in Iraq had fully evolved, setting the stage for the 
“Anbar Awakening.” One of these commanders deployed a second time with the same 
battalion within a year of returning home. Participants P10, P11, and P12 deployed to 
Iraq during 2007–2009. These deployments occurred during the time that U.S. Armed 
Forces were again restoring civil order and the rule of law. None of these commanders 
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deployed a second time with their battalions. Two of the battalion commanders from 
group P1-P12 later commanded infantry regiments in Afghanistan. 
Participants P13, P14, and P15 all deployed to Afghanistan between 2009 and 
2014. At the time of these deployments, U.S. Armed Forces were restoring essential 
public services and promoting democracy in Afghanistan. At the same time, the military 
was also targeting the Taliban presence when and where it consolidated. None of these 
commanders deployed a second time. 
Data Collection 
Data collection for this study adhered to the final interview protocol presented 
previously. The data collection instrument did not require the establishment of reliability. 
The researcher collected data over four months from June 18, 2016 to September 31, 
2016. He conducted telephone interviews with each participant using semi-structured 
interview questions developed specifically to gain an understanding of the phenomenon 
under study. All interviews lasted between 70 and 120 minutes. At the time of each 
telephone interview, the researcher reviewed the provisions of the Informed Consent as 
well as the purpose and scope of the study with each participant. 
The researcher informed each study participant of his intent to audio record the 
interview sessions. He conducted the interviews using a two-way dialogue with both the 
researcher and study participant asking and answering questions to explore each 
interview question thoroughly. The study participants answered the questions 
thoughtfully and often elaborated on their answers to ensure clarity of understanding. 
The dates that each interview occurred are in the table that follows. 
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Table 1. 
Participants and Dates Interviewed 
Participant Date Interviewed 
P1 June 18, 2016 
P2 June 20, 2016 
P3 June 22, 2016 
P4 September 16, 2016 
P5 September 17, 2016 
P6 September 11, 2016 
P7 September 14, 2016 
P8 August 29, 2016 
P9 September 23, 2016 
P10 July 31, 2016 
P11 September 31, 2016 
P12 June 21, 2016 
P13 July 20, 2016 
P14 July 24, 2016 
P15 September 12, 2016 
 
Data Analysis 
The researcher accomplished data analysis by building patterns, categories, and 
themes from the bottom up. Using the electronic (written) interview transcripts 
developed from the recorded interviews, the researcher compiled a list of significant 
statements about how the participants experienced the phenomenon under study. He 
then coded these statements by reducing and aggregating them into meaningful 
elements. The researcher treated each statement in the resulting list of elements as 
having equal value. He organized the data inductively by grouping and classifying the 
resulting coded elements into general themes. 
Data Display 
The data results presented are textual descriptions of what happened when the 
study participants experienced the phenomenon. In Chapter Five, the researcher 
presents descriptions of how the study participants experienced the phenomenon. 
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Using textual and structural descriptions, the researcher developed an essence of the 
study participants’ experience. The researcher organized and displayed the data here in 
Chapter Four by research question and interview questions as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. 
Research Questions and Interview Questions 
Research question Interview questions 
1 1, 2, 3 
2 4, 5, 6, 7 
3 8, 9, 10 
4 11, 12 
 
The researcher presented the synthesis of data results in Chapter Five. The researcher 
developed this study’s interview questions with the intent of synthesizing the interview 
question groups’ data shown in Table 2 to answer the following four research questions: 
1. What current practices do military leaders employ to overcome adversity in 
their organizations? 
2. What challenges do military leaders face in implementing those practices 
employed in overcoming adversity in their organizations? 
3. How do military leaders measure their success at overcoming adversity in 
their organizations? 
4. What recommendations would military leaders make to aspiring leaders 
wanting to overcome adversity in their organizations in the future? 
The interview questions for this study were sub-questions of the original research 
questions. The list of interview questions follows. 
1. What practices did you employ to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
78 
2. What personal attributes enabled you to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
3. What leadership skills enabled you to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
4. What personal challenges did you face implementing practices to overcome 
adversity during combat operations in your military organization? 
5. How did you overcome those personal challenges during combat operations? 
6. What challenges did your organization face overcoming adversity during 
combat operations? 
7. How did your organization overcome those challenges during combat 
operations? 
8. How did you prepare your organization to overcome adversity during combat 
operations? 
9. How did you assess your organization’s readiness to overcome adversity 
during combat operations? 
10. How did you measure your organization’s success at overcoming adversity 
during combat operations? 
11. Is there anything that you have learned from your experience in overcoming 
adversity that you wish you knew prior to your organization’s deployment for 
combat operations? 
12. How would you recommend that aspiring military leaders prepare their 
organizations to overcome adversity during combat operations? 
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Data Collection Results 
The researcher organized the data collection results presented here by 
inductively working back and forth between the database, elements, and themes ad 
nauseam from the beginning of October 2016 to the middle of January 2017. The 
researcher included verbatim examples in the development of these textual 
descriptions. He redacted all personally identifiable information and used pseudonyms 
to reference the study participants (i.e. P1, P2…P15). 
Research question 1. Research question one asked: What current practices do 
military leaders employ to overcome adversity in their organizations? The intent of this 
question was to provide the study participants with an early opportunity to express their 
main ideas and thoughts about overcoming adversity and fostering resilience. 
Regarding his experience with the phenomenon, P5 explained that “we were not talking 
resilience back when I was doing this” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). 
Likewise, P6 said “we were doing it [fostering resilience], we just were not using those 
words” (personal communication, September 11, 2016). 
All the participants stated that for a military unit to overcome adversity in combat, 
the commander must build resilience in the organization prior to the combat 
deployment. These comments support prior assertions found in the literature about the 
relationship between unit cohesion and resilience (Britt & Oliver, 2013; Meredith et al., 
2011). Indicative of this sentiment, P1 observed, “units are resilient because of the 
investment that’s made before you go to combat” (personal communication, June 18, 
2016). The following three interviews questions pertain to research question one. 
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1. What practices did you employ to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
2. What personal attributes enabled you to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
3. What leadership skills enabled you to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
Interview question 1. What practices did you employ to overcome adversity 
during combat operations in your military organization? Previous research has noted 
that resilience is mostly a group-level phenomenon in the military because team 
members rely on each other to work effectively in high-threat environments (Adler, 
2013). This study accounts for multiple responses because some participants shared 
more than one practice. From the participants’ answers to interview question one, three 
themes emerged (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Practices employed to overcome adversity in combat. 
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Small-unit training to build cohesion. Thirteen of 15 participants (87%) identified 
small unit training to build cohesion as a practice that fostered resilience in their military 
organization. Unit cohesion is a social construct that enables a military unit to work 
together towards accomplishing assigned missions (Britt & Oliver, 2013). This finding 
affirms a prior suggestion in the literature regarding the identification of combat training 
as the decisive factor that binds military groups together (King, 2006). P1 remarked that 
cohesion is the result of “shared hardship and shared training” (personal 
communication, June 18, 2016). P2 emphasized that “training pulls a fighting unit 
together” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). P9 stated that on the battlefield, 
“good teams counteract the effects of adversity” (personal communication, September 
23, 2016). The researcher coded three elements as part of the small unit training to 
build cohesion theme. Those elements were (1) building cohesion takes time, (2) trust 
and mutual respect, and the (3) importance of subordinate leaders to building cohesion. 
Eleven participants (73%) discussed how building cohesion takes time. The 
study participants mostly agreed that they would have liked more time to train their units 
and build cohesion prior to their combat deployments. P12 stated, “I had a really difficult 
time building cohesion because I got lots of [new] Marines just prior to deployment” 
(personal communication, June 21, 2016). Faced with the same challenge, P7 told his 
unit that “the best way to be a veteran is to bring a new guy in” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2016). Characterizing the arrival of new personnel late 
in the training cycle as a systemic personnel management problem, P6 admonished 
that the Marine Corps needs to “get in-synch on this” (personal communication, 
September 11, 2016). P10 admitted, “I do not think I overcame the time challenge” 
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(personal communication, July 31, 2016). P8 declared, “I blame the institution” for not 
providing enough time (personal communication, August 29, 2016). 
Seven participants (47%) provided their thoughts on unit cohesion being about 
trust and mutual respect. This finding affirms a prior suggestion in the literature that 
primary group cohesion is about trust among group members and the capacity for 
teamwork (Siebold, 2007). P1 described cohesion in a military unit as having “mutual 
respect, being invested in each other and relying on the man to your left and your right” 
(personal communication, June 18, 2016). P3 stated that cohesion is about having “trust 
in the man to your left and right” (personal communication, June 22, 2016). P5 
explained, “you need a culture of resilience in the unit because we are only as brave as 
the unit we move with” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). Similarly, P1 
observed, “what enables individuals to overcome adversity in combat is the unit’s ability 
to overcome adversity in combat” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). 
Six participants (40%) referenced the importance of subordinate leaders to 
building cohesion. As noted by Siebold (2007), primary group cohesion is comprised of 
both peer and leader bonding. Peer bonding is among members of a military unit at the 
same hierarchical level such as a squad, platoon, or company. Leader bonding is 
between seniors and subordinates at the unit level. Primary group cohesion is about 
trust among group members and the capacity for teamwork (Siebold, 2007). P11 
declared, “getting leaders late in the training cycle was a nightmare” (personal 
communication, September 31, 2016). Conversely, P2 kept most of his key leaders for a 
second combat deployment and “felt we were invincible” because “we all thought the 
same” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). 
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Creating a positive command climate. Of the 15 participants, 13 (87%) identified 
creating a positive command climate as a practice that fostered resilience in their 
military organization. According to Doty and Gelineau (2008), command climate in the 
military is the “culture of a unit” and the leader “is solely responsible for the 
organization’s command climate” (p. 22). This finding affirms a prior suggestion in the 
literature regarding positive command climate being one of the organizational factors 
that influence resilience in the military (Meredith et al., 2011). The researcher coded the 
following four elements as part of the creating a positive command climate theme. 
Those elements are (1) earn their trust, (2) maintain discipline, (3) treat men with 
respect, and (4) have fun. 
Among the participants, 10 (67%) stated that the commander’s ability to earn 
their trust is a critical element of creating positive command climate. As noted in the 
literature review, past studies have shown that military personnel who trust their leaders 
are more willing to accept the influence of those leaders (Sweeney et al., 2009). Trust is 
the most significant component of effective in-extremis leadership (Fisher et al., 2010). 
P1 described a positive command climate as the Marines being “invested in the 
command” and having “faith in their leadership” (personal communication, June 18, 
2016). Likewise, P9 stated that positive command climate is about the “Marines having 
confidence in their leader” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). As pointed 
out by P3, trust is essential because “your decisions are not going to be popular” 
(personal communication, June 22, 2016) in combat. 
Several commanders pointed out the need to earn the trust of their Marines’ 
families as well. P1 said, “I worked to earn the families trust as much as the Marines 
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trust” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P7 said that he focused on families to 
give them confidence that we were ready to deploy (personal communication, 
September 14, 2016). P9 noted, “I did a lot of outreach to the wives because he thought 
it was important that they knew who he was” (personal communication, September 23, 
2016). 
P11 observed that face-to-face contact with the Marines was essential for a 
leader to earn their trust (personal communication, September 31, 2016). P1 found that 
“being a 43-year-old that can communicate with a 21-year-old” was also helpful 
(personal communication, June 18, 2016). P13 was willing to “explain to the Marines 
what he was all about” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P5 noted that earning 
trust requires “good judgment” because “we are older and they expect it” (personal 
communication, September 17, 2016). 
Among the participants, eight (53%) emphasized the commander’s need to 
maintain discipline as an aspect of creating a positive command climate. P3 described 
his battalion has having “sturdy mental, moral, and spiritual discipline” and explained 
that “having expectations and demanding adherence to them” is how a commander 
maintains discipline (personal communication, June 22, 2016). P1 discussed, “flat 
holding them and yourself accountable” (personal communication, Jun 18, 2016). P11 
stated, “you have turned the corner when the NCOs (non-commissioned officers) are 
maintaining the standards” (personal communication, September 31, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) identified a willingness to treat men with 
respect as another component of creating a positive command climate. P13 explained 
that the commander should “treat Marines like men, and they will behave like men” 
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(personal communication, July 20, 2016). Participants pointed out the importance of 
respecting the opinions and contributions of their Marines as well. P8 stated, “we [the 
Marine Corps] are a culture that supports having an opinion because everyone knows 
that once a decision is made, we go with it” (personal communication, August 29, 2016). 
P9 observed, “the younger generation [of Marines] expects to contribute so that they 
have ownership” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) described encouraging their Marines to have 
fun as a contributor to creating a positive command climate. P12 indicated that having 
fun was “part of his [leadership] philosophy” (personal communication, June 21, 2016). 
P4 observed, “humor allows guys to relax” (personal communication, September 16, 
2016). Based on his experience working with the British Royal Marines, P7 adopted 
their mantra of “cheerfulness under adversity” (personal communication, September 14, 
2016). 
Instilling a sense of purpose. Of the 15 participants, 12 (80%) identified instilling 
a sense of purpose as a practice that fostered resilience in their military organization. 
This finding is significant because previous studies of military resilience have not 
identified instilling a sense of purpose as an organizational factor that influences 
resilience. The researcher coded the following two elements as part of the instilling a 
sense of purpose theme. Those elements are the (1) importance of having purpose and 
(2) instilling purpose takes time. 
Among the participants, eight (53%) discussed the importance of having 
purpose. Nations go to war to advance a political purpose. Protecting national interests 
is a noble cause that provides a sense of purpose for service members to go to war. For 
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example, P2 explained to his Marines that their invasion of Iraq in 2003 was “sanctioned 
by our government” and “what we were doing was justified” (personal communication, 
June 20, 2016). In addition to protecting national interests, military ethos provides 
another purpose for service members to go to war. Military personnel aspire to achieve 
the full realization of martial virtue (Jennings & Hannah, 2011). Martial virtue includes 
such ideals as honor, courage, commitment, and sacrifice (Jennings & Hannah, 2011). 
P1 pointed toward the border and said “gentlemen, the way home is north through 
Baghdad” and “we are all in this together” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P3 
reminded his men that our “ancestors are watching” and the “American people believe 
that the Marines will always win on the battlefield and so we have too” (personal 
communication, June 22, 2016). 
However, if the war drags on and the strategy for winning the war appears 
misguided or public support for the war fades, the original purpose of fighting to protect 
national interests becomes less valid. By 2006 in Iraq, P9 was asking, “How long does 
this insurgency need to go on before we realize what is going on?” (personal 
communication, September 23, 2016) P9 further commented, “Marines can see when 
the strategy is not working” and this makes it “much harder to bounce back from the shit 
show of not understanding the mission” (personal communication, September 23, 2016) 
P9 stated that military men and women will certainly begin to ask, “why am I going to 
risk my life for this?” (personal communication, September 23, 2016) As P9 went on to 
explain, “the Vietnam guys had so much trouble because their mission was not 
winnable” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). 
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According to the study participants, once the political purpose for going to war 
becomes questionable, leaders must rely solely on military ethos and martial virtue to 
provide purpose. P13 observed that some of his Marines “extended for their 3rd and 4th 
combat tours so that they could deploy with their roommates” and hopefully see the war 
through to conclusion (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P11 said that when his 
battalion deployed to Iraq in 2007, he and his men were “having trouble seeing the 
value in the mission and thought it would just go back to shit when they left” (personal 
communication, September 31, 2016). In 2009, with the U.S. presence in Iraq drawing 
down, P12 was asking himself “why stop oil smugglers?” and “what is the value of a 
Marine’s life for this type of mission?” (personal communication, June 21, 2016) In 
2014, toward the end of U.S. combat deployments to Afghanistan, P15 was attempting 
to convince his Marines that “the mission was still important” and “there is good in what 
we are doing” (personal communication, September 12, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (40%) recognized that instilling purpose takes time. 
P5 stated, “the commander and the senior leadership are responsible for meaning 
making” and for “putting things in context in the combat environment” (personal 
communication, September 17, 2016). To be successful, P12 noted the commander 
needs time to “get past story-telling and have Marines take ownership” (personal 
communication, June 21, 2016). P11 provided Marines with “continuous reinforcement 
of why we are here, and what we are doing” (personal communication, September 31, 
2016). Reflecting on his battalion’s time in Afghanistan, P13 explained that “as a leader, 
you have to make up your mind about what your message is, and then communicate it 
every single day of the deployment” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). 
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Interview question 2. What personal attributes enabled you to overcome 
adversity during combat operations in your military organization? This study accounts 
for multiple responses because some participants shared more than one attribute. 
Several participants stressed the importance of modeling these attributes as a means of 
setting the example for their Marines. For example, P7 commented, “personal example 
is the one thing that you must do and if you don’t do it, they see it” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2016). P4 noted, “we are a social animal, so people are 
always looking at us” (personal communication, September 16, 2016). P1 said, “if 
something’s important to you, it will be important to them” (personal communication, 
June 18, 2016). From the participants’ answers to interview question two, three themes 
emerged (see Figure 2). These three attributes support the idea that the resilience 
process begins at a point of biopsychospiritual (mental, physical, and spiritual) 
homeostasis (Richardson, 2002). 
 
Figure 2. Personal attributes for overcoming adversity in combat. 
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Educated and trained. Of the 15 participants, 12 (80%) identified educated and 
trained as an attribute that enabled them to personally overcome adversity. This finding 
supports the ideas that in-extremis leaders are inherently motivated and oriented 
towards learning (Kolditz, 2005) and that lifelong pursuit of expert knowledge is an 
intrinsic factor that motivates military professionals (Snider, 2012). This finding also 
confirms a prior assertion in the literature about the positive relationship between 
efficacy and resilience (Lee et al., 2013). P13 said, “I have always prided myself that I 
am constantly in a learning mode” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P1 proudly 
acknowledged, “I knew I was prepared, I prepared my whole life” (personal 
communication, June 18, 2016). The researcher coded the following two elements as 
part of the educated and trained theme. Those elements are (1) institutional military 
training and (2) being well-read on the art and science of war. 
Among the participants, nine (60%) commented on the value of the institutional 
military training that they received from the Marine Corps. Institutional training included 
both tactical training and leadership training. P8 concluded, “the Marine Corps took the 
raw material and developed me progressively” (personal communication, August 29, 
2016). P9 pointed out that after joining the Marine Corps, “he took on the tough schools 
and the tough assignments” to ensure that he was ready to lead men in combat 
(personal communication, September 23, 2016). P1 characterized his institutional 
training as “the Marine Corps had invested in me” (personal communication, June 18, 
2016). P4 shared that “tactical proficiency made him a confident leader” (personal 
communication, September 16, 2016). P6 stated, “all my training had prepared me for 
battle” (personal communication, September 11, 2016). P7 specifically called attention 
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to the training he received to plan tactical operations (personal communication, 
September 14, 2016). Likewise, P2 claimed that doing his “best to plan our operations” 
would help to make the “mission successful” and give his Marines a “fighting advantage” 
(personal communication, June 20, 2016). 
Among the participants, six (40%) addressed the importance of being well-read 
on the art and science of war. P3 claimed that he read widely to “understand the role of 
the commander in combat” (personal communication, June 22, 2016). P2 remarked that 
his reading about warfare provided an “understanding of the nature of war and just war 
theory” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). P8 confessed, “I read all the time 
because history is about as close as you can get to experience…my vocation and my 
avocation were the same thing” and thus, “I encountered 100 dilemmas on the 
battlefield that other people had already encountered” (personal communication, August 
29, 2016). 
Physically fit. Of the 15 participants, 10 (67%) believed that being physically fit 
was an attribute that enabled them to overcome adversity. This finding confirms prior 
assertions found in the literature about the causal relationship between fitness and 
resilience (Meredith et al., 2011). The researcher coded the following three elements as 
part of the physically fit theme. Those elements are: the (a) need for functional fitness, 
(b) conducting rigorous physical training, and the (c) fitness builds tolerance for 
adversity. 
Among the participants. five (33%) noted the need for functional fitness training 
that accurately replicates the grueling demands of the battlefield. P3 claimed that he 
was “fit for purpose” prior to his battalion’s combat deployment (personal 
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communication, June 22, 2016). P1 described how his battalion’s physical training 
program focused on “things that were different than standard fitness, more functional in 
nature” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). Recognizing the importance of being 
functionally fit, P5 remarked that Marines should “shed the old ways of thinking” and 
prepare for combat physically with the same attitude that professional athletes train for 
their respective sports (personal communication, September 11, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) emphasized the necessity for conducting 
rigorous physical training. P7 justified his demanding physical training program by 
noting, “there will be time when you want to quit and you cannot quit” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2016). P8 said that his training programs took Marines 
to the point of “physical exhaustion” (personal communication, August 29, 2016) at each 
event. P9 remarked that the Marines must “feel their heart pounding out of their chests” 
(personal communication, September 23, 2016) during physical training. P4 explained 
how he and his subordinate officers would conduct physical training until completely 
exhausted and then participate in a tactical decision exercise to replicate the duress of 
the battlefield (personal communication, September 16, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) also expressed their understanding that 
fitness builds tolerance for adversity. For example, P3 said that he put himself in “a hurt 
locker” to build a tolerance for adversity (personal communication, June 22, 2016). P13 
observed that physical fitness is a “critical piece for overcoming adversity” (personal 
communication, July 20, 2016). P1 commented similarly, saying that “physical fitness is 
an essential element of resiliency” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). 
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Believes in God. Of the 15 participants, six (40%) acknowledged that believing in 
God was an attribute that specifically enabled them to overcome adversity. As shown in 
the literature review, spirituality is a component of resilience per the Connor-Davidson 
Resilience Scale (Connor & Davidson, 2003). The Army’s Consolidated Soldier Fitness 
(CSF) program also addresses spirituality without reference to any specific religious 
beliefs and practices (Peterson et al., 2011). The researcher coded two elements as 
part of the believes in God theme. Those elements are (1) faith provides confidence and 
(2) command is lonely without faith. 
Among the participants, four (27%) explained how faith provides confidence to 
lead Marines through the rigors of combat. P6 said, “knowing that there is an afterlife” 
provided him with that assurance (personal communication, September 11, 2016). P2 
said that as a leader, “you don’t want to show weakness or signs of faltering and so this 
[belief in God] helped me” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). P1 proudly 
admitted that it was “faith in self, faith in the unit, and faith in God that gave us 
confidence in our ability to carry the day” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P15 
said that believing in something greater than yourself improves chances (personal 
communication, September 12, 2016). 
Among the participants, four (27%) also remarked that command is lonely 
without God. P2 claimed that you need a spiritual background because “for a leader 
trying to do it alone, it is not a good thing” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). P2 
stated, “I prayed that the good Lord was watching over us during combat operations” 
(personal communication, June 20, 2016). P14 credited his success as a combat leader 
to “solid faith and being able to pray at night” (personal communication, July 24, 2016). 
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P15 said as well that “being the commander can be very lonely, but if you are a spiritual 
person, you are not alone” (personal communication, September 12, 2016). 
Interview question 3. What leadership skills enabled you to overcome adversity 
during combat operations in your military organization? P11 stated, “the tools that I used 
were the leadership skills that I learned along the way” (personal communication, 
September 31, 2016). This study accounts for multiple responses because some 
participants shared more than one leadership skill. From the participants’ answers to 
interview question three, five themes emerged (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Leadership skills for overcoming adversity in combat. 
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researcher coded two elements as part of the winning their affection theme. Those 
elements are (1) show concern and (2) build relationships. 
Among the participants, eight (53%) commented on the need to for a commander 
to show concern for the men in his battalion. P7 said that leaders must “show concern 
about their [the Marines] welfare” (personal communication, September 14, 2016). P3 
described the need for a commander to show “genuine concern” (personal 
communication, June 22, 2016). P5 stated that the Marines “must know that you care 
about them” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). P2 was proud to say that 
he would give his Marines “a big bear hug” as “an embrace of brotherly affection” 
(personal communication, June 20, 2016). P2 further stated, “I loved my Marines, but at 
the same time I could also send them to their possible deaths” (personal 
communication, June 20, 2016). 
Among the participants, six (40%) recognized that the commander should build 
relationships with subordinates. P11 discussed “getting kneecap to kneecap and 
building personal relationships with these kids” (personal communication, September 
31, 2016). P1 talked about communicating “father to son” to with his Marines (personal 
communication, June 18, 2016). P4 made an effort to “know about them, know where 
they came from, know what their girlfriend’s name was” (personal communication, 
September 16, 2016). P7 recalled that some commanders did not have this leadership 
skill and “so they fucked things up” (personal communication, September 14, 2016). 
Demonstrating character. Of 15 participants, nine (60%) stated demonstrating 
character is a necessary leadership skill for fostering resilience. Personal adaptation to 
adversity requires positive psychological functioning which is boosted by strengths of 
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character (Boermans et al., 2012). During his career as a leader of Marines, P1 noticed 
“they [the Marines] never do what they’re told, they do what they see” (personal 
communication, June 18, 2016). Followers consider leaders dependable if they have 
good character traits and establish interdependent relationships (Sweeney et al., 2009). 
The researcher coded four elements as part of the demonstrating character theme. 
Those elements are (1) moral courage, (2) humility, (3) honesty, and (4) empathy. 
Among the participants, six (40%) indicated that a leader must show moral 
courage. P1 claimed “moral and ethical courage are essential” because in combat, 
“there are things that will challenge you to your core” (personal communication, June 
18, 2016). P6 stated a commander cannot “take no for an answer from higher 
headquarters when it comes to taking care of the men” (personal communication, 
September 11, 2016). P14 also recommended commanders “not be concerned about 
career” and “just do right by the Marines” (personal communication, July 24, 2016). P5 
observed that moral courage is also about “not trying to be the strongest guy in the 
battalion” or the “iconic war leader” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) believed that humility is a significant character 
trait for leaders. P5 warned against the pitfalls of hubris for a combat leader (personal 
communication, September 17, 2016). P9 cautioned that “when something is bad or 
something is screwed up, you need to tell them, because by the way, they already 
know” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). P7 believed in the importance of 
being “introspective and big enough to recognize when there are problems” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2016). 
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Among the participants, five (33%) emphasized that honesty is an essential 
character trait for leaders. P5 discussed the need for a commander to “be authentic, 
open, and honest” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). P9 said it was 
important to “be honest and acknowledge their intellect” (personal communication, 
September 23, 2016). P8 stressed “the importance of honesty in the little things” and 
“having a reputation for saying exactly what you mean” (personal communication, 
August 29, 2016). Leaders expect that honesty will be reciprocal. P7 noted that 
commanders need “guys to tell you the truth when something is not working” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2016). P9 also stated that “the leader has to have 
people that will tell him the truth” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) recommended that leaders also show 
empathy. P6 cautioned against leaders just saying “buck-up and carry on” to their 
Marines (personal communication, September 11, 2016). P11 insisted that a 
commander must be able to “show empathy with what the young Marine is going 
through” (personal communication, September 31, 2016). P8 remarked that he was able 
“show empathy” for his subordinate leaders “because he had already been there” 
(personal communication, August 29, 2016). 
Sharing in the danger. Of 15 participants, nine (60%) indicated that sharing in the 
danger is a leadership skill that fosters resilience. As noted in the opening chapter of 
this study, Clausewitz identified danger as one of the constant sources of friction in 
military operations (Watts, 2004). Danger is always present on the battlefield (Bartone, 
2006). The researcher coded two elements as part of the share in the danger theme. 
Those elements are (1) lead from the front and (2) go to the sound of the guns. 
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Among the participants, seven (47%) highlighted the requirement for a 
commander to lead from the front. P15 said that leading from the front means “operating 
with them and carrying the weight” (personal communication, September 12, 2016). P8 
said that he “tried to show them what right looks like” on the battlefield (personal 
communication, August 29, 2016). P3 described leadership at the front as “showing the 
dog how to hunt” (personal communication, June 22, 2016). P7 noted that “when fear 
was high” in his battalion, he personally went on “the most dangerous missions” 
(personal communication, September 14, 2016). P2 summarized leading from the front 
as showing “a love of the battle” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). 
P11 recognized that leadership at the front is not always possible because “your 
responsibilities are wide-ranging” (personal communication, September 31, 2016). 
Likewise, P8 understood this challenge, but agreed that “sometimes you need to be 
there to show shared sacrifice and shared risk” (personal communication, August 29, 
2016). Regarding this dilemma, P1 stressed that the “most important decision a 
battalion commander makes is where he places himself on the battlefield” (personal 
communication, June 18, 2016). 
P4 was one of five participants (33%) that remarked on how important it was for 
“the commander to go to the sound of the guns” (personal communication, September 
16, 2016). P1 emphasized that “as a leader, you are willing to share the risk” and so 
“you go to the scene of the fight” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P3 stated, “I 
can look in the mirror now because I left everything on the field” and that he “gave the 
enemy plenty of chances to kill me too” (personal communication, June 22, 2016). 
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Being calm and confident. Of 15 participants, seven (47%) indicated that being 
calm and confident on the battlefield is another leadership skill that fosters resilience. 
This theme contained a single coded element of the same name. P15 noted the 
requirement “to maintain calm in any situation” by “keeping your cool” (personal 
communication, September 12, 2016). P9 stated that a leader’s actions should “project 
calm…all is normal, we will get through this” (personal communication, September 23, 
2016). P13 described projecting confidence on the battlefield as “being the calm in the 
storm” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P4 also counseled to “show 
confidence, show no doubts, show no worries” and “never be the screamer” (personal 
communication, September 16, 2016). P3 discussed his ability to “do just fine in what 
seemed like an uncontrolled environment” (personal communication, June 22, 2016). 
Keeping subordinates informed. Of 15 participants, seven (47%) indicated that 
keeping subordinates informed is a leadership skill that fosters resilience. This theme 
contained a single coded element of the same name. P7 observed that a person “needs 
to be in control to be resilient and Marines basically have no control” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2016). Information provides at least a modicum of the 
control that a person needs. P9 noted that “there is the danger of the unknown, so the 
more information they have, they know what to expect” (personal communication, 
September 23, 2016). P1 emphasized that “when things are at their worst, you have to 
be your best and you have to be seen” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P2 
recommended that commanders “get down to the fighting level [platoon or smaller units] 
on their turf” to talk to Marines during combat operations (personal communication, 
June 20, 2016). P11 also noted the importance of “talking directly to the younger 
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Marines on their post at the battle positions” and “explaining to them what was going on” 
(personal communication, September 31, 2016). 
Summary of research question 1. Research question one asked: What 
practices do military leaders employ to overcome adversity in their organizations? The 
researcher designed three interview questions to support this research question. The 
battalion commanders provided thoughtful and substantial answers to each of the three 
interview questions. 
Interview question 1 asked what practices that battalion commanders employed 
to overcome adversity during combat operations. The commanders identified small unit 
training to build cohesion, creating a positive command climate, and instilling a sense of 
purpose as the practices that they employed to overcome adversity in combat. See 
Table 3 below for themes and associated coded elements for interview question one. 
Table 3. 
Practices Employed to Overcome Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Small unit training to build cohesion Building cohesion takes time 
Trust and mutual respect 
Importance of subordinate leaders to 
building cohesion 
Creating a positive command climate Earn their trust 
Maintain discipline 
Treat men with respect 
Have fun 
Instilling a sense of purpose Importance of having purpose 
Instilling purpose takes time 
 
Interview question 2 asked the battalion commanders what attributes enabled 
them to overcome adversity during combat operations. The commanders identified 
educated and trained, physically fit, and believes in God as the attributes that enabled 
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them to overcome adversity in combat. See Table 4 below for themes and associated 
coded elements for interview question two. 
Table 4. 
Personal Attributes for Overcoming Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Educated and trained Institutional military training 
Being well-read on the art and science of war 
Physically fit Need for functional fitness 
Conducting rigorous physical training 
Fitness builds tolerance for adversity 
Believes in God Faith provides confidence 
Command is lonely without faith 
 
Interview question three asked the battalion commanders what leadership skills 
enabled them to overcome adversity during combat operations. The commanders 
identified winning subordinates’ affection, demonstrating character, sharing in the 
danger, being calm and confident, and keeping subordinates informed as the leadership 
skills that enabled them to overcome adversity in combat. See Table 5 below for themes 
and associated coded elements for interview question three. 
Table 5. 
Leadership Skills for Overcoming Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Winning subordinate’s affection Show concern 
Build relationships 
Demonstrating character Moral courage 
Humility 
Empathy 
Honesty 
Sharing in the danger Lead from the front 
Go to the sound of the guns 
Being calm and confident Being calm and confident 
Keeping subordinates informed Keeping subordinates informed 
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Research question 2. Research question 2 asked: What challenges do military 
leaders face in implementing those practices employed in overcoming adversity in their 
organizations? The researcher designed this research question to identify the 
challenges that military leaders and their subordinates face overcoming adversity in 
combat and how they address those challenges. The following four interviews questions 
pertain to research question two: 
1. What personal challenges did you face implementing practices to overcome 
adversity during combat operations in your military organization? 
2. How did you overcome those personal challenges during combat operations? 
3. What challenges did your organization face overcoming adversity during 
combat operations? 
4. How did your organization overcome those challenges during combat 
operations? 
Interview question 4. What personal challenges did you face implementing 
practices to overcome adversity during combat operations in your military organization? 
This study accounts for multiple responses because some participants shared more 
than one challenge. From the participants’ answers to interview question four, two 
themes emerged (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Personal challenges to overcoming adversity in combat. 
Commander responsibilities. Of 15 participants, 12 (80%) identified commander 
responsibilities as a personal challenge that they faced during combat that caused 
adversity. In recognition of his responsibilities, P1 observed that there is “no such thing 
as a bad battalion, only bad battalion commanders” (personal communication, June 18, 
2016). The researcher coded two elements as part of the commander responsibilities 
theme. Those elements are (1) decision-making and (2) sending men into harm’s way. 
Among the participants, 10 (67%) indicated decision-making was a commander 
responsibility that caused adversity during combat. As Maddi (2004) explained, each 
decision a person makes involves choosing an unfamiliar future path, and this creates 
ontological anxiety through fear of uncertainty and the potential for failure. P9 
commented, “making bad decisions was a challenge” (personal communication, 
September 23, 2016). P10 observed commanders are “dealing in an environment of fog 
and friction” and “despite only having a limited amount of information, a decision is 
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required” (personal communication, July 31, 2016). P11 remarked, “stuff starts 
happening and it happens fast” (personal communication, September 31, 2016). P4 
noted commanders “are getting paid to make the tough decisions” (personal 
communication, September 16, 2016). P8 recalled thinking, “how can I reinforce the 
decisions that the guy on scene is going to make?” (personal communication, 
September 14, 2016). P9 stated he tried to “involve more people in the decision-making 
process” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). P14 also pointed out 
“collective decisions are more well informed” (personal communication, July 24, 2016). 
Among the participants, seven (47%) indicated that sending men into harm’s way 
was a commander responsibility that caused adversity during combat. As noted in the 
literature review, military units confront danger directly with the understanding that there 
will be significant risk to members of the organization (Hannah et al., 2009). P1 
remarked that “causing marines to lose their lives or be injured” was a concern for him 
and “I didn’t want to fail the men that I was responsible for” (personal communication, 
June 18, 2016). P1 further pointed out, “sometimes you can do everything right and it 
still goes badly” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P3 recalled the stress of 
having to “give and order and have people killed or maimed and then having to give it 
again the next day and the next day” (personal communication, June 22, 2016). P4 
remembered thinking, “this guy could die and it would be because of me” (personal 
communication, September 16, 2016). P12 noted that “sending people in when you are 
expecting casualties is tough” (personal communication, June 21, 2016). 
Sleep deprivation. Nine of 15 participants (60%) identified sleep deprivation as a 
personal challenge that they faced during combat that caused adversity. As P3 stated, 
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“it takes an enormous amount of energy” to lead a battalion on the battlefield (personal 
communication, June 22, 2016). The researcher coded two elements as part of the 
sleep deprivation theme. Those elements are (1) effects of not enough rest and (2) 
precautions. 
Among the participants, seven (47%) described the effects of not getting enough 
rest on the commander. P12 recalled that he “did not sleep well due to stress and 
anxiety” (personal communication, June 21, 2016). P8 observed, “when Marines look at 
you they know if you are tired and if you are tapped out” (personal communication, 
September 14, 2016). P3 stated, “cognitive performance declines without sleep and this 
builds over time” (personal communication, June 22, 2016). P7 noted, “you must be 
aware of your own physical limitations” (personal communication, September 14, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) recalled the precautions they took to prevent 
sleep deprivation. P12 observed that during combat, “he had to pace himself” (personal 
communication, June 21, 2016). P7 stated, “you must go down when you tank is empty” 
(personal communication, September 14, 2016). P7 also remembered, “paying attention 
to his MRE (meals ready to eat) diet” and that supplementing the MREs helped 
(personal communication, September 14, 2016). P5 pointed out that “it is up to the 
commander to make sure the men are also getting enough rest” (personal 
communication, September 17, 2016). Interestingly, P10 noted, “some of the best sleep 
he got was in combat because he was so exhausted” (personal communication, July 31, 
2016). 
Interview question 5. How did you overcome those personal challenges during 
combat operations? This study accounts for multiple responses because some 
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participants shared more than one practice. From the participants’ answers to interview 
question five, three themes emerged (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Personal practices used to overcome adversity in combat. 
Focusing on the mission. Of 15 participants, nine (60%) stated that focusing on 
the mission is one way that they overcame adversity in combat. This theme contained a 
single coded element of the same name. P14 pointed out, “Marine Corps leaders are 
trained to think mission first and then Marines” (personal communication, July 24, 
2016). P10 recalled the importance of “getting into a battle rhythm” (personal 
communication, July 31, 2016). Once into a battle rhythm, P4 observed that 
“momentum is important to overcoming adversity” (personal communication, September 
16, 2016). P1 remembered thinking, “the best path to survival for any of us was to stay 
focused on the task at hand” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P14 said, 
“keeping myself occupied on what I had to do next kept me from wandering into 
emotions” (personal communication, July 24, 2016). 
9
7 7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Focusing on the Mission Not Second-Guessing
Decisions
Being with Subordinates
Co
un
t
Themes
Interview Question 5 - Coding Results
(N = 15 - multiple response per interviewee)
106 
Not second-guessing decisions. Of 15 participants, seven (47%) stated that not 
second-guessing decisions is one way that they overcame adversity in combat. This 
theme contained a single coded element of the same name. By not second-guessing 
decisions, military leaders do not exasperate the ontological anxiety described 
previously by Maddi (2004). P9 stated, “it becomes dangerous if you spend too much 
time wallowing after setbacks on the battlefield” (personal communication, September 
23, 2016). P14 admitted that bad decisions were part of the decentralized operating 
environment, but reminded himself each night that he was making the best decisions 
possible “based on mission and welfare of Marines” (personal communication, July 24, 
2016). P10 refused to second-guess himself on his decisions and accepted the idea 
that “not all the decisions he made would be the best” (personal communication, July 
31, 2016). P11 recommended, “when something bad happens, you work through it and 
don’t dwell on the past …you do not let it swim around in your head” (personal 
communication, September 31, 2016). 
Being with the Marines. Of 15 participants, seven (47%) stated that being with 
the Marines is one way that they overcame adversity in combat. This theme contained a 
single coded element of the same name. P13 observed, “leaders take strength from 
their followers” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P1 recalled that he made sure 
to get “out and about” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P2 remembered that 
he “did a lot of driving around” and was “constantly living out there with the young guys” 
(personal communication, June 20, 2016). P3 said that for him, it was “getting around to 
see the dirty smiling faces kept me going and helped pour off the excess stress” 
(personal communication, June 22, 2016). 
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Interview question 6. What challenges did your organization face overcoming 
adversity during combat operations? This study accounts for multiple responses 
because some participants shared more than one challenge. From the participants’ 
answers to interview question six, two themes emerged (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Organizational challenges that caused adversity in combat. 
False expectations. Of 15 participants, 12 (67%) stated having false expectations 
is a challenge to overcoming adversity that their battalion faced in combat. P5 noted, 
“you must confront the brutal reality of what you face” (personal communication, 
September 17, 2016). P3 stated, “you can never eliminate the shock of combat and if 
the gulf [between expectation and reality] is too big, it is a major traumatic event” 
(personal communication, June 22, 2016) The researcher coded two elements as part 
of the false expectations theme. Those elements are (1) casualties and (2) killing. 
Among the participants, eight (53%) stated that casualties could be a cause of 
false expectations during combat. Prior research has noted that engaging in direct 
12
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
False Expectations Changes in Mission
Co
un
t
Themes
Interview Question 6 - Coding Results
(N = 15 - multiple response per interviewee)
108 
combat and seeing peers injured or killed causes stress (Schaubroeck et al., 2011). P2 
recalled that it was “a trying time to keep morale up when we were taking casualties” 
(personal communication, June 20, 2016). P5 noted, “once a casualty happens, you 
know what to do, but [fear of] the unknown causes more stress” (personal 
communication, September 17, 2016). P9 warned against “rationalizing away that these 
people are trying to kill us” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). P7 
remembered at time when “the enemy got ahead of us and the fear was palpable” 
(personal communication, September 14, 2016). Regarding accidental deaths on the 
battlefield, P13 said, “the most challenging time is when you have a casualty, 
particularly when the Marines know that the casualty was preventable” (personal 
communication, July 20, 2016). Friendly fire casualties are especially difficult. P1 
remembered, “my unit came under friendly fire twice…it was horrible…there were plenty 
of friendly casualties” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P14 recalled posting 
“pictures of Marines smiling [during their recovery] at Bethesda [Naval Hospital] for the 
Marines” to help them “get rid of that last memory of the Marine [getting wounded] in 
their head” (personal communication, July 24, 2016). 
Among the participants, seven (47%) stated that killing could be a cause of false 
expectations during combat. In preparation for killing another person, P1 explained “I 
told them, you’re going to sight in on another man, and you are going to pull that trigger, 
and when the bullet leaves the barrel, it is going to change both men forever” (personal 
communication, June 18, 2016). P8 pointed out, “they are not the same person again, 
so you keep him in your crosshairs” (personal communication, September 14, 2016). P2 
noted, “when these young guys kill somebody that did need killing, they take it very 
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hard” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). P8 also said, “the Marines are even 
more impacted when they kill an innocent civilian, especially a child…you could see it in 
their eyes” (personal communication, September 14, 2016). P11 questioned, “how do 
we have these guys do these things and maintain their humanity?” (personal 
communication, September 31, 2016). P1 explained to his Marines, “I will not judge you 
on information you did not have at the time that you pulled the trigger…so make it a 
righteous kill” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). 
Once his Marines became accustomed to killing, P2 recalled that his “biggest 
challenge was having young guys taking [innocent] life and making things worse” 
(personal communication, June 20, 2016). P10 recalled the difficulty he had “changing 
the mentality of the Marines to go from a kinetic environment into a non-kinetic 
environment” (personal communication, July 31, 2016). P13 stated “the emphasis on 
restraint is [also] stressful” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). 
Changes in mission. Of 15 participants, seven (47%) stated that changes in 
mission were a challenge to overcoming adversity that their battalion faced in combat. 
Changing missions are a potential source of the ambiguity that Bartone (2006) has 
previously identified as a battlefield stressor. The researcher coded two elements as 
part of the changes in mission theme. Those elements are (1) operating disbursed and 
(2) new rules of engagement. 
Among the participants, five (33%) stated that operating disbursed is an example 
of changes in mission. P10 observed, “his span of control was stretched when his 
battalion was spread out” (personal communication, July 31, 2016). P11 stated that 
when his battalion was operating disbursed, his “junior leaders had to take on greater 
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responsibility” (personal communication, September 31, 2016). P12 noted that his 
“companies replaced battalions” and were “spread out all over the place” (personal 
communication, June 21, 2016). P12 said that because of operating disbursed, his 
“company commanders absolutely had a battalion commander-like role” and that they 
“were making decisions and running their battlespace independently” (personal 
communication, July 20, 2016). P14 recalled that during disbursed operations, leaders 
need to prevent Marines from “going native” or “drifting into a lack of discipline” 
(personal communication, July 24, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) stated that new rules of engagement (ROE) 
are another example of changes in mission. Military authorities establish ROE to guide 
military personnel and their leaders in the application of deadly force. Scrutiny over 
whether ROE is being followed sometimes results in official investigations by the military 
into the conduct of its personnel. Although their Marines understood the need to hold 
ROE investigations, the commanders noted that these investigations caused additional 
stress for their Marines. P15 said that the “politics and personalities getting involved [in 
the investigation] creates even more adversity” (personal communication, September 
12, 2016). P7 noted the benefits of the investigations saying, “I brought the investigators 
in often to protect them, not to prosecute them” (personal communication, September 
14, 2016). P7 further explained to his Marines that by doing so, “no one will be able to 
accuse you of doing something wrong years later” (personal communication, September 
14, 2016). P13 reminded his men, “the ROE was good and we could always defend 
ourselves and was not alright for a Marine to shoot indiscriminately when he is afraid” 
(personal communication, July 20, 2016). P14 explained that “the problem with a bad 
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shoot happens at the four-month mark, because after a while, the guy behind the tree 
looks like a spotter [for ambushes] instead of potentially being a farmer in the wrong 
place” (personal communication, July 24, 2016). 
Interview question 7. How did your organization overcome those challenges 
during combat operations? This study accounts for multiple responses because some 
participants shared more than one practice for overcoming adversity. Three themes 
emerged from the participants’ answers to interview question seven (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Organizational practices used to overcome adversity in combat. 
Talking about casualties and killing. Of 15 participants, 11 (73%) stated that 
talking about casualties and killing helped their battalions overcome adversity during 
combat? Social support and self-disclosure to trusted and empathetic others help to 
derive meaning from traumatic events (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). This theme 
contained a single coded element of the same name. P4 said, “the first time the guys 
are in the fight, you need to get down there and talk to them, especially if they see the 
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results of their killing…leaders need to do this and provide some closure” (personal 
communication, September 16, 2016). After the friendly fire event that killed several of 
his men, P1 remembered telling his Marines “this is what happened last night, and 
here’s how it happened, and here’s why it happened, and I can explain this but I can’t 
explain that, and the fact of the matter is…somebody fucked up” (personal 
communication, June 18, 2016). 
After taking casualties, P9 remembers telling his Marines that “every once in a 
while, the enemy is going to make a play and connect a pass” (personal 
communication, September 23, 2016). P2 recalled explaining to his Marines that “the 
loss of life had meaning and was part of a bigger picture” (personal communication, 
June 20, 2016). P41 said it was important that “the chain of command being present 
after casualties” (personal communication, July 24, 2016). P5 observed that Marines 
should “vent the stress as soon as you come back in [from a mission] before you go on 
to something else’ (personal communication, September 17, 2016). P7 recalled that 
after taking casualties, “we did not do an extravagant memorial service” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2016). P5 also noted that “the mourning process is 
cleansing” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). P1 also said that after 
taking casualties, ‘you want to pay appropriate respects, but you need to do it quickly” 
(personal communication, July 20, 2016). 
Keeping the unit moving. Of 15 participants, eight (53%) stated that keeping the 
unit moving helped their battalions overcome adversity during combat. This theme 
contained a single coded element of the same name. P9 stated, “it becomes dangerous 
if you spend too much time wallowing after setbacks on the battlefield” (personal 
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communication, September 23, 2016). P13 said that after casualties, “you must get 
back in the swing of things as quickly as possible” (personal communication, July 20, 
2016). P1 explained that after a traumatic event, “there was no time to hold hands, you 
talk about it and say we must move on” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P3 
said it was important to “complete the mission and keep moving” (personal 
communication, June 22, 2016). 
After losing several men in one firefight, P4 recalled that “the men took it hard, 
but they were resilient and shook it off and got back in the fight” (personal 
communication, September 16, 2016). P8 remembered, “I put them back in the fight 24 
hours later after the mass casualty that killed 10 and wounded 24 in one IED 
[improvised explosive device]” (personal communication, September 14, 2016). 
Small unit leadership. Of 15 participants, seven (47%) stated that small unit 
leadership helped their battalions overcome adversity during combat. This theme 
contained a single coded element of the same name. As pointed out by Hannah (2012) 
in the literature review, military leadership provides “the purpose, direction, and 
motivation required to employ…effective and ethical combat power under intense, 
dynamic, and dangerous conditions” (p. 14). P7 explained that during combat, “a lot of 
responsibility gets pushed down” (personal communication, September 14, 2016). Thus, 
as P9 noted, you must have “good leadership at the lower level” (personal 
communication, September 23, 2016). P10 recalled that his “junior leaders took on 
much more responsibility” and that his “NCOs stepped up to the challenge” (personal 
communication, July 31, 2016). Regarding his most junior officers, P15 said that “you 
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must rely on lower level commanders and expect them to do the same thing you are 
doing” (personal communication, September 12, 2016). 
Summary of research question 2. Research question 2 asked: What 
challenges do military leaders face in implementing those practices employed in 
overcoming adversity in their organizations? There were four interview questions 
designed to answer this research question. The battalion commanders provided 
thoughtful and substantial answers to each of the four interview questions. 
Interview question four asked the battalion commanders what challenges they 
faced overcoming adversity during combat operations. The commanders identified 
commander responsibilities and sleep deprivation as the challenges they faced 
overcoming adversity in combat. See Table 6 below for themes and associated coded 
elements for interview question four. 
Table 6. 
Personal Challenges to Overcoming Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Commander responsibilities Decision making 
Sending men into harm’s way 
Sleep deprivation Effects of not getting enough rest 
Precautions 
 
Interview question 5 asked how the battalion commanders overcame adversity 
during combat operations. The commanders identified focusing on the mission, not 
second-guessing decisions, and being with the Marines as how they overcame 
adversity in combat. See Table 7 below for themes and associated coded elements for 
interview question five. 
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Table 7. 
Personal Practices Used to Overcome Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Focusing on the mission Focusing on the mission 
Not second-guessing decisions Not second-guessing decisions 
Being with subordinates Being with subordinates 
 
Interview question 6 asked the battalion commanders what challenges their 
organizations faced overcoming adversity during combat operations. The commanders 
identified false expectations and changes in mission as the challenges their 
organizations faced overcoming adversity in combat. See Table 8 for themes and 
associated coded elements for interview question 6. 
Table 8. 
Organizational Challenges That Caused Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
False expectations Casualties 
Killing 
Changes in mission Operating disbursed 
New rules of engagement 
 
Interview question 7 asked the battalion commanders how their organizations 
overcame adversity during combat operations. The commanders identified talking about 
casualties and killing, keeping the unit moving, and small unit leadership as how their 
organizations overcame adversity in combat. See Table 9 below for themes and 
associated coded element for interview question seven. 
Table 9. 
Organizational Practices Used to Overcome Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Talking about casualties and killing Talking about casualties and killing 
(continued) 
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Themes Coded Elements 
Keeping the unit moving Keeping the unit moving 
Small unit leadership Small unit leadership 
 
Research question 3. Research question 3 asked: How do military leaders 
measure their success at overcoming adversity in their organizations? The following 
three interviews questions pertain to research question three: 
1. How did you prepare your organization to overcome adversity during combat 
operations? 
2. How did you assess your organization's readiness to overcome adversity 
during combat operations? 
3. How did you measure your organization’s success at overcoming adversity 
during combat operations? 
Interview question 8. How did you prepare your organization to overcome 
adversity during combat operations? Keeping in mind that the participants had already 
identified small unit training to build cohesion as a practice that fosters resilience in 
military organizations, the participants now identified how they conducted that small unit 
training. Past research indicates that resilience is critical for soldier mission readiness 
and must be a focus of training (Aude et al., 2014). As noted by Clausewitz in 1832, 
military personnel and their commanders can counter the negative effects of friction 
[adversity] through both experience in combat and realistic training for combat (Watts, 
2004). This study accounts for multiple responses because some participants shared 
more than one preparation technique. Three themes emerged from the participants’ 
answers to interview question eight (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Practices for preparing organizations to overcome adversity in combat. 
Design realistic training that creates adversity. Of 15 participants, 13 (87%) 
identified the requirement to design realistic training that creates adversity when asked 
how they prepared their battalions to overcome adversity in combat. Despite best 
efforts, P12 admitted, “I had a really difficult time building cohesion” because the 
battalion was “resistant to basic combat training” (personal communication, June 21, 
2016). The researcher coded two elements as part of the design realistic training that 
creates adversity theme. Those elements are (1) combat training should be realistic and 
(2) combat training should create adversity. 
Among the participants, nine (60%) explained that combat training should be 
realistic. Rutter (2006) offered that exposing a person to controlled risk, instead of 
avoiding risk, may improve resilience. Realistic training exposes military personnel to 
controlled risk. P2 recalled, “we were always trying to prepare them for the conditions 
they were going to face” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). Several participants 
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mentioned the need to immerse combat units in a realistic training environment. For 
example, P5 stated that “immersion is something we need to figure out how to do all 
through the training” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). “P6 observed, 
“realistic training provides mental hardening” in preparation for combat operations 
(personal communication, September 11, 2016). P9 noted that enemy tactics during the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved during the wars; and thus, “realistic training also 
includes an understanding of how the enemy is actually operating” (personal 
communication, September 23, 2016). 
Among the participants, eight (53%) observed that combat training should create 
adversity. In his explanation of this “steeling effect”, Seery (2011) explained that “just as 
the body requires exertion to improve fitness, there is no opportunity for toughness to 
develop if someone has never coped with stress; likewise, physical overexertion can be 
harmful, and too much stress disrupts toughening” (p. 390). P4 noted, “you want to do 
hard stressful things just to see if people start cracking” (personal communication, 
September 16, 2016). P5 described using a progressive training plan that “stresses 
them more and more” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). P11 remarked 
that realistic training should include “situations where you are in so many tough spots 
that you likely will fail” (personal communication, September 31, 2016). P8 noted, “it is 
important that they can recognize these reactions [to adversity] in their buddies” 
(personal communication, September 14, 2016). P14 recalled that “tough and realistic 
training allowed him to identify a stress case in a key leader” prior to the combat 
deployment (personal communication, July 24, 2016). 
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Design training that builds competence and confidence. Of 15 participants, 12 
(80%) identified the requirement to design training that builds competence and 
confidence to overcome adversity in combat. As noted in the literature review, 
confidence acts as a pathway to resilience (Luthans et al., 2006). P5 recalled 
establishing “challenging training goals for ourselves that we worked up to” (personal 
communication, September 17, 2016). P13 said, “I tried to make the battalion a learning 
battalion” and he told his Marines to “teach both their subordinates and their peers” 
(personal communication, July 20, 2016). P9 demanded that his junior officers “share 
best practices” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). P7 said that his training 
program “built confidence in themselves and the organization” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2016). 
P3 noted his intention to build “tactical prowess” in his battalion because 
“knowing your business” is a stress reliever (personal communication, June 22, 2016). 
P15 explained that “being an expert in what we do” gave him confidence (personal 
communication, September 12, 2016). P10 remembered his battalion having 
“confidence in their preparation” (personal communication, July 31, 2016). Several 
participants described building their Marines’ confidence by continuously rehearsing the 
evacuation of wounded from the battlefield. P1 wanted his men to know, “we will get him 
off the battlefield and take care of his body with respect” (personal communication, June 
18, 2016). P2 said it was imperative that the Marines believe that “if they were hit, we 
would get them out of there” with a “rehearsed system that will get them back” (personal 
communication, June 20, 2016). 
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Manage expectations about war. Of 15 participants, 11 (73%) discussed the 
importance of managing expectations about the realities of war. According to the study 
participants, training the organization to visualize the battlefield is the preferred 
technique to create realistic expectations. As mentioned in the opening chapter of this 
study, Clausewitz explained that soldiers on the battlefield will witness “the heart-
rending spectacle of the dead and wounded” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 104). Having false 
expectations about close combat is a challenge to overcoming adversity in combat. P5 
recognized, “it is hard to replicate the threat to body and spirit in training” (personal 
communication, September 17, 2016). To prepare Marines for the grim reality of the 
battlefield, P6 described the need to “create a realistic picture in their minds” (personal 
communication, September 11, 2016). P7 wanted his men to have “some idea of what 
this was going to look like before we went” (personal communication, September 14, 
2016). 
P1 characterized visualization as already “moving mentally through this place 
before we ever got there” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). P9 explained that 
the purpose of visualization was to “survive the first exposure to combat” by lessening 
the “shock that gets to Marines” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). P3 
described “building mental shock absorbers to minimize the shock of combat” (personal 
communication, June 22, 2016). P14 talked about creating “the ability to look at your 
buddy that might not have legs and then assess and react” (personal communication, 
July 24, 2016). 
Interview question 9. How did you assess your organization’s readiness to 
overcome adversity during combat operations? This study accounts for multiple 
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responses because some participants shared more than one assessment technique. 
From the participants’ answers to interview question nine, two themes emerged (see 
Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Techniques for assessing readiness to overcome adversity in combat. 
Commander’s intuition. All 15 participants (100%) described using commander’s 
intuition to assess the readiness of their battalions to overcome adversity during 
combat. P15 stated, “there was no empirical way, so commander’s ability to know when 
the unit is clicking” is essential (personal communication, September 12, 2016). P8 
observed, “you learn a lot by watching them” (personal communication, September 14, 
2016). P6 explained, “you must be there to get a feel for it, there is no report” (personal 
communication, September 11, 2016). P1 remembered that he looked for “a sense of 
unit cohesion, that whole sense of family that he could feel and see develop over time” 
(personal communication, June 18, 2016). 
15
4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Commander's Intution
and Written Surveys
Written Surveys
Co
un
t
Themes
Interview Question 9 - Coding Results
(N = 15 - multiple responses per interviewee)
122 
P6 recalled “learning a lot from how the Marines are dealing with adversity after 
the first look at training” (personal communication, September 11, 2016). P15 stated, 
“you are looking at the intangibles…the junior leaders are critical” (personal 
communication, September 12, 2016). P1 recalled assessing “their attitude and 
demeanor and how they interact with each other” (personal communication, June 18, 
2016). P2 wanted to see his Marines “thinking like a team instead of an individual” 
(personal communication, June 20, 2016). P5 watched for a “culture of camaraderie” to 
develop (personal communication, September 17, 2016). P5 noted his requirement to 
see “the youngest Marines start demanding the same expectations” of each other 
(personal communication, June 22, 2016). P12 looked for a sense of unit pride and 
identity (personal communication, June 21, 2016). 
Written surveys. Of 15 participants, four (27%) mentioned using written surveys 
to assess the readiness of their battalions to overcome adversity during combat. Per the 
participants, the U.S. Marine Corps has developed written surveys to specifically assess 
a unit’s command climate. Members of the unit complete these surveys anonymously 
and then returned to the unit’s leadership. P15 recalled using command climate surveys 
“to get some data but I am not sure that it helped me” (personal communication, 
September 12, 2016). P13 said that he used a survey, but “most people [commanders] 
do not want to use climate surveys” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P9 stated 
that he liked peer reviews because “you cannot fool your peers” (personal 
communication, September 23, 2016). According to P9, peer reviews are the “best 
indicators of combat performance and leadership according to the Israeli Defense 
Force” (personal communication, September 23, 2016). 
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Interview question 10. How did you measure your organization’s success at 
overcoming adversity during combat operations? This study accounts for multiple 
responses because some participants shared more than one measurement metric. 
From the participants’ answers to interview question 10, two themes emerged (see 
Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Metrics for measuring success at overcoming adversity in combat. 
Of 15 participants, nine (60%) identified using calm under fire as a measure of 
success during combat operations. P1 recalled, “a company’s first firefight doesn’t look 
anything like it’s firefight on day five” (personal communication, June 18, 2016). 
Likewise, P3 observed, “the first five days is critical and getting past that was a key” 
(personal communication, June 22, 2016). P5 described the “magic moment” as the 
men “going from being peacetime Marines and realizing that they are in combat” 
(personal communication, September 17, 2016). P3 proudly observed that on the “first 
night of the war, all units were in contact with the enemy, indirect fire was landing all 
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around the CP [command post], and yet people were talking on the radio calmly” 
(personal communication, June 22, 2016). 
Of 15 participants, eight (53%) identified using not descending into self-pity as 
am measure of success during combat operations. P8 remarked that despite his 
battalion taking over 20 KIAs [killed in action] during both his deployments, “they did not 
descend into self-pity” (personal communication, September 14, 2016). P2 knew the 
adversity of combat was not affecting his Marines when he saw them “clearing the 
rubble to save the enemy soldier’s lives” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). He 
later explained that “only a warrior would understand that” (personal communication, 
June 20, 2016). 
Summary of research question 3. Research question three asked: How do 
military leaders measure their success at overcoming adversity in their organizations? 
The researcher designed three interview questions in support of this research question. 
The battalion commanders provided thoughtful and substantial answers to each of the 
three interview questions. 
Interview question 8 asked the battalion commander how they prepared their 
organizations to overcome adversity during combat operations. The commanders 
identified design realistic training that creates adversity, design training that builds 
competence and confidence and manage expectations about war as how they prepared 
their organizations to overcome adversity in combat. See Table 10 below for themes 
and associated coded elements for interview question eight. 
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Table 10. 
Practices for Preparing Organizations to Overcome Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Design realistic training that creates 
adversity  
Combat training should be realistic 
Combat training should create adversity 
Design training that builds competence 
and confidence 
Design training that builds competence and 
confidence 
Manage expectations about war Manage expectations about war 
 
Interview question 9 asked the battalion commanders how they assessed their 
organization’s readiness to overcome adversity during combat operations. The 
commanders identified commander’s intuition and written surveys as how they 
assessed their organization’s readiness to overcome adversity during combat 
operations. See Table 11 below for themes and associated coded elements for 
interview question nine. 
Table 11. 
Techniques for Assessing Readiness to Overcome Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Commander’s intuition Commander’s intuition 
Written surveys Written surveys 
 
Interview question 10 asked the battalion commanders how they measured their 
organization’s success at overcoming adversity during combat operations. Regarding 
their ability to measure the success of their battalions at overcoming adversity, the 
commanders identified calm under fire and not descending into self-pity. See Table 12 
below for themes and associated coded elements for interview question 10. 
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Table 12. 
Metrics for Measuring Success at Overcoming Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Calm under fire Calm under fire 
Not descending into self-pity Not descending into self-pity 
 
Research question 4. Research question four asked: What recommendations 
would military leaders make to aspiring leaders wanting to overcome adversity in their 
organizations in the future? The following two interviews questions pertain to research 
question four: 
1. Is there anything that you have learned from your experience in overcoming 
adversity that you wish you knew prior to your organization’s deployment for 
combat operations? 
2. How would you recommend that aspiring military leaders prepare their 
organizations to overcome adversity during combat operations? 
Interview question 11. Is there anything that you have learned from your 
experience in overcoming adversity that you wish you knew prior to your organization’s 
deployment for combat operations? Despite their best efforts, all the battalion 
commanders conceded that at least some of their Marines were not able to overcome 
combat related adversity completely. P10 observed, “the stress of combat cannot be 
controlled, they cannot sidestep the events and the stress, the mind and body are 
naturally going to be challenged (personal communication, July 31, 2016). Likewise, 
P14 remarked, “let’s not wish away the fact that nobody comes back with added stress” 
(personal communication, July 24, 2016). P5 noted the need for “methods to both ease 
them into it and ease them out of it” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). 
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This study accounts for multiple responses because some participants shared more 
than one lesson learned. From the participants’ answers to interview question 11, four 
themes emerged (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Lessons learned about overcoming adversity in combat. 
Of 15 participants, 13 (87%) identified post-deployment lessons that they learned 
about overcoming adversity. The researcher coded three elements as part of the post-
deployment lessons theme. Those elements are (1) keeping units together, (2) 
proactive monitoring, and (3) get subordinates and their families the help they need. 
Among the participants, eight (53%) talked about the importance of keeping units 
together. Social support is a key enabler for the recognition, prevention, and care of 
stress (Cacioppo et al., 2011). As noted in the literature review, social support continues 
as a factor that could prevent mental health problems in U.S. military personnel 
returning from deployments (Eisen et al., 2014). As discussed in the responses to 
interview question one, building unit cohesion prior to a deployment helps military 
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personnel overcome adversity during combat. Many of the commanders also remarked 
on the importance of cohesion after a combat deployment. P11 recognized that “time 
with your unit both before and after the deployment is important because guys are 
taking care of each other (personal communication, September 31, 2016). P3 pointed 
out that “the unit is a cocoon of people you know and trust” (personal communication, 
June 22, 2016). P15 noted that “when they are broken, you need the cohesion to handle 
the broken guys” (personal communication, September 12, 2016). P7 explained that 
“keeping a guy with PTSD close to the unit worked” (personal communication, 
September 14, 2016). 
Unfortunately, according to P13, “one thing we [the Marine Corps] tend to do 
wrong is breaking up the units” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P15 recalled 
that “he was gone in one and half months himself and many of his folks were farmed 
out” to other units (personal communication, September 12, 2016). On how this 
negatively impacts the Marines, P4 stated “the most difficult time is coming back and 
getting separated from your combat family” (personal communication, September 16, 
2016). P3 explained that “when they leave the unit and go somewhere else, say you go 
to an adjacent unit with different experiences, even if they have good leadership, it is 
still somewhat alienating” (personal communication, June 22, 2016). P1 described it this 
way: 
If every Marine has a resiliency cup and it’s got eight ounces of resiliency in it. In 
my cup two ounces might be personal resiliency and six ounces are from my unit. 
In your cup, maybe five ounces is personal resilience and only three ounces of it 
you draw from the unit. The Marine whose cup is filled mostly with unit resiliency, 
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that’s where he hangs his heart and his soul, and he falls hard when he has to 
leave the unit. For the guy that stays with the unit, he still has the bond because 
he was with you before and during and now he’s with you after, so you can still 
laugh and talk and cry, all those things. But for the guys that have to leave the 
unit, you promised them that we are in this together and they buy it. And then 
when you get back you have to say, you know I love you but you have to go. 
(personal communication, June 18, 2016) 
In the waning years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, P14 said that the Marine Corps 
issued “an order to freeze people in place for three months” (personal communication, 
July 24, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) discussed the need for proactive monitoring 
to determine if the men are showing signs of combat related stress. The commanders 
explained that Marines are reluctant to ask for help with combat related stress issues. 
According to P6, immediately after returning from war, “Marines would not say anything 
because they were afraid they could not go home on leave” (personal communication, 
September 11, 2016). Thus, P6 told his leadership team to “stay in touch with them 
during the 30-day leave” (personal communication, September 11, 2016). P5 explained 
how the Marines need to “make meaning of their experience after returning from 
combat” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). P4 said, “we made sure to let 
these guys talk about it and let it all hang out” (personal communication, September 16, 
2016). P5 emphasized, “you need somebody with experience to help this process” 
because “you don’t want them trying to solve their own problems at the troop level” 
(personal communication, September 17, 2016). 
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Among the participants, seven (47%) discussed the commander’s requirement to 
get subordinates and their families the help they need. Previous research indicates that 
interventions aimed at promoting and sustaining resilience after deployment might have 
the potential to improve the mental health of veterans (Eisen et al., 2014; Pietrzak et al., 
2009). P12 observed that combat related stress issues are often complicated by TBI 
(traumatic brain injury) and alcohol problems (personal communication, June 21, 2016). 
P13 noted a significant increase in self-referral to his installation’s alcohol treatment 
program (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P14 explained his leadership policy 
of personally tracking the individual Marines’ “get well plans” (personal communication, 
July 24, 2016). P14 also mentioned, 
On the back side, there were a lot of hurting families. We need programs to help 
the wives deal with husbands that were now different. We should be doing 
something for them as a support network and it’s pragmatic because it helps the 
Marines as well. When they are back, the frustrations and real feelings come out 
at home as the Marines come out of one storm and into another. (personal 
communication, July 24, 2016) 
Of 15 participants, nine (60%) identified deployment lessons that they learned 
about overcoming adversity. The researcher coded two elements as part of the 
deployment lessons theme. Those elements are (1) recognizing stress problems in the 
combat zone and (2) prevention and care in the combat zone. 
The commanders explained that most of the Marines they took to war did not 
have any issues overcoming the adversity of combat. However, seven participants 
(47%) did discuss their experience with recognizing stress problems in the combat 
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zone: P9 stated, “you never know how someone is going to react until you get there” 
(personal communication, September 23, 2016). P3 observed, “some folks will be 
naturally more resilient than others” (personal communication, June 22, 2016). P14 
stated, “some guys that ended up having problems, you never would have known or 
expected it” (personal communication, July 24, 2016). P4 recalled that often “the quiet 
guys take stress better and the bravado guys crack” (personal communication, 
September 16, 2016). P9 was glad to say “the guy I was worried about the most, 
understood the most and led his Marines the best” (personal communication, 
September 23, 2016). 
Among the participants, five (33%) discussed their efforts for prevention and care 
in the combat zone. P7 talked about his policy of “making everyone at a combat be 
seen by a corpsman because guys were getting hurt [both physically and mentally] and 
not telling anyone (personal communication, September 14, 2016). P12 recalled that 
some of his senior enlisted personnel “were in full-fledged denial of their stress 
problems” (personal communication, June 21, 2016). 
The commanders noted that it was not only their infantry Marines that experience 
combat related stress issues. For example, P6 pointed out “we had truck drivers getting 
PTSD because they were expecting to be hit by an IED” (personal communication, 
September 11, 2016). P14 recalled in the latter years of the war, “we knew by now that 
getting them right back into the fight was not the answer and that there was a capability 
on Camp Leatherneck [in Afghanistan] to provide mental health services” (personal 
communication, July 24, 2016). 
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Of 15 participants, nine (60%) identified early detection lessons that they learned 
about overcoming adversity. As noted in the literature review, some character traits 
negatively correlate to resilience and hardiness. Skomorovsky and Stevens (2013) 
recommended that the military recruit personnel with lower neuroticism because 
neuroticism helps explain the variance in resilience among military personnel. Another 
study by identified cynicism and emotional exhaustion as relating negatively to 
hardiness (Lo Bue, Taverniers, Mylle, & Euwema, 2013). The researcher coded three 
elements as part of the early detection lessons theme. Those elements are (1) 
recognizing problems during pre-deployment training, (2) recognizing problems during 
boot camp, and (3) identifying childhood issues. 
Among the participants, seven (47%) talked about the need to recognize 
problems during pre-deployment training. P14 recommended looking for Marines “with 
subtle indicators or that exhibited symptoms” (personal communication, July 24, 2016). 
P11 recalled that in the later years of the war, “the point was starting to get out that if 
you see a red flag [signs of stress] to let somebody know” (personal communication, 
September 31, 2016). P12 noted that during his deployment as a battalion commander, 
“his experience with PTSD in previous units helped him deal with these issues” 
(personal communication, June 21, 2016). P8 explained that identifying Marines that are 
starting to have issues is difficult because “just like Lombardi said, the good ones play 
hurt, and that includes mentally hurt” (personal communication, September 14, 2016). 
Among the participants, three (20%) noted that recognizing problems during boot 
camp could prevent combat related stress issues later. P13 recommended, “if we look 
back to boot camp and recruiting, susceptibility to stress needs addressed along the 
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continuum, and the earlier the better” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P12 
insisted that regarding his Marines with combat related stress issues, “a lot of these 
guys had previous medical problems going back to boot camp” (personal 
communication, June 21, 2016). 
Among the participants, three (20%) expressed their opinions about identifying 
childhood issues that might negatively impact a Marine’s ability to overcome stress. 
Because of problems during their childhood, P13 believes that “people are predisposed 
to have problems with stress” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). According to 
P13, “in each instance of PTSD in my experience, there was some underlying factor 
that was present before they came into the military” (personal communication, July 20, 
2016). P6 also affirmed his belief that “some Marines have PTSD from their youth” 
(personal communication, September 11, 2016). P2 adamantly stated, 
Character makes all the difference in the world. And that is established by their 
parents. The further we get away from the family, the missing fathers and so on, 
and too many video games. If you trace them [Marines with combat related 
stress issues] back to childhood, I bet his father wasn’t there and he never 
established the foundation of being a man. (personal communication, June 20, 
2016) 
Of 15 participants, seven (47%) identified leaving military service lessons about 
overcoming adversity. The researcher coded three elements as part of the leaving 
military service theme. Those elements are (1) transitioning out of the service, (2) 
problems reentering society, and (3) veterans and the disability system. 
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Among the participants, four (27%) offered their thoughts on transitioning out of 
the service soon after returning from war. P13 recalled that he had “guys that were on 
their way out within 30 days” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). P2 stated, 
“PTSD manifests after we send these guys home and they don’t have the organization 
behind them” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). P5 characterized the problem 
as “Marines go back carrying this baggage still” (personal communication, September 
17, 2016). 
Other commanders found fault with how the military prepares its personnel to 
transition out of the service. Having now retired and speaking from experience, P13 
stated, 
The military has done harm to itself. We have created a notion in the civilian 
community that all veterans need help. Now, employers do not want to take a 
chance on veterans, especially in an economic downturn. We need to stop acting 
as if everyone has a problem coming out of the service. I personally believe that 
the hardening of combat makes us stronger and that is completely lost on the 
civilian community. (personal communication, July 20, 2016) 
P8 described similar thoughts on the topic of transition. According to him, 
We have got to stop telling everybody that they are heroes and then sending 
them back to the world with the wrong expectations. The problem is, they still 
can’t lay the prom queen and nobody is giving them a job. And so, they go to the 
local bar looking for validation and pretty soon nobody wants to hear their shit 
anymore. And so, it leaves the Marine thinking…I went to the toughest places in 
Iraq and I can’t get a job and I can’t get a date with Sally. If what I did can’t get 
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me a seat at the table in this life, there is nothing else I can do. (personal 
communication, September 14, 2016) 
Among the participants, six (40%) identified that some Marines have problems 
reentering society. P13 said, “young Marines quickly realize that the standard ‘thank you 
for your service’ is just talk” (personal communication, July 20, 2016). As P13 was 
making his transition to civilian society, he found out that “nobody cares who you are” 
(personal communication, July 20, 2016). P3 described the issue as, “the Marine finds 
himself immersed in a society that is completely different” (personal communication, 
June 22, 2016). He goes on to say, 
The veteran comes home and people are clueless because it hasn’t touched 
their lives. The veteran feels alienated because nobody gets him. They [society] 
may sympathize, but there is no way that they can empathize. Marines are wired 
to connect emotionally. While you are still in the service, you don’t even have to 
talk about it because everybody gets you. (personal communication, June 22, 
2016) 
Among the participants, three (20%) called out their personal experiences with 
Department of Veterans Affairs. Reflecting on his own frustrations, P5 explained that 
“when you have a stress or anxiety issue, you start looking for reasons to walk out and 
get angry, so the caretakers need to be aware of this, because we are looking for 
reasons cast aspersions on the VA” (personal communication, September 17, 2016). 
Likewise, P6 stated that “when you get stupid answers out of the VA, you are going to 
try handle it on your own” (personal communication, September 11, 2016). P2 claimed, 
“the VA system is destroying these guys” (personal communication, June 20, 2016). 
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According to him, “our disability system encourages them to stay sick and have no 
sense of value or worth” and instead we all should be helping them “to replicate that 
purpose filled life” that they left behind (personal communication, June 20, 2016). 
Interview question 12. The researcher asked participants what 
recommendations they would make to aspiring military leaders wanting to prepare their 
organizations to overcome adversity during combat operations. The battalion 
commanders uniformly stated that they recommend aspiring commanders implement 
the practices for overcoming adversity and leadership skills identified by interview 
questions one and three. The additional recommendations offered by each of the 
battalion commanders are as follows: 
● P1 said, “Marines don’t expect you to be perfect, they just expect you to be 
consistent”. He also proclaimed that “resiliency in combat is directly linked to 
what you do before you ever get there” (personal communication, June 18, 
2016). 
● P2 declared, “the most important thing is the fighting spirit of the Marines” 
(personal communication, June 20, 2016). 
● P3 admonished, "leadership is all about creating belief" in a common purpose 
(personal communication, June 22, 2016). 
● P4 insisted that if the Marines “don’t feel like they are winning, then they are 
losing.” According to him, ensuring that the Marines never feel that way is the 
“prima facia role of the battalion commander” (personal communication, 
September 16, 2016). 
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● P5 provided the following advice, 
When I became a Battalion Commander, I initially tried to play the heroic 
bravado role. And then I learned along the way not to do that because 
some of that image that I put on was not authentic for me. It was canned, 
so it came off wrong. Bravado talk is not needed and certainly should not 
be part of what an officer does. (personal communication, September 17, 
2016) 
● P6 recommended that new commanders “think about how do you build in the 
answers to the adversity early with proper training and education for those 
that will be expected to lead” (personal communication, September 11, 2016). 
● P7 recalled, “there was no switch to flip, you must be yourself all the time” 
(personal communication, September 14, 2016). 
● P8 noted that while it may come as a surprise to some, "the model of servant 
leadership is applicable" (personal communication, August 29, 2016). 
● P9 advised future commanders “not treat the Marines like victims” after they 
return from war. He also wanted them to know that “risk averse training 
prevents realistic training" (personal communication, September 23, 2016). 
● P10 said he would tell them, “The more immersive style training you can do 
the better. What they smell, what they hear, what they see. These aspects will 
trigger the responses that we are looking for so that we can assess 
readiness” (personal communication, July 31, 2016). 
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● P11 said that he believes “there is a growing and a hardening after adversity” 
after the Marines experience the adversity of the battlefield (personal 
communication, September 31, 2016). 
● P12 stated “There is a balance. We don’t want people to have an out, but if 
somebody is showing signs of stress” we should send them home early from 
war (personal communication, June 21, 2016). 
● P13 said he would assure commanders that “when we push leadership 
responsibility down, we are inoculating them against adversity" (personal 
communication, July 20, 2016). 
● P14 insisted, "a strong battalion is great, but strong companies are better, and 
strong platoons are even better" (personal communication, July 24, 2016). 
● P15 wanted them to know, "the quicker you can get your [leadership] team 
together before you deploy, the better" (personal communication, September 
12, 2016). 
Summary of research question 4. Research question four asked: What 
recommendations would military leaders make to aspiring leaders wanting to overcome 
adversity in their organizations in the future? There were two interview questions 
designed to answer this research question. The battalion commanders provided 
thoughtful and substantial answers to each of the two interview questions. 
Interview question 11 asked the battalion commanders to identify anything that 
they have learned about overcoming adversity during their deployments to combat. The 
commanders identified post-deployment lessons, deployment lessons, early detection 
139 
lessons, and leaving military service lessons. See Table 13 below for themes and 
associated coded elements for interview question 11. 
Table 13. 
Lessons Learned About Overcoming Adversity in Combat 
Themes Coded Elements 
Post-deployment lessons Keeping units together 
Proactive monitoring 
Get subordinates and their families the help they need 
Deployment lessons Recognizing stress problems in the combat zone 
Prevention and care in the combat zone 
Early detection lessons Recognizing problems during pre-deployment training 
Recognizing problems during boot camp 
Identifying Childhood issues 
Leaving military service Transitioning out of the service 
Problems reentering society 
Disability system and veterans 
 
Interview question 12 asked what recommendations the battalion commanders 
would make to aspiring military leaders wanting to prepare their organizations to 
overcome adversity during combat operations. The battalion commanders uniformly 
stated that they recommend aspiring commanders implement the practices for 
overcoming adversity and leadership skills identified by interview questions one and 
three. Some additional remarks provided by the participants were also provided. 
Summary of Chapter Four 
This chapter provided demographic information and deployment timeframes for 
the 15 participants that agreed to take part in this study. How and when the data was 
collected from the participants was also discussed. An overview of the data analysis 
process followed. Data display procedures were explained with a restatement of the 
four research and twelve interview questions. Lastly, the results of the data collection 
were presented with supporting charts and graphs. It should be noted that the complete 
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data collection results found here might also be of use to other researchers conducting 
research on a related phenomenon. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
The conclusions presented here are a synthesis of the data collected from the 
study participants. The researcher analyzed the data and developed structural 
descriptions of the phenomenon under investigation. In total, these structural 
descriptions convey the essence of the study participant’s lived experience of 
overcoming adversity in military organizations. 
Summary of the Study 
Bartone (2006) has previously argued that military leaders can influence how 
members of their units make sense of, interpret, and understand operational stress. He 
hypothesized that hardy leaders could, by example, encourage their followers to have 
hardy interpretations of stressful experiences (Bartone, 2006). Sinclair and Britt (2013) 
also asserted that leader behaviors can influence the ability of military personnel to 
exhibit positive adaptation to significant adversity. The results of this study provide 
support for those assertions. The conclusions here suggest that military leaders can and 
do foster resilience in their organizations. 
Results and Discussion of Findings 
The purpose of this research study was to identify leadership strategies and 
practices for fostering resilience in military organizations. This entailed determining what 
challenges military leaders face in implementing practices aimed at fostering resilience. 
Also examined was how military leaders measure success at fostering resilience. 
Finally, this study considered what recommendations military leaders would make to 
aspiring leaders wanting to foster resilience in their own organizations in the future. 
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Collectively, the following practices (Appendix E) can enable a culture of resilience in a 
military organization. 
This study suggests that there are three foundational practices for fostering 
resilience in military organizations: 
1. Build cohesion in the organization by conducting small unit training 
2. Create a positive command climate in the organization 
3. Instill a sense of purpose in the organization 
This study suggests that there are five pre-deployment practices for fostering 
resilience in military organizations: 
1. Demonstrate character to subordinates 
2. Win the affection of subordinates 
3. Design training for the organization that builds competence and confidence 
4. Design realistic training for the organization that creates adversity 
5. Have subordinates visualize the battlefield 
This study suggests that there are eight deployment practices for fostering 
resilience in military organizations: 
1. Share in the danger with subordinates 
2. Be calm and confident on the battlefield 
3. Focus on the mission 
4. Do not second-guess decisions 
5. Talk about the casualties and killing 
6. Keep the unit moving after casualties and killing 
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7. Keep subordinates informed 
8. Empower small unit leaders 
Results and discussion of research question 1. Research question 1 asked: 
What current practices do military leaders employ to overcome adversity in their 
organizations? All the study participants agreed that for a military organization to 
overcome adversity in combat, the unit commander must build resilience in the 
organization prior to the combat deployment. The first interview question asked the 
study participants what practices they employed to overcome adversity during combat 
operations. The results of this study suggest that the following three practices can foster 
resilience in a military organization: 
1. Small unit training to build cohesion 
2. Creating a positive command climate 
3. Instilling a sense of purpose 
Combat training is the factor that decisively binds military groups together (King, 
2006). This study further suggests that the primary practice employed to overcome 
adversity in military organizations is small unit training specifically. Military units conduct 
small unit tactical training in preparation for combat operations. Small unit training 
requires military personnel to work in teams. Teamwork enables social resilience, or the 
capacity to overcome adversity by working with other people (Cacioppo et al., 2011). 
Social resilience then manifests as unit cohesion in the military organization. 
Primary group cohesion is about trust among group members and the capacity 
for teamwork (Siebold, 2007). This study confirms that trust and mutual respect are 
indeed the primary components of unit cohesion. In a military unit, being able to rely on 
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the person to your left and right builds trust. Having trust in your teammates is what 
enables teamwork. Without trust, effective teamwork is not possible. Teamwork 
therefore, serves as a measure of trust and mutual respect. A four-step process for 
building cohesion via small unit training emerges: 
1. Small unit training builds trust and mutual respect amongst peers. 
2. Trust and mutual respect enables the teamwork that small unit training 
requires. 
3. Teamwork enables social resilience which is the capacity to overcome 
adversity by working with other people. 
4. Social resilience manifests as unit cohesion which in turn fosters resilience. 
The primary challenge that military leaders face when building unit cohesion is 
not having sufficient time to train the unit prior to deployment. As already noted, small 
unit training is the primary means of building cohesion in a military organization. 
According to the participants in this study, the Marine Corps typically allows for a six-
month cycle of training prior to a combat deployment. All the study participants 
described this six months of training as barely sufficient to build unit cohesion. Now that 
the military services are in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan wars, they should review 
their deployment schedule policies to determine if it is possible to increase the time 
allotted for future pre-deployment training of combat units. 
The time challenge just described is routinely complicated by the joining of new 
personnel to combat units during an already too-short training cycle. The integration of 
new personnel into existing teams is certain to disrupt group dynamics, at least 
temporarily. As noted by Siebold (2007), primary group cohesion includes both peer and 
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leader bonding. The participants of this study noted that the joining of senior enlisted 
and officers late in a training cycle is especially detrimental to the establishment of unit 
cohesion. The military services should review their personnel assignment policies to 
determine if solutions are available that will eliminate or mitigate these challenges. 
The second practice that military leaders can employ in their organizations to 
overcome adversity is creating a positive command climate. Meredith et al. (2011) 
previously identified command climate as being one of the organizational factors that 
influences resilience in the military. This study suggests that the primary means of 
creating a positive command climate in a military organization are: 
1. Earn subordinates’ trust 
2. Maintain discipline 
3. Treat men with respect 
4. Have fun 
Sweeney et al. (2009) found that military personnel who trust their leaders are 
more willing to accept the influence of those leaders. This study suggests that earning 
subordinates’ trust is indeed the most significant contributor to positive command 
climate. Military personnel should have faith and confidence in their leaders, particularly 
in combat. Making personal contact and communicating effectively with subordinates 
are essential to a military leader’s ability to earn trust. Earning the trust of military 
subordinates also includes earning the trust of the subordinates’ families, especially 
spouses. Military leaders should meet collectively, on more than one occasion, with the 
spouses of their subordinates during the pre-deployment training cycle. It is imperative 
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that military spouses have trust and confidence in the leaders that will be responsible for 
the safety and well-being of their loved ones during a combat deployment. 
Regarding the maintenance of discipline in military organizations, leaders must 
set expectations for behavior and performance and then demand that everyone in the 
organization adhere to those expectations. Leaders should be exemplars of discipline. 
Accountability is the key to maintaining discipline in military organizations. For discipline 
to be effective, non-commissioned officers must commit themselves to holding 
themselves and others accountable. At the same time, leaders should temper unit 
discipline by treating their subordinates with appropriate respect. The participants of this 
study explained that young people in the military today expect respectful treatment. 
Younger military personnel, especially younger non-commissioned officers, appreciate it 
when their leaders show respect for their opinions and contributions. Proper discipline 
ensures that once a leader decides on a course of action, subordinates support that 
decision earnestly despite any opposition or apprehensions that they may have 
harbored initially. Military leaders should seek opportunities to provide their young non-
commissioned officers with a sense of ownership in the organization. 
The establishment of sound discipline does not preclude having fun. Pre-
deployment training for combat, while certainly a serious undertaking, can also be fun. 
Appropriate humor, inserted during an otherwise stressful situation, can allow military 
personnel to relax. Competitive training, in addition to encouraging higher levels of 
performance, is also a means for having fun. Military personnel will work long and hard 
during pre-deployment training for an opportunity to secure bragging rights over their 
comrades. Once deployed to combat, it is even possible to find respectful humor in 
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unlikely places on the battlefield. The ability to see at least some humor during combat 
can provide fond remembrances of an otherwise deadly serious experience. 
The third practice that military leaders can employ in their organizations to 
overcome adversity is instilling a sense of purpose. This finding is significant because 
previous studies about military resilience have not identified having purpose as an 
organizational factor that influences resilience. It is important for military personnel to 
know that their government sanctions their wartime efforts and that the American people 
support them. Fighting to protect national interests is a noble cause that provides an 
adequate sense of purpose for military personnel. However, if the war drags on, and the 
strategy for winning the war appears misguided or public support for the war fades, the 
original purpose of fighting for the nation becomes less valid. If this initial purpose for 
going to war becomes questionable, leaders must rely solely on military ethos and 
martial virtue (Jennings & Hannah, 2011) to provide a purpose for fighting. 
It is also important that military personnel believe that the war is winnable. 
Fighting for a lost cause negates any sense of purpose and is certain to create levels of 
adversity that are even more difficult to overcome. It seems unreasonable to expect that 
military leaders can foster enough resilience in their organizations to overcome the 
adversity of fighting for a lost cause. Fighting without a sense of purpose may have a 
significant negative impact on the ability of military personnel to make any meaning out 
of their combat experiences when they return to civilian life. This may well explain the 
difficulties facing so many Vietnam veterans. Veterans should feel that their military 
service during wartime served a purpose. They should especially feel that the war’s 
purpose justified the inevitable loss of life that comes with war. 
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The next interview question asked the study participants which personal 
attributes enabled them to overcome adversity during combat operations. Some experts 
consider resilience to be an individual trait that is fixed and stable while others consider 
resilience to be dynamic and changeable over time (Lee et al., 2013). The leadership 
literature uses the terms trait and attribute interchangeably. The trait perspective guided 
most leadership research until the middle of the 20th century. Based on scholarly 
reviews that questioned the efficacy of the trait perspective, many researchers 
abandoned the trait-based study of leadership. However, additional research conducted 
in the 1980s showed that the refutation of trait-based leadership models lacked 
satisfactory empirical grounding (Zaccaro, 2007). The results of this study suggest that 
the following three attributes enable military leaders to personally overcome adversity 
during combat operations: 
1. Educated and trained 
2. Physically fit 
3. Belief in God 
The identification of these three attributes as enablers in the process of overcoming 
adversity provides support for the idea that the resilience process begins at a point of 
biopsychospiritual homeostasis (Richardson, 2002). In this case, homeostasis refers to 
the stable state of equilibrium between the interdependent elements of mental, physical, 
and spiritual well-being. 
There is a positive relationship between efficacy and resilience (Lee et al., 2013). 
The pursuit of expert knowledge is an intrinsic factor that motivates military leaders 
(Kolditz, 2005; Snider, 2012). Professional education and training for military leaders 
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includes both institutional training provided by the military services and additional self-
study reading on the topic of war. When the nation is not at war, military units are busy 
training for war. Institutional training, conducted by military schools and units, ensures 
that individuals and units are competent on the battlefield. Just as importantly however, 
military training also provides the individual service member with confidence in 
themselves, their unit, and their leaders. Self-study reading about war adds additional 
competence and confidence. Self-study reading about war is a necessary augment to 
institutional training for military leaders. Reading about war can specifically help leaders 
understand the nature of war and the many causes of adversity on the battlefield. 
Reading about military history and combat is about as close as one can get to actual 
combat experience without being there. The combination of competence and 
confidence provided by military training and self-study reading enables military 
personnel, especially leaders, to overcome adversity in combat. 
There is a causal relationship between fitness and resilience (Meredith et al., 
2011). Military personnel should approach physical fitness with the same sense of 
seriousness that professional athletes do. Military fitness training should be both 
functional and rigorous. Functional fitness training seeks to accurately replicate the 
demands of the combat environment on the battlefield. For example, building strength to 
carry heavy combat loads over significant distances. The intent of rigorous physical 
training is to build the endurance needed for continuous combat operations lasting 
weeks or even months. In addition to providing aerobic, anaerobic, and strength 
benefits, military physical training also builds a tolerance for adversity by conditioning 
both the body and the mind to push beyond previously established limits without 
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quitting. Physical fitness not only encourages resilience, physical fitness is indeed a 
requirement for overcoming adversity in combat. 
Spirituality is a factor that contributes to resilience (Connor & Davidson, 2003; 
Peterson et al., 2011). Several of the participants in this study were eager to name their 
belief in the Christian God as a factor that contributed to their personal resilience. Active 
duty military officers rarely discuss their personal religious beliefs. However, since these 
study participants have since retired from active duty, some were willing to talk about 
the importance of their religious beliefs. Belief in God, or another higher power, can 
provide military leaders with additional confidence to lead men into battle. Praying to 
God, or any other form of appropriate dialogue with a higher power, can provide a 
sense not being alone with command responsibilities. 
The final interview question supporting research question one asked what 
leadership skills enabled the study participants to overcome adversity during combat 
operations. The study participants noted that their demonstration of these leadership 
skills also enabled their subordinates across the organization to overcome adversity in 
combat. The results of this study suggest that the five leadership skills that enable 
military leaders and their organizations to overcome adversity during combat operations 
are: 
1. Winning subordinates’ affection 
2. Demonstrating character 
3. Sharing in the danger 
4. Being calm and confident 
5. Keeping subordinates informed 
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Military leaders can win their subordinate’s affection by showing genuine concern 
and building relationships with them. Genuine concern means having much more than a 
grudging appreciation or even sincere respect for subordinates. Genuine concern, as 
described by the participants in this study, approximates the love that a parent feels for 
their children. Despite concerns to the contrary, relationships between military leaders 
and their subordinates can be both personal and professional at the same time. The 
family analogy is applicable as well to building relationships. In the same way that a 
parent tries not to show favoritism to one child over another, so too must the military 
leader be careful to “love” all his or her subordinates equally. Military leaders should 
strive to “get to know” their subordinates on a personal level. Not every decision that a 
military leader makes is going to be popular. This is especially true in a combat 
situation. Shared affection enables leaders to overcome the adversity that comes with 
making and enforcing tough decisions. Shared affection enables subordinates to 
overcome the adversity that comes with following orders without question. 
Character strengths boost the psychological functioning that personal adaptation 
to adversity requires (Boermans et al., 2012). The results of this study suggest that 
demonstrating the following character traits fosters resilience in military organizations: 
1. Moral Courage 
2. Honesty 
3. Humility 
4. Empathy 
Moral courage in combat can take several forms. Applying the laws of land warfare 
uniformly and justly requires moral courage. For example, military leaders routinely 
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confront the issues of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality on the 
battlefield. Military necessity refers to attacking only legitimate military targets that are 
necessary to defeat the enemy. Distinction refers to distinguishing civilians from 
combatants on the battlefield and taking reasonable steps to ensure their safety. 
Proportionality refers to using only the force necessary to achieve the military results 
required to accomplish the mission. For military leaders, moral courage also includes 
putting your unit and your mission above yourself. It the simplest of terms, it means 
doing the right thing just because it is the right thing to do. The demonstration of moral 
courage by leaders fosters resilience in military organizations. 
Humility is another specific character strength of leaders that fosters resilience. 
Humility in the military is about being introspective and admitting when there are 
problems. Humility is the lack of hubris and the willingness to listen to others. Humility is 
recognizing that you may not have all the answers all the time. Honesty is another 
specific character strength of leaders that fosters resilience. In the military, honesty is 
not just about telling the truth. Honesty in the military is also about being authentic. The 
inordinate amount of time that military personnel spend with each other during combat 
operations quickly exposes behaviors that are not authentic. Military leaders should 
present their authentic selves to their subordinates well prior to a combat deployment. 
Military leaders must also keep in mind that a reputation for honesty may take months to 
build but only minutes to destroy. Empathy is the fourth specific character strength of 
leaders that fosters resilience according to the participants in this study. Military leaders 
should have a sincere appreciation for the work that their subordinates are doing. One 
way to gain a full understanding of the challenges that subordinates face is to 
153 
occasionally share in their burdens. Working alongside of subordinates from time to 
time keeps military leaders grounded. The demonstration of empathy by leaders fosters 
resilience in military organizations. Collectively, the demonstration of moral courage, 
honesty, humility, and empathy constitute an essential military leadership skill that 
fosters resilience in military organizations. 
Military leaders are willing to share risks with their subordinates in combat 
(Kolditz, 2005). It is important for military personnel to know that their leaders are willing 
to share in that danger with them. Leading from the front in the military is about the 
leader being at those places most likely to make enemy contact. Leading from the front 
shows a willingness to share in the danger with subordinates. Once the unit becomes 
engaged with the enemy, the leader of the unit should make every attempt to “go to the 
sound of the guns”. However, as military leaders gain rank and assume command of 
larger units, their responsibilities become more wide-ranging. As the participants of this 
study pointed out, based on their experiences leading infantry battalions, it is not always 
possible to lead from the front of a large unit. Therefore, one of the most important 
decisions that a military leader makes is where to place himself or herself on the 
battlefield. When military leaders share in the danger with their subordinates, it fosters 
resilience in military organizations. 
Military personnel will experience powerlessness and ambiguity in the combat 
environment (Bartone, 2006). The battlefield is an uncontrollable environment and the 
resulting lack of control is a significant source of adversity. Although military leaders can 
exert some control over the actions of their own personnel and units, they cannot 
control the actions of the enemy. Despite having limited control, military leaders must 
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maintain personal calm through the chaos of combat. In doing so, military leaders 
project confidence and engender calm in their subordinates. Military leaders can also 
mitigate the loss of control that military personnel experience during combat operations 
by providing them with information. Fear of the unknown can be palpable. Not knowing 
what to expect is a source of adversity. Having at least some information provides a 
measure of control. Military leaders should keep their personnel informed. Providing 
information personally is most effective. When military leaders remain calm and 
confident in combat and keep their subordinates informed, they foster resilience in their 
military organizations. 
Research question 1 summary. Research question 1 asked: What current 
practices do military leaders employ to overcome adversity in their organizations? 
Military leaders build resilience in their organizations prior to a combat deployment. This 
study suggests that small unit training to build cohesion, creating a positive command 
climate, and instilling a sense of purpose are three practices that foster resilience in 
military organizations. Trust and mutual respect are the primary components of unit 
cohesion. The primary means of creating a positive command climate in a military 
organization are earn subordinates’ trust, maintain discipline, treat subordinates with 
respect, and have fun. 
Education and training, physically fitness, and belief in God are three attributes 
that enable military leaders to personally overcome adversity during combat operations. 
The five leadership skills that enable military leaders and their organizations to 
overcome adversity are winning subordinates’ affection, demonstrating character, 
sharing in the danger, being calm and confident, and keeping subordinates informed. 
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Demonstrating the character traits of moral courage, honesty, humility, and empathy 
also fosters resilience in military organizations. 
Results and discussion of research question 2. Research question two 
asked: What challenges do military leaders face in implementing those practices 
employed in overcoming adversity in their organizations? Boermans et al. (2012) 
previously noted that the military can develop organizational resilience by strengthening 
internal capacities and environmental resources. The researcher developed this 
research question with the intent of collecting data that might be beneficial to the 
development of future training interventions aimed at fostering resilience in military 
personnel. The first interview question supporting research question two asked what 
personal challenges the participants of this study faced implementing practices to 
overcome adversity during combat operations. The results of this study suggest that the 
two significant causes of adversity during combat operations for military leaders are 
commander responsibilities and sleep deprivation. Military leaders often refer to their 
responsibilities as the burden of command. Two specific responsibilities that cause 
adversity for military leaders during combat operations are decision-making and sending 
subordinates into harm’s way. 
Each decision that a person makes involves choosing a future path that is 
unfamiliar which creates ontological anxiety through fear of uncertainty and the potential 
for failure (Maddi, 2004). Military leaders are particularly aware of the results that may 
follow from making a wrong decision on the battlefield. Leaders in the military are 
responsible not only for their own decisions, but also for the decisions of their 
subordinates. The battlefield is a chaotic environment where having only limited 
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information with which to make important decisions is the norm. Nevertheless, military 
leaders must make tough decisions in a timely manner during combat. Having a 
competent supporting staff allows more people to participate in the decision-making 
process which can result in more informed decisions. 
Military leaders must be willing to accept casualties to accomplish their missions 
(Hannah et al., 2009). When military leaders send men into harm’s way in combat, 
casualties are not just possible, they are almost certain. Having to give orders in combat 
that will result in the death or severe injury of subordinates is a significant cause of 
adversity for military leaders. Mission accomplishment is the measure that military 
leaders must use to measure the success of combat operations. Casualties are both 
expected and accepted as a price for accomplishing the mission. 
Military leadership in combat requires an inordinate amount of energy, both 
physical and mental. The effects of stress and anxiety can sometimes make sleeping 
difficult. Lack of sleep is certain to negatively impact cognitive performance over time. 
Declines in cognitive performance will diminish the military leader’s decision-making 
abilities. In addition, military leaders that appear exhausted are likely to cause 
subordinates to lose confidence in the leader and the organization. Military leaders 
should be aware of their own physical limitations and pace themselves accordingly. 
Military leaders must ensure that both they and their subordinates are getting enough 
rest during combat operations. 
The next interview question asked participants how they personally overcame 
adversity during combat operations. The results of this study suggest that some 
additional practices used by military leaders to personally overcome adversity during 
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combat operations include focusing on the mission, not second-guessing decisions, and 
being with subordinates. The military services train their leaders to put mission 
accomplishment ahead of all other concerns, including the welfare of their subordinates. 
During combat operations, military leaders establish a battle rhythm, or routine, 
that enables them to stay focused on the mission at hand. Routine and momentum 
helps military leaders to overcome the adversity that accompanies the responsibility of 
command. Another practice that enabled military leaders to overcome adversity during 
combat operations is to not second-guess decisions. Not second-guessing decision, 
both good and bad, ensures that military leaders do not exasperate the ontological 
anxiety described previously by Maddi (2004). Military leaders must accept that not all 
decisions made by them and their subordinates are going to be good. Being with 
subordinates is another practice that helps military leaders overcome adversity during 
combat operations. Military leaders draw strength from their subordinates. Getting out of 
the command post to see the men and women that must withstand the worst of the 
battle keeps military leaders grounded. The collective martial virtue of a military unit in 
combat is an inspiration for military leaders. 
The next interview question asked the participants what challenges their 
organizations faced overcoming adversity during combat operations. The results of this 
study suggest that two additional causes of adversity during combat operations for both 
military leaders and their subordinates are false expectations and changes in mission. 
Military personnel must confront the brutality of war. This study suggests that having 
false expectations about encountering casualties and the requirement for killing are 
significant causes of adversity during combat operations. 
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Military personnel must prepare themselves to encounter casualties in combat, 
both friendly and enemy. Dead and severely wounded soldiers are a necessary part of 
the battlefield. Wounded or dead civilians are unfortunately sometimes also a part of the 
battlefield. Military leaders should anticipate that fear levels will rise once a unit starts 
taking and inflicting casualties. Leaders and their subordinates should also expect that 
“friendly fire” or other accidents will be the cause of some friendly casualties. Casualties 
that seem to have been preventable are especially difficult to rationalize and a 
significant cause of adversity during combat operations. 
False expectations about the requirement for killing are also predictable. Killing 
another person in a significant source of adversity for military personnel during combat 
operations. Taking human life can change a person forever. After military personnel 
experience the act of killing, it is the leader’s responsibility to ensure his or her 
subordinates can make meaning of the killing and maintain their humanity. The 
accidental killing of civilians is especially difficult for military leaders and their personnel 
to deal with and a significant cause of adversity during combat operations. 
Changing missions are a challenge on the battlefield and potential source of the 
ambiguity that Bartone (2006) has previously identified as a combat stressor. Military 
units must react quickly to changing circumstances on the complex battlefield. As a 
result, military units must embrace new and often unfamiliar tasks to accomplish their 
new missions. Having to operate disbursed in one example of a change in mission that 
the participants of this study experienced. Operating disbursed over great distances 
from other friendly units causes the isolation described by Bartone (2006). When 
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operating disbursed, junior leaders must take on more responsibility than they are 
accustomed to. 
Having to adapt to new Rules of Engagement (ROE) is another example of a 
change in mission that the participants of this study experienced. The purpose for ROE 
is to provide strict guidelines for when and how military personnel can engage the 
enemy with lethal force. It is common for the ROE to change after meeting certain 
military and political objectives. For example, after a war zone is turned over to civil 
authorities, they may permit the local population to carry weapons for self-protection. In 
this new situation, it becomes more difficult for military personnel now tasked with 
providing local security to determine friend from foe. This change in mission and the 
need to adhere to new ROE can be a significant source of adversity for military 
personnel. Adding to this adversity, scrutiny over whether military personnel have 
properly followed the ROE sometimes leads to official investigations that often result in 
serious penalties for convicted violators. 
The final interview question supporting research question two asked the 
participants how their organizations overcame adversity during combat operations. The 
results of this study suggest that some additional practices used by military leaders to 
help their organizations overcome adversity during combat operations include talking 
about casualties and killing, keeping the unit moving, and small unit leadership. Talking 
about casualties allows military personnel to vent their frustrations. Social support and 
self-disclosure to trusted and empathetic others help to derive meaning from traumatic 
events. Military leaders should personally spend time with subordinates that have 
recently experienced casualties and killing for the first time. In doing so, military leaders 
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may be able to provide some closure by talking about the experience and making 
meaning with their subordinates. 
Military leaders should remind their personnel that the loss of life during war is 
both expected and worthwhile to accomplish the mission. It is important that military 
leaders allow their personnel to vent their frustrations accordingly and respectfully after 
experiencing casualties and killing. Short appropriate memorial services can help 
facilitate the mourning process. Talking about killing soon thereafter permits military 
leaders to provide some absolution to personnel that might need it. This is especially 
important when the conduct of military operations results in the killing of innocent 
civilians. Keeping the unit moving after experiencing casualties and killing for the first 
time is another practice that helps to overcome adversity in military organizations. 
Military leadership, to include the small unit leadership of non-commissioned officers, 
provides the “purpose, direction, and motivation required to employ…effective and 
ethical combat power under intense, dynamic, and dangerous conditions” (Hannah, 
2012, p. 14). Military leaders must empower small unit leaders. Effective small unit 
leadership by non-commissioned officers is essential for military organizations to 
overcome adversity during combat operations. 
Research question 2 summary. Research question two asked: What 
challenges do military leaders face implementing those practices employed in 
overcoming adversity in their organizations? This study suggests that the two significant 
causes of adversity during combat operations for military leaders are commander 
responsibilities and sleep deprivation. Decision-making and sending subordinates into 
harm’s way are examples of commander responsibilities that cause adversity. Military 
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leadership in combat requires an inordinate amount of energy. The effects of stress and 
anxiety can sometimes make sleeping difficult. Lack of sleep negatively impacts 
cognitive performance over time. 
Two additional causes of adversity during combat operations for both military 
leaders and their subordinates are false expectations and changes in mission. Having 
false expectations about encountering casualties and the requirement for killing are 
significant causes of adversity. Military units must react quickly to changing 
circumstances on the complex battlefield. Military units must embrace new and often 
unfamiliar tasks to accomplish their new missions. Having to operate disbursed is one 
example of a change in mission that the participants of this study experienced. Having 
to adapt to new ROE is another example of a change in mission. 
Some additional practices used by military leaders to personally overcome 
adversity include focusing on the mission, not second-guessing decisions, and being 
with subordinates. Additional practices used by military leaders to help their 
organizations overcome adversity include talking about casualties and killing, keeping 
the unit moving, and small unit leadership. 
Results and discussion of research question 3. Research question three 
asked: How do military leaders measure their success at overcoming adversity in their 
organizations? The first interview question asked the participants how they prepared 
their organizations to overcome adversity during combat operations. The intent of this 
question was to collect data that might be beneficial to the development of future 
training interventions aimed at fostering resilience in military personnel. Resilience is 
critical for soldier mission readiness and must be a focus of training (Aude et al., 2014). 
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As noted by Clausewitz, military personnel and their commanders can counter the 
negative effects of friction [adversity] through both experience in combat and realistic 
training for combat (Watts, 2004). The participants of this study have already identified 
that small unit training to build cohesion is a practice that fosters resilience in military 
organizations. In response to this interview question, the participants now identified how 
they conducted that small unit training. The results of this study suggest that military 
leaders use the following three practices to prepare their organizations to overcome 
adversity during combat operations: 
1. Design realistic training that creates adversity. 
2. Design training that builds competence and confidence. 
3. Manage expectations about war. 
Military leaders should design training for their units that is both realistic and 
creates adversity. Realistic training for combat provides mental hardening against the 
effects of adversity. The purpose of realistic training is to replicate, as closely as 
possible, the physical conditions and mental stressors of the combat environment. To 
that end, the military services have created training environments at stateside military 
bases that replicate overseas locations. These training environments, complete with 
actors playing the parts of both enemy combatants and civilians on the battlefield, serve 
to immerse military personnel into the sights, sounds, and smells of the operating 
environment that they will deploy to. 
Realistic training also includes exposing military personnel to controlled risk. 
Exposing a person to controlled risk, instead of avoiding risk, may improve resilience 
(Rutter, 2006). Providing opportunities for military personnel to cope with stress and 
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even fail during training enables a steeling effect that develops toughness in the face of 
adversity (Seery, 2011). Realistic training that creates adversity allows military 
personnel to witness and assess their own reactions to stress as well as those of their 
peers and leaders. Designing realistic training that creates adversity is a practice that 
fosters resilience in military organizations. 
The training programs that military leaders design should also build competence 
and confidence in their personnel. The goals of individual and unit collective training 
should become progressively more challenging over time. Military organizations are 
quintessential learning organizations. Individual and unit competence is essential to 
success on the battlefield. Collective competence provides individual service men and 
women with the confidence they need to confront the challenges of combat. Confidence 
in turn, serves as a pathway to resilience (Luthans et al., 2006). Designing training that 
builds competence and confidence is a practice that fosters resilience in military 
organizations. 
Clausewitz explained that soldiers on the battlefield will witness “the heart-
rending spectacle of the dead and wounded” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 104). Managing 
expectations about war includes visualizing a realistic picture in your mind of what the 
battlefield will look like, sound like, and smell like. Visualization is about moving through 
the combat environment before getting there. Visualizing close combat and the 
casualties and killing that come with it before a deployment to combat prevents false 
expectations. Visualization prepares military personnel to withstand the initial shock of 
combat. Managing expectations about war is another practice that fosters resilience in 
military organizations. 
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The next interview question asked the participants how they assessed their 
organization’s readiness to overcome adversity during combat operations. As the 
participants in the study pointed out, assessing readiness to overcome adversity is 
mostly subjective. The results of this study suggest that military leaders primarily use 
commander’s intuition to assess readiness for overcoming adversity in their 
organizations. When assessing their organization’s readiness to overcome adversity, 
military leaders are looking for the indicators of unit cohesion, positive command 
climate, and a sense of purpose previously described in this study. Military leaders can 
use written surveys to assess the individual components of resilience. As noted by the 
participants of this study, some of them found command climate surveys to be helpful. 
However, since climate surveys only assess individual perceptions of command climate 
without assessing unit cohesion or sense of purpose, they are not a good indicator of 
the unit’s overall readiness to overcome adversity in combat. 
The military services should make additional options for measuring resilience 
available to military leaders. For example, the U.S. Army has developed the online GAT 
to measure psychosocial fitness in the emotional, social, family, spiritual, and physical 
domains (Lester et al., 2015). However, the Army only releases GAT profiles to 
individual soldiers and not to unit commanders (Peterson et al., 2011). The Army should 
consider compiling a collective unit GAT score for unit commanders to use as a tool to 
assess readiness for overcoming adversity in their organizations. The other military 
services should consider using the GAT to measure resilience as well. 
The next interview question asked the participants how they measured their 
organizations’ success at overcoming adversity during combat operations. The 
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participants in this study pointed out that overcoming adversity and getting past the first 
five days of combat are critical. The results of this study suggest that staying calm under 
fire and not descending into self-pity are the metrics that military leaders can use to 
measure their organizations’ success at overcoming adversity, particularly during those 
first five days. As noted previously in this study, military leaders can prepare their 
subordinates to stay calm under fire by designing realistic training that creates 
adversity, designing training that builds competence and confidence, and managing 
expectations about war. Military leaders can prepare their subordinates not to descend 
into self-pity by employing small unit training to build cohesion, creating a positive 
command climate, and instilling a sense of purpose. 
Research question 3 summary. Research question 3 asked: How do military 
leaders measure their success at overcoming adversity in their organizations? Design 
realistic training that creates adversity, design training that builds competence and 
confidence, and managing expectations about war are three practices that military 
leaders use to prepare their organizations to overcome adversity during combat 
operations. Realistic training for combat provides mental hardening against the effects 
of adversity. The training programs that military leaders design should also build 
competence and confidence in their personnel. The goals of individual and unit 
collective training should become progressively more challenging over time. Collective 
competence provides individual service men and women with the confidence they need 
to confront the challenges of combat. Visualization is about creating a realistic picture in 
your mind of what the battlefield will look like, sound like, and smell like. Visualization 
prepares military personnel to withstand the initial shock of combat. 
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Assessing readiness to overcome adversity is mostly subjective. Military leaders 
primarily use commander’s intuition to assess readiness for overcoming adversity. 
When assessing their organization’s readiness to overcome adversity, military leaders 
are looking for indicators of unit cohesion, positive command climate, and a sense of 
purpose. Military leaders can also use written surveys to assess the individual 
components of resilience. Staying calm under fire and not descending into self-pity are 
the metrics that military leaders can use to measure their organizations’ success at 
overcoming adversity during combat. 
Results and discussion of research question 4. Research question 4 asked: 
What recommendations would military leaders make to aspiring leaders wanting to 
overcome adversity in their organizations in the future? The first interview question 
asked the participants what they learned from their experience overcoming adversity 
during combat operations that they wished they had known prior to their combat 
deployments. The participants in this study explained that most of the personnel that 
they took to war were quite able to overcome the adversity of combat. They also 
admitted that a few of their personnel were unable to overcome combat related 
adversity. A summary of their recommendations for future leaders follows. 
The military services might consider screening applicants prior to enlistment or 
commissioning for those character traits that might negatively influence a person’s 
ability to overcome stress during combat operations. Studies have shown that character 
traits such as neuroticism, cynicism, and emotional exhaustion correlate negatively to 
resilience and hardiness (Lo Bue et al., 2013; Skomorovsky & Stevens, 2013). Studies 
have also shown that hardiness and resilience are predictors of success during military 
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training (Bartone et al., 2008; Bartone et al., 2013; Hystad et al., 2011; Johnsen et al., 
2013). Hardiness and resilience levels in new military recruits will obviously. Some 
people will be more resilient because of youthful experiences. Some people will 
encounter “problems” during their youth that will either result in PTSD at the time or 
potentially predispose them for PTSD later in life. 
The military services should consider reviewing and strengthening any policies 
and procedures that allow for the identification of personnel susceptible to stress during 
entry-level basic training for new recruits. Military boot camps are well known for 
introducing new recruits to tough and realistic training and the inevitable stress that 
comes with it. The imagination of drill instructors is almost limitless when it comes to 
“stressing out” new recruits to test their mettle. If identified early during boot camp 
training, the military services should have the option to separate those personnel that 
are more susceptible to stress. The military services should facilitate this same 
screening process in units conducting pre-deployment combat training. If leaders 
identify “stress-susceptible” personnel during pre-deployment combat training with their 
units, the military should provide additional training to these service members or assign 
them to units not likely to engage in direct combat. 
Based on their life experiences, some people are going to be more resilient than 
others (Rutter, 2006; Seely, 2011). Military leaders face the challenge of monitoring 
personnel for the negative effects of stress during the combat deployment. Complicating 
this task, this study has shown that experienced personnel will sometimes refuse to 
admit that they are having problems at all with stress. Just like professional athletes, 
military personnel will sometimes insist on playing hurt. To be effective at identifying 
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personnel that are having difficulties with stress, military leaders must work closely with 
their supporting medical personnel to properly identify developing stress issues. 
Once returned from combat, the military services should seek to keep combat 
units together for as long as possible. Current military personnel manning policies 
necessitate the transfers of large numbers of personnel, particularly key leaders, to 
other units and assignments following a combat deployment. The commanders 
interviewed for this study consistently referred to this practice as “breaking up the units”. 
Previous research has shown that social support is a key enabler for the recognition, 
prevention, and care of stress (Cacioppo et al., 2011). Social support continues as a 
factor that influences resilience after military personnel return from deployments (Eisen 
et al., 2014). 
Just as building unit cohesion prior to a combat deployment fosters resilience in 
military personnel, maintaining unit cohesion after a combat deployment continues to 
foster resilience in those same personnel. Military personnel come to know and trust 
their comrades in a combat unit and they take care of each other. Cohesive units will 
band together to help take care of those experiencing issues with stress after a 
deployment. According to the participants of this study, in the waning years of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps did initiate a policy of keeping personnel in 
their combat units three months after returning from deployment. The other military 
services should take note of this lesson learned by the Marine Corps. More importantly, 
the military services should not forget this lesson when the next war starts. 
The participants in this study indicated that service members are reluctant to ask 
for help with combat related stress issues. Military leaders must also keep in mind that 
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traumatic brain injury and other issues to include alcohol and prescription drug abuse 
often confound combat related stress issues. The military services must provide its 
leaders with training on how to recognize the signs and symptoms of these complicated 
mental health problems. Relying on service member to self-report issues with stress is 
not realistic and most certainly leads to unattended problems. 
Providing opportunities for military personnel to talk about their combat 
experience is imperative for the process of making meaning out war. Talking about 
those experiences with others that have also “been there” seems to make sense. In this 
regard, discharged veterans may be quite helpful to active duty personnel and the 
military services should look for ways to engage their active duty personnel with the 
veteran community. Providing post-deployment mental health services to families is a 
responsibility that the military services must embrace. Family members also endure 
stress because of their loved-one’s wartime deployments and experiences. Helping 
family members is pragmatic because it also helps the service member. 
Transitioning completely out of the military service exasperates the loss of unit 
cohesion for those personnel returning to civilian life. As noted in the study, is was not 
unusual for the military to discharge a service member from active duty within 30 days 
of returning from a combat deployment. PTSD might manifest in those individuals that 
have recently lost the organizational support that they had previously relied on to remain 
resilient. In the recent war, veterans returned to civilian communities that were relatively 
or even completely “untouched” by the war. It is reasonable to say that the expression 
“thank you for your service” has become cliché and carries less meaning that it did at 
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the start of the recent long wars. The military services should prepare veterans to deal 
with the feelings of alienation or isolation that may result when they leave the military. 
Veterans organizations such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American 
Legion may be able to replace some of the organizational support that service members 
lose when they leave active duty. Although mostly filled with older veterans from 
America’s previous wars, these veterans’ organizations should look for opportunities 
bring the new generation of post-911 veterans into their fold. In addition to brick-and-
mortar organizations, several online veterans’ organizations have appeared in recent 
years. These organizations, while popular with tech-savvy younger veterans, cannot 
provide the face-to-face support that service members are accustomed to. 
The final interview question asked the participants what recommendations they 
would make to aspiring military leaders wanting to prepare their organizations to 
overcome adversity during combat operations. The participants uniformly recommended 
that aspiring commanders implement the practices for fostering resilience identified by 
interview question one. Those practices include: small unit training to build unit 
cohesion, creating a positive command climate, and instilling a sense of purpose prior to 
deploying to combat. The participants also recommended the leadership skills and 
practices identified by interview question three which include: winning subordinates’ 
affection, demonstrating character, sharing in the danger, being calm and confident, and 
keeping subordinates informed. 
Research question 4 summary. Research question 4 asked: What 
recommendations would military leaders make to aspiring leaders wanting to overcome 
adversity in their organizations in the future? The military services might consider 
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screening applicants prior to enlistment or commissioning for those character traits that 
might negatively influence a person’s ability to overcome stress during combat 
operations. The military services should have the option to separate those personnel 
that are more susceptible to stress. The military services should facilitate this same 
screening process in units conducting pre-deployment combat training. 
Military leaders face the challenge of monitoring personnel for the negative 
effects of stress during the combat deployment. Military leaders must work closely with 
their supporting medical personnel to properly identify developing stress issues. Once 
returned from combat, the military services should seek to keep combat units together 
for as long as possible. Maintaining unit cohesion after a combat deployment continues 
to foster resilience in those same personnel. Service members are reluctant to ask for 
help with combat related stress issues. The military services must provide its leaders 
with training on how to recognize the signs and symptoms of stress. Providing 
opportunities for military personnel to talk about their combat experience is imperative 
for the process of making meaning. Providing post-deployment mental health services 
to families is a responsibility that the military services must embrace. 
Transitioning completely out of the military service exasperates the loss of unit 
cohesion for those personnel returning to civilian life. The military services should 
prepare veterans to deal with the feelings of alienation or isolation that may result when 
they leave the military. Veterans organizations such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
and the American Legion may be able to replace some of the organizational support 
that service members lose when they leave active duty. The online veterans’ 
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organizations have appeared in recent years cannot provide the face-to-face support 
that service members are accustomed to. 
Key Findings 
Many of the findings from this research study are new and add to the existing body of 
knowledge on military resilience. Those key findings that add to the literature are: 
 The three personal attributes that enable military leaders to overcome 
adversity during combat operations are educated and trained, physically fit, 
and belief in God. 
 The primary practice employed to build cohesion in military organizations is 
small unit training specifically. 
 Trust and mutual respect are the primary components of unit cohesion and 
the enablers of teamwork in military organizations. 
 Instilling a sense of purpose is one of three organizational factors that 
influences resilience in military organizations. The other two are small unit 
training to build cohesion and creating a positive command climate. 
 The four primary components of creating a positive command climate in 
military organizations are earn their trust, maintain discipline, treat 
subordinates with respect, and have fun. 
 The leadership practices that foster resilience in military organizations are 
winning subordinates’ affection, demonstrating character, sharing in the 
danger, being calm and confident, and keeping subordinates informed. 
 The primary components of demonstrating character in military organizations 
are moral courage, humility, honesty, and empathy. 
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Implications of the Study 
When military personnel face a demanding event such as combat, they go 
through an appraisal and coping process (Britt, Sinclair et al., 2013). Both personal and 
organizational factors influence this appraisal and coping process (Boermans et al., 
2012; Britt, Sinclair et al., 2013). Examples of individual factors that can encourage 
resilience in the military include “positive coping, positive affect, positive thinking, 
realism, behavioral control, physical fitness, and altruism” (Meredith et al., 2011, p. 16). 
Examples of organizational factors that can support resilience include positive 
command climate, morale, teamwork, unit cohesion, and other social facets (Boermans 
et al., 2012; Britt & Oliver, 2013; Meredith et al., 2011). 
Past research has also described resilience variables as being either a risk factor 
or a protective factor (Lee et al., 2013). Examples of risk factors include anxiety, 
depression, and perceived stress. Examples of protective factors include optimism, 
social support, and self-efficacy. Protective factors have shown the largest correlation 
with resilience and therefore indicate that resilience improves more effectively by 
enhancing protective factors than reducing risk factors (Lee et al., 2013). This leader 
practices for fostering resilience identified in this study are both organizational and 
protective. 
If military leaders employ the practices for fostering resilience identified in this 
study, then their subordinates may be able to cope more effectively with the stressful 
experience of combat. In addition, by enabling military personnel to better overcome 
adversity, active duty service members and veterans might exhibit fewer mental health 
problems because of their experiences in war. To these ends, the military services 
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could use these findings to improve their institutional leader training programs for both 
enlisted personnel and officers. The military services might also take into consideration 
a leader’s level of personal resilience as a criterion for assignment to combat units or 
promotion to greater positions of responsibility. The military services could measure 
levels of personal resilience in using the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (Connor & 
Davidson, 2003) or the U.S. Army’s Global Assessment Tool (Peterson et al., 2011). 
The ability of military leaders to foster resilience in their organizations may also 
impact operational readiness and combat effectiveness. If military leaders can increase 
the capacity of their organizations to overcome adversity during combat, then the 
likelihood of success on the battlefield may also increase. The military services might 
use these findings to improve their existing pre-deployment training programs or 
develop new training programs for military units deploying to combat. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This study of military resilience also has implications for leadership studies in 
general and change leadership specifically. Diane Coutu (2002), writing for Harvard 
Business Review, brought the idea of resilience to the attention of professionals outside 
of the mental health community. Coutu’s review of resilience theories identified three 
common characteristics of resilient people. Resilient people accept reality; resilient 
people believe that life has meaning; and resilient people can adapt and improvise in 
response to change. Warren Bennis (2007) concluded that, “adaptive capacity or 
resilience is the single most important quality in a leader or in anyone else for that 
matter who hopes to lead a healthy, meaningful life” (p. 5). 
As noted by (McManus et al., 2008), translating the concept of resilience into a 
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working construct for organizations is complicated. Organizational resilience is new to 
management thinking (McAslan, 2010) and the concept of organizational resilience has 
remained mostly ambiguous and undefined (Burnard & Bhamra, 2011). Friery (2012) 
suggested that since gradual exposure to adversity enables individuals to develop 
coping skills, regular exposure to adversity for organizations may enable the 
development of coping skills at the organizational level. As we know from the preceding 
study, resilience manifests behaviorally as “recovering quickly from setbacks, shock, 
injuries, adversity, and stress while maintaining a mission and organizational focus” 
(Aude et al., 2014, p. 47). It would be reasonable to describe organizational change as 
being about setbacks, shock, injuries, adversity, and stress. Maintaining a mission and 
organizational focus is certainly a goal during a change initiative. Luthans (2002b) 
described resiliency as the “positive psychological capacity to rebound, to ‘bounce back’ 
from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure or even positive change, progress, and 
increased responsibility” (p. 702). The goals of any change initiative are likely to include 
positive change, progress, and increased responsibility. 
If we can discern how military leaders foster resilience in their organizations, then 
we may be able to determine how the leaders of other types of organizations might be 
able to foster resilience as well. With minor modifications, the taxonomy of leader 
practice for fostering resilience described above may be of use to leaders in many types 
of organizations. A recommendation for future research is to determine if a leader’s 
ability to foster resilience in an organization contributes either directly or indirectly to the 
leader’s ability to lead change in an organization. The results of this study could serve 
as a starting point for applying what we know about overcoming adversity in military 
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organizations to other types of organizations. 
Final Thoughts 
It may be surprising to those who have not served in the military that despite 
exposure to traumatic events, most military personnel do not develop mental health 
problems after experiencing the trauma of combat (Bonanno et al., 2012; Hystad et al., 
2015; Seligman & Fowler, 2011; Sinclair et al., 2013). Certainly then, military leaders 
must be doing an excellent job of fostering resilience in their organizations. This 
research sought to figure out how they are doing exactly that. In doing so, I took a 
positive psychology approach to determining the how of fostering resilience. As 
explained earlier, positive psychology focuses on positive experiences, positive 
individual traits, and positive institutions (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). As 
explained by Luthans (2002b), positive psychology aims to “shift the emphasis away 
from what is wrong with people to what is right with people” (p. 697). This approach 
worked quite well for the purposes of this study. Military leaders are fostering resilience 
in their organizations. Of course, they can always do better and this study is an attempt 
to help future leaders do just that. 
Will this study be in vain? Mancini and Bonanno (2009) expressed doubts as to 
whether resilience-building interventions are effective, because according to them, the 
predictors of resilience are mostly stable and therefore not easily changed. I disagree 
wholeheartedly. Military leaders can and do foster resilience in their subordinates. How 
is this possible? Consider the work of Zaccaro (2007). He proposed a model of traits 
and leadership that categorized leader attributes as being either distal or proximal. The 
less malleable distal attributes are cognitive abilities, personality, motives, and values. 
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Resilience would fall into this category. On the other hand, proximal attributes include 
social appraisal skills, problem-solving skills, experience, and tacit knowledge. Leader 
training programs usually seek to influence proximal attributes because they are easier 
to change and therefore more disposed to intervention. 
However, as Zaccaro (2007) points out, some long-term systematic interventions, 
like those found in military training programs, can positively affect the development of 
distal attributes as well. The training programs described by the military commanders 
that participated in this study were long-term and systematic. They designed their 
training programs specifically to build confidence, competence, and most importantly, 
unit cohesion. All three of these goals support the fostering of resilience in military 
organizations. The results of this study show that resilience is a trait that is amenable to 
long-term and systemic intervention. 
Some have surmised that the idea of teaching resilience skills might “lead some 
people to overestimate their own coping ability or to underestimate the level of distress 
they might experience in response to a potential psychological hazard such as combat” 
(Bonanno et al., 2011, p. 527). This may be true, but does it really matter? I suppose 
the implication is that if people overestimated their own ability to overcome adversity, 
they might inadvertently take on more stress than they can handle in combat. My 
experience in combat is that military personnel do not get a choice in how much 
adversity they take on. Combat serves up stress at every corner. Military personnel do 
not have the option to pass on their fair share. 
Military leaders understand that combat is stressful and potentially traumatic. 
Moreover, they recognize their responsibility to foster resilience in their organizations. 
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Fostering resilience in subordinates is transformational leadership at its best. The 
practices for fostering resilience identified in this study are the vehicles for the idealized 
influence, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration that Bass 
(1999) refers to in his explanation of how leaders move both themselves and their 
followers beyond self-interest. 
My research on overcoming adversity in military organizations has opened my 
eyes to see just how transformational most military leaders are. Indeed, the military 
services are quintessential examples of transformational organizations. According to 
Bass (1999), transformational organizations establish policies and practices that 
empower employees and encourage morale. Transformational organizations provide 
meaning to their employees’ lives and work. As a result, employees come into 
alignment with the leader and the organization. This alignment promotes collective 
efficacy and effectiveness in the organization (Bass, 1999). This describes every 
military organization that I served in over twenty years. 
The transformational leaders that I worked for helped me to land in the category 
of more than 90% of military personnel who experienced the trauma of close combat but 
did not develop chronic post-traumatic stress. I am proud to say that the 
transformational leadership that I provided to others served most of them well. For those 
that I served with that are still struggling to cope with the trauma of combat stress, I wish 
you all the blessings that you surely deserve and pray that you let God help you cope 
with, and hopefully overcome the adversity that has left its mark on you. 
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APPENDIX B: 
Invitation to Participate in the Study 
Dear (Participant name), 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in a voluntary study in association with the Doctor 
of Education in Organizational Leadership (EDOL) program at Pepperdine University’s 
Graduate School of Education and Psychology. The purpose of this research study is to 
identify leadership strategies and practices for overcoming adversity in military 
organizations. Your participation in the study is voluntary and confidentiality will be 
maintained to your satisfaction. Participation entails a no longer than 60 minute 
interview. Interview questions and an informed consent form are attached. Please 
review this in advance of the interview. Your participation in this study will be extremely 
valuable to new and current military leaders, as well as other scholars and practitioners 
in the field. 
 
Please respond to this message if you are willing to be interviewed as part of this study. 
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APPENDIX C: 
Informed Consent 
PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY 
Graduate School of Education and Psychology 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 
 
 
FOSTERING RESILIENCE: LEADER STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES FOR 
OVERCOMING ADVERSITY IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted Mr. Gene Coughlin, a 
doctoral student at Pepperdine University. You were carefully selected because of your 
classification as a former Marine Corps officer that commanded an infantry battalion in a 
war zone in Iraq or Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. Your participation is voluntary. 
You should read the information below, and ask questions about anything that you do 
not understand, before deciding whether to participate. Please take as much time as 
you need to read the consent form. You may also decide to discuss participation with 
your family or friends. You will be given a copy of this form for you records. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this research study was to identify leadership strategies and practices 
for overcoming adversity in military organizations. This entailed determining what 
challenges military leaders face in implementing practices employed in overcoming 
adversity in their organizations. Also examined was how military leaders measure 
success at overcoming adversity in their organizations. Finally, this study considered 
what recommendations military leaders would make to aspiring leaders wanting to 
overcome adversity in their organizations in the future. 
 
STUDY PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an 
approximately 60-minute interview. 
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The following interview protocol will be used: 
 
Interview Protocol 
 
Ice breaker: Tell me a little about your career 
 
Question 1: What current practices did you employ to overcome adversity during 
combat operations in your military organization? 
 
Question 2: What personal attributes enabled you to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
 
Question 3: What leadership skills enabled you to overcome adversity during combat 
operations in your military organization? 
 
Question 4: What personal challenges did you face implementing practices to overcome 
adversity during combat operations in your military organization? 
 
Question 5: How did you overcome those personal challenges during combat 
operations? 
 
Question 6: What challenges did your organization face overcoming adversity during 
combat operations? 
 
Question 7: How did your organization overcome those challenges during combat 
operations? 
 
Question 8: How did you prepare your organization to overcome adversity during 
combat operations? 
 
Question 9: How did you assess your organizations readiness to overcome adversity 
during combat operations? 
 
Question 10: How did you measure your organization’s success at overcoming 
adversity during combat operations? 
 
Question 11: Is there anything that you have learned from your experience in 
overcoming adversity that you wish you knew prior to your organization’s deployment 
for combat operations? 
 
Question 12: How would you recommend that aspiring military leaders prepare their 
organizations to overcome adversity during combat operations? 
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POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
Potentials risks may include the following: feeling uncomfortable with certain questions, 
fatigue, and boredom. Another risk to study participants was the potential disclosure of 
privileged internal policies and procedures belonging to the military organizations in 
which they served. 
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
While there are no direct benefits to the study participants, the practical benefits to 
society includes: 
 
1. The practical importance of this study is that finding protective factors, such as leader 
practices and strategies for overcoming adversity, may help military personnel cope with 
the stressful experiences of combat. 
 
2. The conclusions of this study may be useful for improving leader selection and 
development programs in the military. 
 
3. Developing an understanding how military leaders foster resilience in their 
organizations could be of substantial value for civilian organizations such as fire or 
police departments. 
 
4. This contextual study of military leader strategies and practices may also provide a 
more thorough understanding of leadership in general. 
 
In addition, upon your request, a completed copy of this study will be provided to you. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
I will keep your records for this study confidential as far as permitted by law. Your 
responses will be coded with a pseudonym and transcription data will be maintained 
separately. However, if I am required to do so by law, I may be required to disclose 
information collected about you. Examples of the types of issues that would require me 
to break confidentiality are if you tell me about instances of child abuse and elder 
abuse. Pepperdine’s University’s Human Subjects Protection Program (HSPP) may also 
access the data collected. The HSPP occasionally reviews and monitors research 
studies to protect the rights and welfare of research subjects. 
 
The interview audio-tapes and notes will be destroyed one week after the final defense 
of the dissertation before the candidate’s faculty doctoral committee. The data will be 
stored on the hard drive of a password-protected computer in the candidate’s place of 
residence. A backup copy of the data will be stored on the candidate’s password-
protected Carbonite cloud-based data storage service. The data will be stored for a 
minimum of three years. Any identifiable information obtained in connection with this 
study will remain confidential. 
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PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
Your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss 
of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may withdraw your consent at any 
time and discontinue participation without penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, 
rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study. 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO FULL PARTICIPATION 
The alternative to participation in the study is not participating or completing only the 
items which you feel comfortable. Should you chose this alternative, your relationship 
with your employer will not be affected whether you participate or not in this study. 
 
EMERGENCY CARE AND COMPENSATION FOR INJURY 
 
If you are injured as a direct result of research procedures you will receive medical 
treatment; however, you or your insurance will be responsible for the cost. Pepperdine 
University does not provide any monetary compensation for injury 
 
INVESTIGATOR’S CONTACT INFORMATION 
 
I understand that the investigator is willing to answer any inquiries I may have 
concerning the research herein described. I understand that I may contact Mr. Gene 
Coughlin at eugene.coughlin@pepperdine.edu if I have any other questions or concerns 
about this research. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, 
contact Dr. Judy Ho, Chairperson of the Graduate & Professional School Institutional 
Review Board (GPS IRB) at Pepperdine University, via email at gpsirb@pepperdine.edu 
or at 310-568-5753. 
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT – IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
 
If you have questions, concerns or complaints about your rights as a research 
participant or research in general please contact Dr. Judy Ho, Chairperson of the 
Graduate & Professional Schools Institutional Review Board at Pepperdine University 
6100 Center Drive Suite 500, Los Angeles, CA 90045, 310-568-5753 or 
gpsirb@pepperdine.edu. 
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APPENDIX D: 
Research Questions and Corresponding Interview Questions 
Research Questions Interview Questions 
 
RQ1: What current 
practices did you 
employ to overcome 
adversity during combat 
operations in your 
military organizations? 
 
 
IQ1: What practices did you employ to overcome adversity during 
combat operations in your military organization? 
 
IQ2: What personal attributes enabled you to overcome adversity 
during combat operations in your military organization? 
 
IQ3: What leadership skills enabled you to overcome adversity 
during combat operations in your military organization? 
 
RQ2: What challenges 
do military leaders face 
in implementing those 
practices employed in 
overcoming adversity in 
their organizations? 
 
IQ4: What personal challenges did you face implementing 
practices to overcome adversity during combat operations in your 
military organization? 
 
IQ5: How did you overcome those personal challenges during 
combat operations? 
 
IQ6: What challenges did your organization face overcoming 
adversity during combat operations? 
 
IQ7: How did your organization overcome those challenges during 
combat operations? 
 
RQ3: How do military 
leaders measure their 
success at overcoming 
adversity in their 
organizations? 
 
IQ8: How did you prepare your organization to overcome adversity 
during combat operations? 
 
IQ9: How did you assess your organization readiness to overcome 
adversity during combat operations? 
 
IQ10: How did you measure your organization’s success at 
overcoming diversity during combat operations? 
 
RQ4: What 
recommendations 
would military leaders 
make to aspiring 
leaders wanting to 
overcome adversity in 
their organizations in 
the future? 
 
IQ11: Is there anything that you have learned from your 
experience in overcoming adversity that you wish you knew prior 
to your organization’s deployment for combat operations? 
 
IQ12: How would you recommend that aspiring military leaders 
prepare their organizations to overcome adversity during combat 
operations? 
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APPENDIX E: 
Practices That Foster a Culture of Resilience in a Military Organization 
 
Three Foundational Practices for Fostering Resilience in Military Organizations 
Build cohesion by conducting small unit training 
Cohesion is about trust and mutual respect among peers 
Create a positive command climate 
Earn trust, enforce discipline, show respect, and have fun 
Instill a sense of purpose 
Purpose answers the question “what are we fighting for and why” 
Five Pre-deployment Practices for Fostering Resilience in Military Organizations 
Demonstrate character to subordinates 
Demonstrate moral courage, humility, empathy, and honesty 
Win the affection of subordinates 
Show concern and build personal relationships 
Design training that builds competence and confidence 
Functional training makes people better at their job 
Provide realistic training that creates adversity 
Scenario-based training prepares people for the operating environment 
Manage expectations about war 
Visualize the worst-case scenarios and get mentally prepared for them 
Eight Deployment Practices for Fostering Resilience in Military Organizations 
Share in the danger with subordinates 
Identify the friction points and be there alongside your people 
Be calm and confident on the battlefield 
Always be the experienced professional, do not get emotional 
Focus on the mission 
Do not lose sight of the task at hand or the final objective, do not become distracted 
Do not second-guess decisions 
Both you and your subordinates are going to make some bad decisions 
Talk about the casualties and killing 
Bad things will happen, talk about them when they do 
Keep the unit moving after casualties and killing 
Determine the next action and start working on it, maintain momentum 
Keep subordinates informed 
Information prevents fear of the unknown, get face-to-face with your people and talk 
Empower small unit leaders 
Demand leadership from everyone up and down the chain of command 
